DECISION This is an appeal under section 37(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), against an award of the learned Chairman of the First Sind Labour Court, Karachi, dated 19th September 1970. The impugned order was passed on an application under section 34 of the Ordinance, whereby the respondent had challenged the competency of the appellant to raise any financial demand during the pendency of the agreement dated 26th April 1969, and to terminate the same. The respondent also prayed that the Court be pleased to adjudicate as to whether the agreement dated 26th April 1969, was still in operation. The facts giving rise to the appeal briefly put are these.
2. Some industrial dispute arose between the appellant "Valika Cement Labour Union" (hereinafter called the Union), and the respondent, "Valika Cement Limited" (hereinafter called the Management), which was referred to the Conciliation Officer. The Conciliation Officer, however, because of the promulgation of the Martial Law, filed the strike notice. A press release was issued by the Martial Law Authorities on 6th April 1969, that employers and workers were free to negotiate and come to a settlement. As a. result of this Press Note, the Management and the Union came to a settlement on 26th April 1969. There are as many as 13 paragraphs in the settle--ment. Twelve of the paragraphs of the settlement cast certain duties on the Management to perform In short, the Management agreed to increase the wages of all the workers. It agreed to introduce Provident Fund Scheme and have a canteen for the factory, which was to supply food at a reduced rate. The Management also agreed to have a Fair Price Shop, to have Welfare Fund Scheme and to pay at double rate for overtime work by the workers. The Management also agreed to make ex gratia payment to 3 persons. In return for all that the Management undertook upon itself to do for the workers, the latter agreed not to raise any financial demand for the period of the operation of the agreement (Para. 13 of the Settlement). It may be mentioned here that the agreement does not mention the period for which the same was to remain in operation. Under section 19 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the repealed Ordinance), if no period was fixed for the operation of the settlement, it was to continue for a period of two years.
Under section 40 of the Ordinance, if no period was mentioned in a settlement for which it was to remain in operation, it would remain in operation for a period of one year.
3. The President, Valika Cement Labour Union gave a notice on 25th April 1970, to the Managing Director, Valika Cement Factory, stating therein that the agreement would expire on 26th April 1970, and that they would present a Charter of Demands within a week. Thereafter, the General Secretary of the Labour Union on 7th May 1970, gave another notice of two months terminating the agreement dated 26th April 1969. After the expiry of the period of the notice dated 7th May 1970, the General Secretary gave a notice on 11th July 1970, forwarding a Charter of Demands to the Management. Thereafter, on 4th August 1970, the Management, as already mentioned, made an application under section 34 of the Ordinance.
4. The learned Judge, after considering the points raised by the learned Representatives of the parties, came to the conclusion that the respondent had a vested right under the terms of the settlement, one of the terms being that the appellant would not raise any financial demand during the period of operation of the settlement. The period of settlement, according to section 19 of the repealed Ordinance, which was in operation on the date of the settlement, was two years.
5. Mr. Mohammad Hasan Siddiqi, the learned Representa--tive for the appellant, reiterated the points taken in the reply to the application of the respondent and raised the following points :-
(1) That one of the terms of the settlement being that it could be modified in the light of future legislation, the period of operation of the settlement is one year only.
(2) That by virtue of subsection 2(b) of section 67 of 1969-- Ordinance, the provision of section 40 of the Ordinance was attracted and the period of the settlement was one year only and, Therefore, the appellant was entitled to raise any demand which may even involve financial implication.
6. After hearing Mr. Siddiqi for the appellant, I considered it advisable, in the interest of justice, to bear some of the Representatives for the Labour and the Management, who usually appear before me. I asked the Registrar to issue notice to some of these Representatives. Mr. Shafiq Qureshi, Mr. A.
A. Shareef and Mr. S. P. Lodhi supported the contention of Mr. Siddiqi. Messrs M. A. Khan, M. A. Ghani and Ali Amjad, supported the finding of the learned Chairman of the Labour Court. I would now proceed to dispose of the contentions of lair. Siddiqi.
7. There is no force in the contention that the Press Note formed part of the settlement. The Press Note, referred to in the settlement, reads as under :- "The employers and the workers would be free to negotiate with each other for coming to reasonable and mutually acceptable terms of settlement during this interim period. Such settlement would, however, be protected even after the review in so far as these terms are not less beneficial to the workers than what would be given to the workers on the basis of review."
8. In the first place, the Press Note, reproduced above has no validity as law, so as to bind the parties. In the second place, the Press Note is not one of the terms of the settlement between the parties. It appears as a preface in the deed of settlement. The object of reproducing the Press Note in the settlement- was only to show that in spite of the Martial Law the workers and the Management were now competent to enter into a settlement: There are in all 13 items of the settlement. The Press Note, on the face of it, is not one of the terms to which the parties had agreed upon to act. The contention of Mr: Siddiqi was that in the light of the Press Note, the workers could reduce the period of settlement to one year under section 40 of 1969-Ordinance.
9. Ignorance of law is no excuse. The workers and the Management would be deemed to know that under section 19 of the repealed Ordinance, when the period, for which the settlement would remain in operation, is not mentioned in the agreement, it would be valid for two years. The parties having not mentioned the period for which the agreement was to remain in force, they would be deemed to have agreed by operation of law that it would remain in force for two years. The agreement was acted upon to the advantage of the workers. It is now "past and closed transaction". The Management conferred as many as 12 benefits under the agreement -on the workers in return that the workers will not raise any, financial demand during the period of operation of the settlement. The Management agreed to perform as many as 12 items only under the belief that there will be industrial peace at least for two years.
10. The agreement must be read as a whole. A compro--mise or settlement consists of mutual duty and obligation. A compromise would not be complete if only those items remain which cast a duty on one party and the other part which casts an obligation on the other party is taken away. The settlement, in the instant case, consists of 13 items, 12 of the items cast a duty on the. Management to perform certain things, while the 13th item is an obligation cast on the workers not to do certain things. The workers had a vested interest in the increase of pay. Overtime Allowance, Provident, Fund and other items of the settlement. The Management had a corresponding vested interest in the undertaking given by the workers that they would not raise demands, which may involve financial implication during the period that the settlement was in operation. The 'settlement having been given full effect so as to be covered by the term "past and closed transaction", the workers cannot be allowed to take advantage of the new legislation, which came into force on 13th November 1969.
11. Mr. Siddiqi quoted certain passages from Maxwellion Interpretation of Statutes, in support of his contention that where the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than .to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. Relying on the rule of interpretation, the learned Representative contended that under subsection 2(6) of section 67 of the Ordinance everything done shall be deemed to have been done under the corresponding provisions of this Ordinance to the extent of consistency there-- with. In other words, his submission was that the settlement being silent as to the period for which it could remain in operation, the period should be for one year under section 40 of the Ordinance of 1969. There is not much force in this contention. In the first place, 1969-Ordinance has not been given retrospective effect, either expressly or by necessary-- intendment. This came into force on 13th November 1969 while the agreement was entered into on 26th April 1969. On the face of it, unless 1969-Ordinance was given retrospective effect-it could not reopen "past and closed transaction".
12. Mr. A. A: Shareef, who appeared as amicus curiae contended that Industrial Relations Ordinance; 1969, being a Central Act, would apply in preference to the repealed Ordinance of 1968, which was a Provincial one. 'This proposition cannot be doubted. The question. still would be as to whether 1969--Ordinance had been given retrospective effect or not. If it had not been given retrospective effect, it cannot re-open a transaction which is "past and closed." In the second place, Mr. Shareef relied on section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1897. The relevant portion on which he relied reads as under :-- There this Act, or any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless' a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a)
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repeated or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c)
(d)
(e)
13. Mr. Shareef contended that a different intention expressed in section 67 of the Ordinance so as to affect the previous operation of 1968 enactment. There is no force in this contention. There is no contrary intention, expressed in section 67 of the Ordinance so as to take away the effect oft section 6(b) of the General Clauses Act.
14. Mr. M. A. Khan, the learned Representative, who appeared as amicus curiae traced the history of the period for which the settlement could be binding, in case the same was not mentioned in the Settlement. He submitted that in 1947 Industrial Disputes Act the period for which a settlement could remain in operation In the absence of any specific mention thereof in the settlement was six months. In 1958-Ordinance, it was one year. The same period continued in 1959-Ordinance. In 1968-Ordinance, the period was raised to two years and the same has been reduced in 1969- Ordinance to one year. The history of legislation as to the period for which the settlement could be binding in case no such period was agreed upon, does not resolve the question before me. The only thing that can be deduced from this history is that the Legislature during 20 years (1947-1968), considered it advantageous to increase the duration for which the settlement could be binding in case it was not agreed upon up to 2 years. The underlying idea must have been that where the parties do not themselves fix a date for which the settlement should remain binding on them the Legislature in the interest of industrial peace should fix the period to two years. The Legislature considered that a period of six months was too little for. industrial peace and increased it to one year and ultimately to two years. The Legislature, however, did not put any curb on the intention of the parties to fix a period for which the settlement could remain in operation. They were free to fix a period for which the settlement was to remain in operation. It was only where the agreement was silent as to the period for which it was to remain in operation that the Legislature provided the duration for which it was to remain in operation. There is nothing in section 40 of the Ordinance to disclose as to why the period of two years had been reduced to the period of one year.
15. Mr. Khan next contended that acts and statutes are operative only on facts which came into existence after the statutes are passed, unless a retrospective effect be clearly intended. It is a fundamental rule of English Law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. In this connec--tion, he relied on a passage from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition, p. 205. It runs as under :- "Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this, that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment."
16. Nothing has been pointed out in the enactment to show that the Ordinance had been given retrospective effect, either expressly of by necessary intendment.
17. Mr. Khan relied on Pakistan River Steamers Limited v. The Province of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1961 SC 393), in support of his contention, that the settlement having come into operation and in effect prior to 1969-Ordinance, the period for which the settlement was to remain in force under section 19 of the repealed Ordinance, cannot be reduced to the period of one which the award was to remain in operation. In that case it was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the award which was originally to remain in force only for a period of one year would, even after the expiry of one year, remain is force till the expiry of six months from the date of notice of termination of award on account of subsection (5) of section 19 of the Act. Kaikaus, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court observed that: "---------on the wording of section 19 as it now stands awards remain in force till they aft terminated by notice, but subsection (5) by which their life has been so extended was introduced in section 19 only by the Industrial Disputes Amendment Act XXXI of 1958, whereas the award which is being relied upon was delivered on the 22nd of October 1955. In accordance with section 19 as it stood on the date when the award was delivered it was to remain in force only for a period of one year."
18. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the obser--vation of his Lordship is that the relevant enactment under which the limitation period for which the settlement was to remain in operation would be the enactment in operation when bra settlement was arrived at, i.e. 1968- Ordinance.
19. Mr. M. A. Ghani, who appeared as amicus curiae, contended that the Courts must lean against giving retrospective operation where the vested rights are concerned. In this connection, he relied on Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, p. 206 : "Every statute, it has been said, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or, attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past, must be presumed, out of respect to the Legislature, to be intended not to have a retrospective operation. Where vested rights are affected, prima facie it is not a question of procedure".
20. I have come to the conclusion; after hearing the learned Representatives for the parties, Mr. Siddiqi and Mr. Anew Ahmad, and the learned Representatives, who have appeared as amicus curiae that 1969-Ordinance has not been given retrospective effect so as to affect the vested right of the parties under the settlement dated 26th April 1969. I would maintain the order of the learned Chairman of the Ist Labour Court and dismiss the appeal.