1. ' SALEM AKHTAR, J.-The petitioners owned land bearing survey Nos. 308 measuring 2. 21 Acres and 309 measuring 4. 15 Acres in Deh Sari, Taluka Hyderabad. The respondent by notification, dated 13th June, 1975 acquired the above survey numbers and the respondent No, 1 acted as Land Acquisition Officer. The petitioners have alleged that in notices under sections 9 and 12 of the Land Acquisition Act were not served on them. The petitioners have also alleged that on count of malice and vengeance the respondent No, 1 accept the matter pending. The Advocate for the petitioners, therefore, addressed a notice, dated 19th March, 1977 to the respondent No, 1 intimating him that after more than two years of Notification nothing was heard from him and unless adequate compensation was awarded within 10 days from the receipt of the notice action would be taken against him. The respondent No, 1 replied this letter on 12th July, 1978 addressed to the petitioner's attorney which reads as follows:- "Due to some legal aspects of the case, the announcement of the Award has been postponed.
2. ' You are, therefore, advised to produce the following documents before the undersigned on any working day-
(1) Extracts of record of rights in favour of claimants duly attested by the Mukhtiarkar.
(2) Position of the land at the eve of its acquisition whether it was evacuee or non-evcauee.
(3) When the land was allotted to the parties, the relevant documents if any may be produced."
3. ' The petitioners claim to have supplied all these required documents and waited for the announcement of the Award, but as nothing was heard from the respondent a notice, dated 19th April, 1979 was addressed to the respondent No, 1 calling upon him to make the Award within a reasonable time, otherwise the petitioners would seek relief from the Court. The respondent No, 1 by his letter, dated 10th May, 1979 informed that the Award was made on 25th June, 1978. The said letter is reproduced as follows :- "I am to inform you that the formal announcement of the Award in question has already been made on 25th June, 1978.
4. ' The amount of the Award is lying with the undersigned for payment to the parties concerned.
5. ' They may please be advised to collect the compensation money from the undersigned on any working day."
6. ' It is alleged that the contents of the letter, dated 10th May, 1979 are false, motivated and inconsistent and the petitioners were never informed of the award earlier. The petitioners addressed a letter, dated 13th May, 1979 to the respondent No, 1 requesting him to refer the matter to the civil Court for determination of the objection raised in the Petition. It may be mentioned that the petitioners had inter alia challenged the quantum of compensation. The respondent No, 1 by his letter, dated 22nd May, 1979 stated that the petitioner's attorney had been informed by an office letter No, LAP/BOD/WCH (iii)/379/A dated 15th July, 1978 about the announcement of the Award and for receipt of payment of the Award, but no steps were taken by them and finally he refused to refer the matter to the District Court as the request had been made after the period of Limitation, and the Award had become final. The petitioners replied this letter on 27th May, 1979 specifically stating that the letter, dated 15th July, 1978 referred by the respondent No, 1 was a false and fabricated letter, which was planted merely to justify the illegality, although no such letter was ever sent or received by the petitioners or their attorney. In reply to this letter on 10th June, 1979 the respondent No, 1 stated that as the petitioners were maligning him to cover up the delay in order to meet the ends of justice matter will be referred to the Court alongwith my observation on production of the following documents which were specified. The petitioners by letter, dated 28th June, 1979 denying the adverse allegation supplied copy of the appeal. It seems that the petitioners filed a Revision Application against the refusal (letter, dated 27th May, 1979) to refer the matter to the civil Court.
7. The respondent No, 1, therefore, by his letter, dated 22nd May, 1979 refused to refer the matter to the civil Court. The revision application was dismissed on 22nd February, 1981 holding that it was not maintainable. The petitioners, therefore, filed this petition on 10th May, 1981 challenging the order of the respondent No, 1 refusing to refer the matter to civil Court as well as the Award.
8. ' Mr. Aftab A. Shaikh the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that as no notice of making the Award was served on the petitioners, the period of limitation of six months should be computed from the date of knowledge which should be treated as the date of the Award. The provision relating to reference to the civil Court is contained in section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act which reads as follows :- "18. Reference to Court.-(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken : Provided that every such application shall be made-
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his Award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's Award ;
(b) In other cases, within six weeks of receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, subsection (2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's Award, whichever period shall first expire."
9. ' Section 18 provides a remedy to any person interested who has not accepted the award to apply to the Collector in writing to refer the matter to the Court for determination. Under this section only disputes and objections relating to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable or apportionment of compensation amongst the person interested or the amount of cost can be entertained. Subsection (2; of section 18 provides period of limitation for filing application for reference to the Court. It prescribes different period of limitation :
(1) where the applicant was present personally or through his attorney at the time of making the award the period of limitation is six weeks from the date of the Award. (2) In other cases six weeks of the date of service of notice under section 12 (2) or six months from the date of the award whichever period first expires. If applicant has no notice under section 12 (2), he will be entitled to file application for reference within six months of the date of the award provided he or his attorney was not present at the time of making the award.
10. ' Mr. Aftab Ahmed Shaikh the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that as neither the petitioner nor his attorney was present at the time of the award nor, a notice under section 12 (2) was served on the petitioners they entitled to file application for reference with a period of six months from the date of the award. The learned counsel further contended that the date of the award should not be the date when the award is made, but the date when the petitioners came to know of the Award. He has relied on Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another (1), State of Punjab v. Qaisar khan Begum and another (2). In Raja Harish Chandra's case relying on Ezra v. Secretary of the State (3) it was held that the proceeding before the Collector culminating in the award is a tenderbinding on the Government, but not on the person interested who can file reference under section 18. We may point out that by Land Acquisition (West Pakistan Amendment) Ordinance (49 of 1969) a new subsection was needed whereby the Provincial Government may if it has not accepted the award, refer the matter to the Court. This subsection has been deleted by North-West Frontier Province amendment in 1972.
11. However, the Supreme Court of India treating the award a tender observed as follows :- "Therefore, if the award made by Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. That is the normal requirement under the contract law and its applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus, considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words "the date of the award" occurring in the relevant section would not be appropriate.
12. ' There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired
(1) AIR 1961 SC 1500 (2) AIR 1963 SC 1604
(3) I L R 32 Cal. 605 (P C) ' it is clear that the said decision ultimately effects the rights of the owner of the property and in the sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus, considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector ; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression "the date of the award" used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is, either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words "from the date of the Collector's award" used in the proviso to section 18 in a literal or mechanical way."
13. ' Mr. Abdul Hameed Khan, the learned counsel for the respondent has referred to Ghulam Muhammad v. Government of West Pakistan (1). In this case on 12th November, 1956 Government of West Pakistan issued Notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thereafter, notices under sections 9 and 10 were issued to all the owners and persons interested to appear before the Land Acquisition Collector. At the hearing before the Land Acquisition Collector it was found that K hasra Nos. 6313 and 6314 were though entered in revenue records in the name of Jaswant Rai and others as evacuee vendees, also shown as being in adverse possession of the appellant Ghulam Muhammad. The Collector made the Award on 16th June, 1958 and the compensation for this area was assessed at Rs, 8,511-11-0. However, treating it as "dispute item" he deposited the amount with the civil Court under section 30 of the Act" so that the claim of the person with adverse possession could be determined and payment made to the rightful claimant." Subsequently on 14th March, 1959 the appellant got a mutation sanctioned in his favour recording him as owner on the basis of his adverse possession. Reference under section 30 was registered, and in spite of notice duly issued no one appeared to contest the claim of the appellant and on 26th October, 1962 the Court held that the appellant was entitled to the entire compensation and payment may be made to him. The appellant withdrew the amount under protest. On 31st December, 1962 he filed objection before the Land Acquisition Collector complaining about the inadequacy of the compensation. It was also alleged that he was never served with any notice under section 9 or section 12 (2) of the Act and as he was not treated to be the owner or person interested could not have preferred any objection to the ex parte and arbitrary fixation of compensation. The objection was dismissed by the Collector as barred by time under section 18 of the Land
(1) PLD 1967 SC 191 ' Acquisition Act. The appellant filed writ petition on 28th March, 1983 before the High Court which was dismissed in limine. Leave was granted by the Supreme Court to consider the following question :- "Whether it is not the case that right of the petitioner (now appellant) either to accept or object to the Award in respect of portion of the land in which he is interested, only arose after the settlement by the Court of the dispute as to his entitlement ?
14. ' As the question of limitation was argued at length Hamood-ur-Rehman, J. (as he then was) observed :- "The Land Acquisition Act does not define the expression "date of award" and there appears to be also some amount of conflict in judicial opinions as to the exact meaning to be attached to these words in section 18. Some Courts have taken the view that the date of the award being indefinite must be taken to mean the date of filing the award under section 12 whilst some other Courts have held that it would be the date on which the Land Acquisition Collector makes a formal declaration under section 11. A third view taken is that the date of the award is the date on which the award has been properly drawn up with all the particulars of apportionment etc., as required by section 11 of the Act, and signed by the Collector vide L. E. J Solomon V. H. C. Stork (1). It would, however, appear that in none of these cases has the meaning of the words "date of the award" been extended to the extent now suggested by the appellant, namely, that it should be calculated from the date when the entitlement of the objector is determined by another Tribunal or Court. It seems to me that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act be read as a whole and reading it in this way it appears that the Act has provided for 2 kinds of reference, one under section 18 and the other under section 30 of the Act, but the scope and the object of these two references are quite distinct and separate."
15. ' The fact that admittedly no notice of the award was served upon the appellant under section 12
(2) of the Act, is in no way, relevant for the purpose of deciding the controversy as to the time within which the objection should be filed for, under section 18, proviso (b), it would appear that if notice is served the period of limitation is only six weeks from the date of the Collector's award. This proviso fixes a special period of limitation and since the Land Acquisition Act does not make the provisions of the Limitation Act applicable it would appear that in the same case of an objection under section 18 of the maximum period allowable is six months from the date of the making of the award in accordance with section 11."
16. ' This view has been followed in PLD 1984 Pesh.
635. We are bound by the observation of the Supreme Court. In Ghulam Muhammad's case the facts were materially different from the present case. There the appellant was an interested person; was following the proceedings and had knowledge of the award, made on 16th June, 1958.
17. Certain observations of the Supreme Court suggest that in appropriate cases and nor circumstances the period of limitation for filing reference or objection under section 18 may be computed from the date of knowledge of the award. They are reproduced as follows :- "In any event, from the date of mutation in his favour was sanctioned in 1959 (14th March, 1959) his right to be a person interested could not be possibly dispute. The Collector and the High Court were, therefore, in my opinion right in holding that the appellant's objection filed in December, 1962 was well out of time."
18. Again in the closing part of the judgment it was observed ;- "At any rate, from the date when the Court of the Civil Judge gave him notice to appear in 1961 he was certainly aware of the award. He did not file his objection even within six months of this date.".
19. ' In the present case a completely different situation has arisen. Here the date of the Award is unscertainable and it cannot be determined what is the real date of the Award or on what date the Award was made under section 11. This situation has arisen due to the contradictory stand taken by the respondent No, 1 himself as has been stated above. The petitioner had complained to the respondent for remaining quiet for an unreasonably long period and had threatened him to take legal action whereupon on 12th July, 1978 he replied that due to some legal aspect of the case "the announcement of the award has been postponed." Therefore, according to the respondent No, 1 himself upto 12th July 1978 no award had been made. However, when his demand for supplying certain documents were met by the petitioners and no award was made, another notice was served. The respondent No, 1 by his letter, dated 10th May, 1971 informed that formal announcement of the award has already been made on 25th June, 1978. This statement is completely contradicted by his statement made earlier, because if till 12th July, 1971 Award had not been announced, how can it be stated that it was made on 25th June, 1978.
20. ' Mr. Abdul Hameed the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that confusion has arisen due to typographical error in the letter of the respondent, dated 12th July, 1978. The petitioners have filed the aforestated letters and made specific allegation against the respondent No, 1 that he was delaying the award for ulterior motives and was keeping this information away from the petitioners which was not conveyed to them deliberately. The respondent No, 1, nor any one from his office has come forward to contradict this statement. No counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents to explain the alleged typing error or to show the date when the award was made. Therefore, we are not inclined to accept the explanation offered by the learned counsel for the respondent because if it is a typographical error then explanation should come from the person responsible for such mistake. In any event reading these letters together we are unable to reconcile that the first letter, dated 12th July, 1978 is a product of any typographical error, because it contains a definite statement to the effect that the announcement of the award has been postponed. Therefore, the correct date of making the award is not available on record. From these facts it seems that the respondent No, 1 has tried to keep such material information away from the knowledge of the petitioners and by letter, dated 12th July, 1978 the petitioners were kept away from taking any action which they could have taken if they would have come to know that the Award has been announced or made on 25th July, 1978. Can in such circumstances, the respondent justifiably assert that the period of limitation should be computed from the date when the award is alleged to have been made and not from the date of the knowledge of the award. It was, therefore, to be considered whether in section 18 (2) (b) of the Act, the words "date of the award" can be interpreted as date when the award is known to a party.
21. ' Before dealing with this aspect we would first examine the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act. We find that the legislature has made every attempt to or make all the proceedings which effect any party as well as of the award known to him. Section 4 deals with publication of preliminary Notification and prescribes the powers of the appropriate officer. It provides that whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that the land in any locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose, a Notification to that effect is published in the Official Gazette and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of notification to be given at convenient place in the said locality. Under section 5 of the authorised officer shall at the time of entry pay or tender for all necessary damages to be done. Section 5 (a) entitles any person interested in any land which has been notified under section 4, subsection (a) to file objections and after giving such person opportunity of being heard, the Collector shall submit the case for decision of the Provincial Government. After the objections have been considered a declaration under section 6 to the effect that the land is required for public purpose has to be made. Such declaration has to be published in the official Gazatte. Section 6, subsection (3) makes such declaration in the official Gazette a conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company as the case may be. After such declaration has been made directions under section 7 are issued to the Collector to take order for the acquisition of the land. Thereupon under section 8 the Collector shall measure and mark out the land. Section 9 provides that the Collector shall cause public notice to be given in the specified manner stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land and call for claims to compensation in respect of all interests in such land. Section 9 (2) prescribes particulars of such notice clearly stating that 15 days' notice shall be given to file the claims. Section 9 (3) provides that notice shall be served on occupier, if any of such land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein. Section 9 (3) and (4) also prescribes the manner of service of notice. Section 11 provides for enquiry pursuant to notice under section 9 to the measurement, value of land, Claim and respective interests of persons claiming compensation and finally making the award. Section 12 provides that such Award shall be filed in the Collector's office and shall be final and conclusive between the Collector and the person interested. Section 12
(2) provides that Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such persons interested who were not personally present or by their representative when the award is made. Thereafter, section 18 reproduced above provides for making a Reference. From a perusal of the aforestated provisions of the Act, it is clear that the Legislature has taken precaution to ensure that not only the land-owner, but any person who is an occupier or in any manner interested in the land is intimated of the proceedings that are taken after publication of the Notification under section 4. The award is made under section 1 I . Therefore, while considering section 18 such meaning has not to be given which may defeat the intention of the Legislature. In the present case as the respondent No, 1 being the Land Acquisition Officer who had to conduct enquiry and make award seems to have purposely led the petitioners to believe that the Award had not been made although according to his own statement the Award had been made. The respondents have not produced any record to show that the award was made on 25th June, 1978. In the face of the contradictory statement made by the respondent No, 1 we are not inclined to believe that the respondent has made the award on 25th June, 1978. The petitioners were systematically kept away by misstatement by the respondent No, 1 from the knowledge of the date of the Award. In these circumstances to interpret the words "date of the award" in its literal sense will defeat the intention' of the legislature. In this regard we rely on the observation made in the case of Allah Ditta v. Faqir Muhammad and others (1). In this case section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act which provides for filing review application within 90 days from the date of the order, came up for consideration. Leave was granted to consider the correctness of the order of the Member Board of Revenue that the petition was barred by time from the date of the order although it was within time, if the starting point is to be taken from the date of the appellant's knowledges of the order. It was held : "It cannot, however, be denied that the Reader to the learned Member, Board of Revenue, in his letter referred to above (copy placed on the record) acknowledged the receipt of the appellant's application and had informed him in response there to, that his Revision Petition was dismissed on the 20th of March, 1962. It is clear from this circumstance that the appellant did not know about the result of his Revision Petition which was decided behind his back, until the intimation received from the Reader on the 20th of March, 1963. His Review Application brought within 90 days from that date was, therefore, within time. In a case where a litigant is kept in dark about the fate of his case, it is wrong to say that for a remedial action against it as provided by law, time would start to run against him from the date of the order and not from the date when he comes to know about it."
22. This observation supports the view that in certain circumstances the date-of the order can be interpreted to meant the date of the knowledge of the order. In the present case, the petitioners were systematically kept in the dark and in fact were misled by the respondent No,
1. Therefore, in such a case, particularly when the correct date of Award is also not ascertainable, it would be proper that the period of limitation for filing application for reference t the Court should be computed from the date of the knowledge of the award. In these circumstances, the application filed by the petitioners for referring the matter under section 18 was within time.
23. ' Mr. Abdul Hameed Khan the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the petitioners had come to know about the award on 22nd May, 1979, but they have filed this petition on 20th May, 1981 almost about two years front the knowledge, therefore, it suffers from laches. From the record it is clear that the petitioners had immediately filed a Revision Application against respondent's refusal to refer to the Court which was dismissed on 23rd February, 1981. The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed on record a list of various authorities to show that there is a sharp conflict of decision on the point, whether Revision Application was maintainable. , In this state of uncertainty the petitioners were perusing a remedy which was dismissed and immediately thereafter, they filed this petition, such conduct cannot be termed as negligent nor the petitioners are guilty of laches disentitling them to seek the discretionary remedy, under the Constitution. We declare the impugned order and or action of the respondent No, 1 to be without lawful authority and direct the respondent No, 1 that he should
(1) PLD 1965 SC 582 ' refer the matter to the Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for determination of the petitioners objection to the Award.
24. ' The petition is allowed.