' ABDUR RASHID (MEMBER).-- The appellant, who was at the relevant time an Assistant Accounts Officer (since retired), was aggrieved as he was not allowed to cross efficiency bar at Rs,1,000 in the scale of Rs,500-50-1,000/50-1,250 with effect from 1-12-1974. The information to this effect was conveyed to him vide Accountant-General's letter dated 31-3-1977. Aggrieved by the order of the Accountant-General, the appellant preferred a departmental appeal to the Auditor-General on 5- 7-1981 which was rejected vide letter dated 26-9-1981. Thereafter, the appellant filed his present appeal before this Tribunal on 24-10-1981. It was admitted for regular hearing on 30-1-1982, was heard on 24-5-1984 and is being disposed of by this order.
2. We heard the learned counsel from both sides and also perused service record of the appellant.
We find that in the year 1970, the appellant received below average report and was declared unfit for further promotion. These remarks were communicated to him on 20-8-1971. The said remarks were not expunged and held good. The ACR for the year 1971 is average. There was hardly an need to communicate any adverse remarks but the reporting officer, to be on the safe side, did communicate the expression "average abilities" to the appellant. The ACR for the year 1972 (written in the year 1976) is good. There is no report for the year 1973 because, as stated at the bar, the appellant did not serve under any officer for a period of three months. The ACR for the year 1974 available on record, covers the period from 1-4-1974 to 13-7-1974. It was written on 28-5-1975. The ,report is average but has a number of adverse entries which were communicated to the appellant on 28-8-1976 and were subsequently not expunged.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant argued before us that the ACR for the year 1974 should not be taken into account because it became relevant in the year 1975. We do not agree with this contention for the simple reason that the ACR for the particular year in which efficiency bar is due to be crossed, has to be taken into account as it covers the period upto 30th of November of the particular year with the increment falling due on 1st of December chargeable in January of the next year in accordance with the system in vogue. The respondent department's action is, therefore, upheld in this respect.
4. The learned counsel then argued that in case it had been decided not to allow the crossing of the bar then the information to this effect should have been communicated to the appellant before 1st of December, 1974, the date on which the efficiency bar fell due. On the face of it the argument does seem to carry weight. We would expect that in cases where the crossing of efficiency bar falls due, an EARLY ACR upto 31st August of the particular year should be called for so that the decision to allow or disallow the crossing of efficiency bar could be B finalised by 1st December, allowing three months (September-November) for representations against adverse remarks, if any. However, we do feel that the respective departments should be allowed to regulate their system as they deem appropriate in accordance with the rules. Even if there is a few months' delay in permission to cross the bar, it cannot do any great harm because the arrears can be claimed once the efficiency bar is allowed subsequently. Adverting to the argument of the learned counsel wherein he stated that if no intimation is received as to stoppage of crossing of bar before 1st December then it is to be presumed that the efficiency bar has been allowed. Again we do not subscribe to the viewpoint of the learned counsel. We do wish that a department should be allowed time to evaluate the performance of an individual. In the appeal before us even though the appellant had not been informed in. Writing before 1-12-1974 that the crossing of efficiency bar was nor being allowed, the department had by their Manifest Action stopped his increment and informed him subsequently.
5. It is all too well known that the crossing of efficiency bar is directly related to the performance of an individual. There is no better measure of judging and evaluating this performance except from the ACRs, In the appeal before us even if we disregard the punishment o censure awarded to the appellant in 1969, because 5 years period as stated by the respondent department to include the year of 1974 should run from 1970 (and not from 1969 as they have done), the fact of the matter is that between 1970 and 1974, the report for the year 1970 is adverse, and the report for the period 1- 4-1974 to 13-7-1974 is average with adverse remarks. When an officer receives one adverse report (1970) and one report with adverse remarks even though graded a average (1974) then this performance cannot be considered worthy permission to cross the efficiency bar even if his report for 1971 average, for 1972 good and for 1973, after expunction of adverse remarks, treated as satisfactory. a. Viewed, in the over all context of the appellant's performance we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that he should have been allowed to cross the efficiency bar and that the action of the Auditor-General in disallowing the same was ultra vires the rules. We agree with the respondent department that the Auditor-General could do so under FR 25 as the authorised officer. We also do not subscribe to the view point of the learned counsel that where the crossing of efficiency bar is disallowed then a show-cause be served under Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. This would be a sheer waste of time and energy when the record i,e, ACRs are there to speak for themselves.
7. The respondent department has been considerate. According to their statement, after disallowing efficiency bar in the year 1974, they have regularly, each year, evaluated the performance of the appellant. However, except for the year 1976, when the appellant earned an average report, in the year 1975 and then in the years 1977 to 1980, he has earned adverse reports, certainly a dismal performance. From 23-11-1980, he was sent on LPR.
8. In view of the above analysis, we have no doubt that the appellant has been rightly disallowed the crossing of the efficiency bar which fell due on 1-12-1974. We uphold the departmental action and dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs.