1. ' The appellant purchased the disputed property in May, 1974. At that time the respondent was the tenant of the disputed shop and after the transfer he paid rent to the appellant up to October, 1975.
2. Thereafter as no rent was paid the appellant filed ejectment application on 7-5-1976 on the ground of default in payment of rent. The respondent pleaded that the appellant had not served any notice under section 13-A and further that the address of the appellant was not available with him and he being an old man of 70 years remained sick and could not remit the rent and as the appellant used to come and collect the rent and did not turn up during this period the rent could not be paid. The learned Controller held that as rent had been paid after purchase of the property the plea of want of notice under section 13-A was not sustainable and on ground of default the application was granted. The respondent filed first appeal and the learned lower Appellate Court by the impugned judgment held that as the respondent was sick and did not have the address of the appellant sufficient cause has been made out for exercise of discretion in favour of the respondent and the appeal was allowed.
3. ' Mr. P.A. Gazdar, the learned Advocate for the appellant has challenged the impugned judgment only on one ground namely, that the first lower Appellate Court did not have the jurisdiction to exercise the discretion vested in the Controller. The first lower Appellate Court while deciding the appeal can exercise all powers conferred on the A Controller under section 13 of Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. There can be no dispute with this proposition. Mr. Abdul Majid the learned counsel for the respondent has cited PLD 1982 Kar. 180 where the appellate Court in a second appeal has exercised its discretion in favour of the tenant. Although Mr. Gazdar has not challenged the finding of the First Appellate Court Mr. Majid the learned counsel has contended that on the basis of the evidence on record the First Appellate Court has taken a view in favour of the respondent and unless it is perverse or arbitrary the second Appellate Court should not take a different view even if such a view is possible on assessment of evidence. The learned counsel has referred to 1980 CLC 443. The statement of law propounded by the learned counsel is correct. In the circumstances I do not find any ground to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned First Appellate Court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. .