' Since the four appeals captioned above involve common questions of law, they are being disposed of together alongwith the cross-objections filed by the respondent in each appeal, through this single judgment, wherein the four appellants mentioned in the title will be described as appellants Nos, 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
2. All the appellants tendered resignations and claimed service benefits in their separate grievance petitions. The learned lower Court dismissed the petitions on the sole ground that the appellants having resigned from the posts ceased to remain workmen, therefore, could not seek relief from the Labour Court. The ground given is that from section 2(xxviii) the words termination" and "resignation" have been omitted. The learned trial Court has kept in view the inclusive clause of the section and has ignored the main portion, wherein workman is defined. The inclusive clause applies to those persons who otherwise are not covered by the definition of workman. Before looking into the inclusive clause, it is to be seen if the person concerned actually does not come within the purview of the definition. According to the definition, a person who is not covered by the definition of employer and has been employed in an establishment is a workman. There are two exceptions (a) and (b). A person who comes within the exceptions is not covered by the main definition. For persons who are not otherwise covered by the definition, the inclusive clause has been incorporated in the definition. The appellants, according to their designation, are not covered by the definition of 'employer'. This is nobody's case that they are employers. This is not denied that they joined service with the respondent. This is nobody's case that they fall within the exception (a) or (b) being managers or supervisors. The learned trial Judge has said that it has been held by some Courts that a resigned cannot be a workman but no authority has been quoted by him.
However, the view of the learned Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal is that a person terminated is no longer a workman but I have in many cases differed with this view. The words 'is employed' have been wrongly interpreted. These words do not mean that at the time of bringing an action in the Labour Court, the persons concerned should be in the employment of his master. Not only in section 2(xxviii) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 but in other enactments also present tense has been used while defining a worker or a person in employment. In section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, the words 'is employed' are used. The same is the case with section 2(n) read with Schedule II of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the definition of the Railway servant also, present tense has been used. So is the case with definition of a civil servant defined in section 2 of the Civil Servants Act of 1973 Central and 1974 Provincial. Same is the case with the definition of workman given in the Factories Act. Very alarming results would follow if the words 'is employed' are interpreted to mean only those persons who are in service at the time of bringing any action in the Labour Courts, Since in all the Acts, present tense is used while defining the worker or an employee or a civil servant, there would remain no remedy for a, person not in service to challenge the order of dismissal or termination, wrongful retirement or claim benefits of service. The relationship of employer and worker continues even after the termination of services in any manner till the workman concerned has been fully paid the benefits of service. So I reverse the finding of the learned trial Judge on the point.
3. Only in the case of appellant No, 1 there is dispute about wages in lieu of earned accumulated leave. In cross-objections it has been contended that the learned lower Court has wrongly held that 112 days' leave was due to the appellant. There is no clear cut finding but the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is forceful that wages only for 28 days' leave can be allowed.
Standing Order 12(4) does not make any unqualified provision for wages of unavailed leave but makes reference to Standing Order 8(1) but in turn makes reference to Chapter IV-A of the Factories Act, section 49-B. According to section 49-B(1)(2) 14 days' leave can be accumulated in a year which can be added to the unavailed of leave of the next year totalling only 28 days. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show that appellant No, 1 is entitled to unavailed leave for a longer period than 28 days. I, therefore, hold that appellant No, 1 is entitled to wages for 28 days unavailed leave only.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent has not argued the remaining cross-objections, meaning that they have not been pressed.
5. As upshot of the observations made above, I accept all the four appeals, grant the prayer made in the grievance petition except this that so far as unavailed leave is concerned appellant No, 1 is entitled to wages for 28 days' leave only.