1. DECISION MD. NURUL ISLAM KHAN (CHAIRMAN). This is an appeal under section 8,3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, with a prayer for directing the Registrar of Trade Unions to register the Union.
2. The case of the first party appellant as given in the plaint is given as follows.
3. The appellant is a Trade Union of the East Pakistani pilots stationed in Dacc4 and working in the Pakistan lnternational Airlines Corporation. The said Union was duly formed by a resolution, dated 2-4-70. After the formation of the Union they submitted an application before the Registrar of Trade Unions, East Pakistan, on 5-5-70 for registration of the Union. There--after there was an inspection.
4. The appellant submitted its application for registration and duly complied with the requirements as required under sections 5, ti and 7 of the Ordinance. A long time passed, but the respondent Registrar of Trade Unions did not register .the Trade Union of the appellant. The respondent was to inform the appellant within fifteen days if he had any objection. But there was no such communication from the side of the Registrar of Trade Unions regarding any deficiency as required in section 8(1) of the Ordinance. Sixty days having passed and the respondent having not complied with the mandatory provision of law, the appellant has now approached the Court for directing the Registrar of Trade Unions to register the Trade Union. The respondent made some verbal observation that it was a craft Union, etc. But there is no bar in the law for registration of a craft Union even.
5. The respondent-Registrar of Trade Unions did not appear in Court but sent a letter to the effect that the first party Trade Union has Inserted a provision in their Constitution which restricts the membership of the Union to the Pilots hailing from East Pakistan only irrespective of their place of employment under the P.I.A.C: The P.I.A.C. employees various categories of workers such as Pilots; Stewards Hostess, Loading and Unloading workers, Clerical staff, etc. The Union under reference has confined the scope of its membership only to one category of workman namely _ the Pilots and among the Pilots also discrimination has been' made by confining the scope of membership for the Pilots hailing from East Pakistan only. It was the opinion of the respondent that this provision is in conflict with the provision of section 3(e.) of the Y. R. O. It was further stated that while the question of selection of collective bargaining agent to arise in the establish--ment as there is to be only one collective bargaining agent for the workers of one establishment, the difficulty would arise as the present Association would be the association of only one class of workers.
6. While the matter was being argued on 8-8-70, the learned counsel for the appellant f4ed an application embodying certain amendment in Rule 2.1.1 at page 6-of the Constitution of the Union.
7. It appears from the said amendment that the words "who hails from East Pakistan" were deleted and that the whole rule was framed differently in which the ordinary membership of the Association was made subject to the completion of the procedure given in the Constitution as well as the discretion of the Executive Committee. The amendment, however, kept the membership limited to Pilots of P.I.A C. only.
8. Point for determination is whether the first party appellant Trade Union is entitled to registration: FINDINGS AND DECISION In the first place it has been argued that this is an appeal and this Court should not go into the formalities and intricacies of law except to see the non-compliance .of the procedure by the Registrar of Trade Unions only. I am afraid, we cannot remain content to scrutinise the procedural defects of the Registrar only while there is an application pending with prayer to direct to register the Trade Union. In the present case, we are also to examine whether things standing as they are, the Registrar o A Trade Unions could register the Trade Union and whether there are any objections which could be validly raised by the Registrar. It has been submitted in this case that under section 8(1) of the Ordinance the Registrar was to find out any deficiency in the material respect in the application and he was to communicate the same to the Trade Union within a period of 15 days from the receipt of the application, and that he has failed to do so. True that the Registrar did not point out the deficiency in the applica--tion within 15 days. But it cannot, necessarily mean that there cannot be any defect or deficiency in the application for registra--tion whatever may be the failing of the Registrar. In other sense, the learned counsel argued that we should not enter into, the merits of the case, but should only examine whether according to section 8(1) the Registrar could comply with the provisions. Admittedly the Registrar could not comply with the provisions of law in so far as he failed to point out the deficiency of the Trade Union within 15 days of the application.
9. But it does not necessarily mean that as such there is no defect and that we should construe that there is no defect in the application. For the laches of the ,Registrar of Trade Unions a Trade. Union cannot be B registered against the legal provisions of law irrespective of the merit. In other words, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that we are not entitled to enter into the merits of the case rather we should confiee ourselves to the mere frame work of law that the Registrar of Trade Unions failed to comply with certain procedures of law. We have to disagree with such contention of the learned counsel since we find that a Trade Union for its registration must comply with certain provision of~ law, and, the mere failure of the Registrar ' to communicate his objection to the Trade Union within time does not remove the deficiency of the Trade Union, if there be any.
10. It has been pointed out by the Trade Union that the workers without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only one the rules of the organisation concerned, to join association et their own choice without previous authorisation, according to-section 3(e.) of the I.
11. R: O., 1969. But even this provision is subject to the other provision of the Ordinance. Now this subsection 3(e.) has two -aspects. The first portion of the subsection says that all workers without distinction shall have the right to establish Trade Union. But as about the membership of the Association the same subsection has certain reservation. l On a mere perusal of- the subsection it appears that the member--ship is subject, only to the rules of the organisation concerned. This means that each Trade Union can have its own set of rules. Subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned a worker can join a Trade Union of own choosing. If some organisation frames rules restricting membership, according to the subsection that association will have a right to insert such a clause in its constitution. So the learned Registrar should have construed this subsection 3(a) of section 3 of the I. R. O. in its true perspective. The first portion is with regard to the general right of the workers to form their Union and the second portion of this subsection is with regard to the membership of the Trade Union which could be restricted by the respective provision of the Trade Union. Whatever may be the defect of law, the Court has no, right to impose any idealistic injunction on the Legislature.
12. Next we find that the requirement for application and the requirement for registration of a Trade Union have been given in sections 6 and 7 of the Ordinance. It has been pleaded by the learned counsel for the appellant that they have complied with all the provisions of these two sections and hence there is no legal bar in according registration to the said Union. Of course there would be some practical difficulties as pointed out by the Registrar of Trade Unions in determining the collective bargaining agent and in representing the difference categories of workers within an establishment. But the present provision of law is no bar to the registration of a Trade Union even if a Trade Union includes only one category of workman. There is no mention in the present'
13. Ordinance that there should be no craft Union and that workers could not combined on regional basis or on the basis of a particular category of workers and in the absence of such restriction it shall be presumed accord--ing to first portion of section 3(a) that workers of all categories can establish a Trade Union. We are quite aware of the fact that an Association of the present type with the present constitution might create difficulties in the practical fulfilment of its objects and might create other difficulties within the workers of the same establishment. But even then as there is no bar in the present Ordinance for forming such a Union, we are of the opinion that the Registrar of the Trade Unions cannot refuse registration to the appellant Union. The appellant has intended to bring in some more amendments in Rule 2.1.1 of its constitu--tion. But it is not that necessary and we are not also sure that they could bring about the amendment in their constitution within such short period after their first argument: on 5-8-70. As we find that the amendment which was moved in. Court on 8-8-70 was irrelevant for the purpose of this application, we overlook the same and we further find that even if the said restriction is imposed according to the promised amendment, the merit of the case would not be altered.
14. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we allow this appeal ex parte. The Registrar of Trade Unions did not enter into appearance in Court.
15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed ex parte and I direct the Registrar of Trade Unions to register the appellant Trade Union and issue a certificate of registration to them within fifteen days from to- day.
16. I have consulted the members who agree between themselves that the Union should be registered