' The facts are that Kamal-ud-Din, the father of the petitioner, leased out the shop in dispute to respondent No,
1. On the death of Kamal-ud-Din by way of family settlement, in terms of the decree dated 20th October, 1976 passed by the Civil Court, the demised property fell to the lot of the petitioner. The latter applied to the Rent Controller for respondent's eviction inter alia on the ground of bona fide personal need. The learned Rent Controller accepted this contention and ordered the respondent's eviction. However, in appeal the learned District Judge, by his order dated 23rd January, 1982 reversed these findings and dismissed the ejectment petition. The landlord has now invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the available record. Before the Rent Controller, in order to controvert the bona fides of the petitioner's claim the respondent raised the plea that the former cultivated his agricultural land and also ran a cinema in partnership with his witness namely, Muhammad Mushtaq. He further relied upon a copy of Khasra Girdawari showing some land under self-cultivation of the petition. The latter led evidence indicating that he intended to run cloth business in the shop in dispute. In this behalf, to cast doubt on the petitioner's bona fide, the respondent took up the stand that he was not possessed of any knowledge about the cloth business which professedly be would start.
3. On thorough examination of the evidence of the parties, the learned Rent Controller discarded the respondent's version. He maintained that the land was cultivated by the tenants and the allegation of self-cultivation was successfully rebutted by the petitioner. He also held that the petitioner was not bound to disclose as to what type of business would be carried on by him. He came to the conclusion that the petitioner was jobless and did not own any other shop or possessed business premises within the urban area of Daska. Accordingly, the petitioner's plea of bona fide personal requirement was upheld.
4. The learned District Judge took the view that Kamal-ud-Din owned 10 shops but he or for that matter any of his sons, did not run any business. The deceased brought an ejectment petition against the respondent but when the rent was enhanced he did not press it. In the opinion of the learned District Judge, Kamal-ud-Din deceased and his family mainly lived on rental income. He found that before the commencement of the ejectment dispute, the petitioner managed 8 acres agricultural land and also ran film show. The other finding recorded by the learned District Judge was that the petitioner and his brother jointly owned a plot ; it was' got vacated and the shops were built thereon, which were given on rent. It was on the basis of these findings, that the learned District Judge reserved the decision of the Rent Controller.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, I feel that the impugned order has got to be set aside. Whatever may be the position, during the life of Kamal-ud-Din, the fact remains that after his death, as per evidence on the record, only land measuring 9 kanals 9 marlas devolved on the petitioner. The learned District Judge did not advert to this aspect of the case. In any case, according to the leanred Rent Controller, on the basis of his evaluation of evidence, the respondent's contention as to the petitioner's self-cultivation, including the entry in the Khasra Girdawari stood rebutted. But the learned District Judge failed to apply his mind to this fact. As an appellate Court it was his obligation to meet the reasoning which weighed with the learned Rent Controller in answering the issue of personal need, in favour of the petitioner. Again the allegation of running film show, was not put to the petitioner when he appeared as his own witness. The fact, that the rental income was the main source of Kamal-ud-Din's income, in no small measure, influenced the decision of the learned District Judge but this is hardly a relevant consideration, for adjudication upon the petitioner's claim that he required the shop in good faith for personal use.
What is relevant, is his assertion that he passed his intermediate examination about three years ago he is jobless and does not own any other shop in Daska. According to some judicial pronouncements, the statement of a landlord as to his bona fide personal need, corroborative of the averments made in the ejectment petition, is entitled to A considerable weight. Reference in this connection may be made to Haji Ghulam Muhammad v. Abdul Qadir (1) and Muhammad Siddiq v. Mistri Muhammad Aslam (2).
6. As regards the vacant plot, the petitioner deposed that the shops would be constructed over that site for leasing out the same. But the learned District Judge took the view that the shops have already been constructed and leased out. This is a gross misreading of evidence.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, argued that all these matters amount to appraisal of evidence, for which there is no room in exercise of writ jurisdiction. He submitted that while hearing the writ petition this Court cannot play the role of an Appellate Court and heavily relied upon Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail etc. (3).
8. I am unable to agree with the Respondents' learned counsel. This is not a case of reappraisal of evidence. The impugned order is vitiated by lack of application of mind by the learned District Judge to the material aspects of the case ; misreading and non-reading of important evidence and consideration of irrelevant factors. In Muhammad Sharif's case, it has been maintained :- "In our view the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere in matters of the kind involved in the present case is a very limited one and confined only to ascertaining whether the District Judge has not flouted the provisions of the relevant statute or has failed to follow the law relating thereto as laid down by the superior Courts."
9. I have no doubt that the impugned order runs counter to the law laid down by the superior Courts and suffers from errors patent on the face of the record justifying its removal through judicial review.
10. For the foregoing reasons this writ petition is accepted, impugned order declared to have been passed without lawful authority and the case is remanded to the learned District Judge, to decide the
(1) PLD 1975 Lah. 200 (2) PLD 1975 Lab. 308
(3) PLD 1981 SC 246 ' petitioner's appeal afresh, in accordance with law. The parties are left to bear their own costs.