' As the questions of law and fact involved in the two appeals mentioned above are the same, the appeals are being decided together through this single judgment.
2. The respondents were Meter Readers and on the allegation that they had hand in the stealing of electricity they were dismissed from service without making any proper enquiry. The plea of the appellant before the lower Court was that the respondents were civil servants but the learned trial Judge instead of deciding the point held that they were workmen. According to the definition of civil servant given in the Civil Servants Act, the employees who are covered by the definition of 'workman' given in section 2 (n) read with Schedule II of the Workmen's Compensation Act or fall within the ambit of the definition of workman given in the Factories Act are excluded from the definition of 'civil servant'. The respondents being Meter Readers are employed in supply and distribution of electricity and thus are covered by clause (xix) of Schedule II of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads as under :- "employed in the generating, transmitting or supplying of electrical energy or in the generating or supplying of gas."
Previously before 1973 the following words were occurring in clause (xix) "otherwise than in a clerical capacity", but they were omitted by Act XIV of 1973. By the omission of the said words, the employees employed even in clerical capacity in the generating, transmitting or supplying of electrical energy are covered by the definition of workman given in section 2 (n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The duties of the Meter Readers are clerical because after making reading from the meters, they record it in their books. They, therefore, stand, excluded from the definition of 'civil servant'. One thing more is to be made clear which is that in 1977 a notification was issued by the Governor excluding WAPDA installations such as power houses and workshops from the application of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 but the Meter Readers are not employed in power houses and workshops. Therefore, they are not hit by Notification No, 9.9 (Lab-II) 68 published in Punjab Gazette of 24th August, 1977. So far as the definition of workman given in Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is concerned, it was not objected to by the appellant, nor this point was argued before me. Anyhow, the duties of the Meter Readers being to read the consumption from the meters and to record it in their books is clerical and they are covered by the definition of workman given in Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Their duties not being managerial or supervisory, they are also covered by the definition of workman given in section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
3. No prosecution evidence was recorded to prove the allegation that the respondents had hand in the stealing of electricity. The enquiry proceedings consist of the statement of the respondents only which too was recorded in the form of questions and answers, meaning that the ,-respondents were no).Afforded opportunity even to put forward their own case. They had to answer only those questions which were put to them. The statement of a person under enquiry is recorded in order to put to him the material which has come on the record during the enquiry in order to give him opportunity to explain the material brought on the record against him. The statement cannot be recorded with an attempt to prove the prosecution case. How the respondents had hand in the stealing of electricity has remained a mystery, as no evidence was produced. In the case of Karamat Ali, photostat copies of two applications are on the enquiry file. One is by M. Siddiq Khalid and the other by Abdur Rashid Cheema, Haji Mushtaq, Tariq and Muhammad Rafiq, but those persons were not examined at the enquiry, nor opportunity of cross-examination was affored to Karamat Ali. No doubt froth the respondents it was enquired if they wanted to examine any witness in defence, and one week's time was given, but since no prosecution evidence was recorded nor the respondents given opportunity of cross-examination upon the persons whose written applications were brought on the record, the respondents had not been afforded opportunity to defend themselves and extraneous matter was brought on the record. The respondents were, therefore, rightly reinstated by the lower Court. I do not find any force in the two appeals and dismiss them.