' The decision dated 19th May, 1982 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 4, Faisalabad has been challenged in this appeal, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his reinstatement in service was dismissed.
2. The case of the appellant is that he was appointed as helper to cook in 1978 and was made cook in 1981 and his services were terminated on 19th January, 1982 by a verbal order. The case of the respondent according to the written statement is that the appellant was never employed by the respondent mills and that the mess of bechelor was not of the respondent mills but was a private arrangement of the officers. The appellant appeared as his own witness and produced in evidence service certificate Exh. P. 2, which is to the effect that the appellant had been working in the respondent organization as a cook since 1978. R. W. 1 admitted that there was a bochelor officers mess within the factory and that the respondent had been issuing furniture cutlary and other utensils from its store. Regarding Exh. P. 2 he said that the mills never authorised Mr. Irfan to issue service certificate Exh. P.
2. Besides examining R. W. 1 the respondent produced attendance register Exh. R. I. R. W. 1 stated that the appellant was employed for a few days on daily wages and before May, 1981 he never joined the mills. He also said that after he was relieved from the mills, some officers engaged him privately.
3. The learned lower Court has not gone through the attendance register thoroughly. This register belies the statement of R. W.
1. As mentioned above R. W. 1 said that the appellant was employed by the mills for a few days and before May, 1981 he never remained in the mills service but in the attendance register Exh. R. 1 right from November, 1980 to July, 1981 the attendance of the appellant is ecorded. I have underlined his name with red ink. He stands supported by Exh. P. 3 also which is a requisition slip admitted by him (R. W. 1). Exh. P. 3 requisition slip is for the supply of certain articles such as plates and spoons etc. It is dated 23rd December, 1981. R. W. 1 has admitted after seeing Exh. P. 3 that crockery etc. We're being supplied by the mills to the mess. If the mess had been running privately by the officers, the question of the requisition of articles from the mills could not arise. So firstly this appears to be wrong that from May, 1981 the appellant became private employee of the officers and secondly the version of the appellant appears to be correct that he was employed in 1978. Exh. R. 1 register is from November, 1980 to August, 1981 and as mentioned above, the attendance of the appellant is recorded in it, right from the month from which the register stands. Registers of 1978 and 1979 were not produced. The presumption is that if they had been produced, they would have disproved the stand taken by the respondent. Admittedly, no termination letter was issued. Even if at all it be assumed that in July, 1981 the appellant was terminated and he became private employee of certain officers. There is no evidence that he was verbally informed about. The solitary witness does not say so. In cross-examination also it was not suggested to the appellant that in May or July, 1981 he was informed about his termination. Since in the said mess the appellant continued working and this is not proved that he was informed about the internal change of employment, so he did not know anything and considered himself as the employee of the mills and brought the action when he was finally relieved of his duties in 1982. This appears to be the reason that the respondent did not raise the objection of limitation. Since the respondent continued in service without the knowledge of change, he was justified in giving grievance notice within three months of his termination of June, 1982. Learned counsel for the respondent has emhasised on the point that since in written statement the very employment was denied, the onus was upon the appellant but he did not call any document to discharge it. He says that the appellant cannot be given benefit of the evidence of R. W.
1. Ex facie the argument is hollow. The Court is not debarred from considering the whole material present on the record irrespective of the fact whether it was brought by the appellant or the respondent. If in reality the appellant had been privately employed by some officer after May or July, 1981 anyone of them would have been examined by the respondent and receipt of salary produced in evidence. Failure on the part of the respondent to do clearly shows that what R. W. 1 in this respect has stated is wrong. As admitted, that no termination order was passed in writing giving explicit reasons, the provisions of Standing Order 12 (3) were violated and no order came into being. The appellant, therefore, continued in service.
4. As a result of the observations made above, I accept the appeal and setting aside the impugned decision of the learned lower Court, direct the reinstatement of the appellant in service with 50% back benefits.