' This appeal arises from the decision, dated 12th December, 1979 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court. No, 1, Lahore, whereby the appellant was directed to pay bonus to the respondents in accordance with the provisions of section 10-C of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders, Ordinance, 1968.
2. The respondents had claimed bonus for the year 1977-78 (from 1st July, 1977 to 30th June, 1978) on the ground that during the said year profit of more than four lakhs had accrued to the Workshop in which the respondents were employed. It was argued before the learned lower Court that by a notification, workshops had been exempted from the application of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. The leaded trial Judge did not accept this plea on the ground that since the notification had not been produced, it was never published The other argument advanced before the lower Court was that WAPDA is a big organization and since the whole organization was sustaining loss every year, therefore, the profit accrued to the workshop did not entitle the workers to claim bonus. The learned trial Judge held that Electrical and Mechanical Workshop was an independent establishment controlled by a Works Manager, who was the employer of the workers working there, therefore, the workers were entitled to bonus. It was also argued that the claim was time-barred, but the learned trial Judge further held that the cause of action arose on 5th March, 1979 when the request was turned down vide letter Exh. P. 2 and thus the grievance notice served on 14th April, 1979 and the grievance petition brought on 8th May, 1979 are within time.
3. The ground given by the learned lower Court for holding that the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is applicable is not cogent. Notification had been issued on 24th August, 1977 and its number is 9.9. (Lab-II) 68. .This notification is according to section, of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. The word 'Government' is use in the section and according to the definition of the word given in the same Ordinance, Government means the Provincial Government. The words 'Provincial Government' were substituted by the words 'Government of West Pakistan' by P.
0. 4 of 1975, meaning that before the notification was issued the words 'Provincial Government' had been substituted for the words 'Government of West Pakistan'. Since the notification has been issued by the Government, it means that it was issued by the Provincial Government. The representative of the respondent has argued that the President of Pakistan could have issued the notification and that the notification issued by the Governor is of no legal effect and that Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is still applicable to the workshop. The reason given by him is that the employees of WAPDA are under the Central Government. He has not been able to make reference to any law to say that the employees of the workshops in dispute are under the Central Government. However, section 17 (1-B) of WAPDA Act, 1958 which was inserted by way of amendment in 1975 has declared service under the Authority as Service of Pakistan. The WAPDA Act, being central enactment, the amendment made by it cannot be nullified by the provisions of a Provincial Ordinance. After the insertion of section 17 (1-B.), amendment should have been made in section 8 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 substituting the words 'Central Government' for the words 'Provincial Government', or adding the words 'Or Central Government'. If it had been done, the establishments intended to be not governed by Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, could have been exempted under section 8 of the Standing Orders Ordinance by the Provincial Governments within the territorial jurisdiction of which they were situated. Although section 1-B was added in section 17 of WAPDA Act, 1958, in 1975 yet no law was promulgated to substitute Standing Orders Ordinance which is a Provincial Ordinance. If there had been existing, any statutory rules of WAPDA there could have been no necessity of the promulgation of any Central Statutes. WAPDA has no doubt framed Efficiency and Discipline Rules but they are not warranted by any law. Section 18 of WAPDA Act does not say that WAPDA may make Efficiency and Discipline Rules. It authorises WAPDA only to lay down a procedure for the appointment of its employees. It no doubt authorises WAPDA to take action against its employees but since it does not authorise to make Efficiency and Discipline Rules action can be taken according to the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. The intention of the legislature when inserting section 18 in WAPDA Act was that WAPDA should not have its own Efficiency and Discipline Rules and should be governed by Standing Orders Ordinance. Section 29 authorises WAPDA to make regulations, but it also provides that the regulations be got approved from the Government. Efficiency and Discipline Rule framed by WAPDA do not show that they were got approved by the Central Government thus they cannot be said to be warranted by section 29. The result is that although service under WAPDA is service of Pakistan yet and as Standing Orders Ordinance is substituted by duly authorised statutory Efficiency and Discipline Rules or any Central Act or Ordinance it Will continue to apply. The notification of Governor exempting workshops from the applicability of Standing Orders Ordinance is (sic) effective and does (sic) employees of WAPDA declared as service of Pakistan by section 17 (1-B)
WAPDA Act, to take benefit of it provisions.
' Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show that the workshop in which the respondents are employed is not a separate establishment. The respondents, therefore are entitled to share the profits earned by the workshop and are not responsible if the whole WAPDA runs at a loss. Bonus on account of profit is for the workers to work hard and gain more profits. It is, therefore, in the interest of the workshop that bonus be given to the respondents.
' As upshot of the discussion made above I uphold the finding of the learned lower Court that the respondents are entitled to bonus claimed by them. There is no force in this appeal which is dismissed.