' S. ABDUL JABRAR .KHAN (CHAIRMAN).-Syed Shah Samad Alam, ex-Foodgrains, Supervisor has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, in which he has impleaded the Deputy Director Food, Lahore Region, Lahore and Director Food, Punjab, Lahore, as respondents.
2. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that the order, dated 13th February, 1979 passed by the Deputy Director Food, Lahore Region, Lahore and order, dated 30th December, 1980 of Director of Food Punjab, be set aside and he may be reinstated in service with all back benefits.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant was working as Foodgrains Supervisor and posted at Farooq Flour Mill, Lahore. He was charge-sheeted by the District Food Controller(R) on 21st February, 1978, for irregularities and discrepancies in the mill account. The appellant was suspended on 1st March, 1978. Mr. Abdullah Yusaf, Storage Officer was appointed as Enquiry Officer and he submitted report to the Deputy Director Food. Respondent No, 1 issued a show-cause notice dated 17th January, 1979 and the appellant was dismissed from service, on 13th February, 1979. The appellant filed appeal before respondent No, 2, who was placed to reject the same vide his order, dated 30th December, 1980. Hence this appeal.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned District Attorney assisted by the representative of the Department and have perused the record of this case carefully with their assistance.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant was appointed by the Deputy Director Food, therefore, he could not be charge-sheeted by the District Food Controller (R), as the said officer was not empowered to do so. It has been vehemently argued that the District Food Controller was neither appointing authority nor an authority to remove or suspend the appellant, therefore, the dismissal of the appellant from service, was void ab initio. It was further submitted that the appellant had already been punished with minor penalty vide order dated 15th April, 1977 therefore, he could not be punished twice for the same charge as it was repugnant to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Learned counsel has assailed the inquiry report on the ground that the same is based on alleged confession of the appellant whereas the appellant never confessed it.
6. With regard to the merits of the case, it has been submitted that what happened in this case was that entries mentioned in the charge-sheet, stood removed and rubbed from Registrar by the Depot-holders wherein it was mentioned that they had taken quota. In this connection a criminal case had been registered against the said Depot-holder. It has been further submitted that all the excesses of the Depot-holder had been recovered and no loss had been done to the Food Department. It was further pointed out that the colleagues of the appellant who were also charge- sheeted with these allegations are still working in the Food Department and no action has been taken against them.
7. On the other hand the Department has taken a stand that the appellant did commit serious irregularities in the Mill account for which he was properly placed under suspension and charge- sheeted and thereafter regular enquiry was conducted under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1975, in which the appellant has admitted his guilt at the time of personal hearing, that he did issue 510 bags in excess, therefore, was awarded major penalty of dismissal from service. With regard to the legal objection, it has been submitted that the District Food Controller only acted as Authorised Officer and recommended to the Deputy Director Food for major penalty.
8. We have given our anxious thought to the arguments so advanced by the parties and after going minutely into the details, by summoning the Accountant of the Bank, in order to verify, whether the Government has suffered any loss on account of such excess issues of bags, and have lsatisfied ourselves that all the bagel so issued, were issued against the payments and the money duly dein/sited in the account of the Government by the Depot-holders. We have also examined the excess and have found that the appellant did issue excess quota to the Depot-holders beyond their entitlement due to rush of work as he was looking after the work of other two officials viz. Mr. Abdul Bari who had been suspended and due to retirement of Rana Abdul Hamid. It is also on the record that when the appellant realised that he had issued excess quota to the Depot-holders beyond their entitlement, he adjusted the same from their turn and thus balanced the account. By going into the entire details of the case, we are fully satisfied that the appellant had no ulterior motive and had not sold the bags into black-market as alleged in the charge-sheet, but only issued more quota to Depot-holders which was beyond their entitlement. We have also taken care to satisfy ourselves that the entire money of 510 bags stood duly deposited in the account of Government vide statement recorded by us, of the Accountant of the said Bank. In these circumstances, the appellant can only be held guilty of negligence but not of any ulterior motive.
We therefore, find that the major punishment of dismissal from service, awarded to him is excessive and not in consonance with the guilt of the appellant.
9. In view of the above analysis of the case, we proceed to accept the appeal, set aside the impugned orders and vary the punishment of dismissal from service to that of imposition of censure, withholding of two years increments without cumulative effect.
10. With regard to the period of absence from duty due to protracted proceedings both in the Court as well as before the authorities, C we hereby order that this period will be counted as leave of the kind due. There will be no order as to costs.
Appeal accepted.
1984 PLC (C. S.) 74 [Service Tribunal Punjab] Present : S. Abdul Jabbar Khan, Chairman and Abdul Hamid Chaudhry, Member AHMAD DIN versus PRINCIPAL, GOVERNMENT COMMERCIAL INSTITUTE, SIALKOT AND ANOTHER Case No, 508/1949 of 1982, decided on 16th May, 1983.
Civil service- --Disciplinary action-Strong presumption in favour of prosecution case in absence of evidence to show that accused made victim of conspiracy-Dismissal order impugned on plea of malice on part of competent authority-Record indicating sufficient proof to establish charge of misconduct- Charge established in departmental enquiry-Nothing to establish ill-will or malice-Interference, in circumstances, refused by Service Tribunal-Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974), S.
4. [p. 75].1 & B Ch. Abdul Rashid for Appellant.
4. G. Humayun, District Attorney for Respondent.
' S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).- Ahmad Din, ex-Chaukidar, Government Commercial Institute, Sialkot, has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, in which he has impleaded the Principal, Government Commercial Institute at Fort, Sialkot City, Director Technical Education Punjab, Lahore, as respondents.
2. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that the order of dismissal dated 26th January, 1982 and appellate order dated 4th February, 1982, be set aside and he be reinstated in service.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant was appointed as Chowkidar on 1st July, 1973 and served the Department for about 12 years. The appellant was charge-sheeted on 20th January, 1982. He submitted his explanation on 25th January, 1982. An enquiry was held and Mr. Abdul Hafiz, Enquiry Officer, after recording evidence, found him guilty of the charges and recommended stern action against him. The competent authority gave him personal hearing and after going through the report as well as the circumstances of the case, dismissed the appellant from service on 26th January, 1982. He filed appeal before the Director, Technical Education, Punjab, Lahore, who also rejected the same on 4th September, 1982. Hence this appeal.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned District Attorney assisted by the Principal himself who passed the impugned order and have perused the record of this case carefully with their assistance.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant mainly based his case on malice which according to him, was in the mind of the competent authority, who was bent upon dismissing the appellant from service.
With regard to the number of complaints so made against him by a number of people, it has been submitted that all this was a put up show, whereas actually there was no basis for the same. In the end the learned counsel has made a grievance that the Principal is a cruel person, whose treatment with other civil servants of the Institute, is also unfair and instead of looking into the grievance of the appellant, has proceeded to dismiss him from service without judging all the pros and cons of the case.
6. On the other hand learned District Attorney has submitted that the appellant is a bad egg who had become nuisance to the Institute and a large number of complaints started pouring against him, which have been placed on the record to show the conduct of the appellant vis-a-vis the administration of the said Institution. It has been further argued that the case was fully probed into through regular enquiry by a senior officer and it became crystal clear that the appellant, had been insulting and irritating his superiors on a number of occasions and had been responsible for creating hinderance in the official duty.
7. We have given our anxious thought to the arguments so advanced by the parties and find from the record that the appellant grappled with Iqbal Khalid and not only abused but also injured him and when Ghulam Muhammad Chawkidar intervened to rescue Iqbal Khalid from the don slaughter of the appellant, he chewed the thumb of Ghulam Muhammad Chowkidar and thus caused him grievous injury. We have also looked into the large number of complaints including a resolution passed by the staff as well as by the students, in which they unanimously clammered of the dismissal of the appellant, due to his insulting behaviour and immoral activities within the premises of the Institute. While going through the defence of the appellant, we do not find an iota of defence which could establish that the respondents bad any personal enmity with anyone of them or that the competent Authority bore or malicentowards him. There would be strop presumption in favour of the prosecution case in the absence of any such evidence on the part of the appellant, to show that he has been victim of some conspiracy and has been wrongly dismissed.
8. In view of the above we do not find any justification to interfere with the impugned order so passed by the competent authority as well as the appellate order by respondent No, 2 rejecting the appeal of the appellant. The result is, we dismiss the appeal as being without any merit. There will be no order as to costs.