' Appellants Sakhi Muhammad and Muhammad Sharif through this appeal by leave seek to challenge the legality of the judgment and decree passed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 25th December, 1975. The circumstances giving rise to the controversy are that a declaratory suit with respect to the land in dispute measuring 18 kanals, 18 marlas, situated in village Kotera Khanqah, was instituted in the Court of Deputy Custodian Kotli wherein the appellants claimed that they purchased occupancy rights of this land through an oral sale against a consideration of Rs, 265 from the non-Muslims in 1942 ; and as such they were the owners of the property in dispute. It was further claimed that their right had ripened into title on account of adverse possession and that they have effected improvements to the tune of Rs, 2,045. After recording the evidence the claim was allowed by the Deputy Custodian vide his judgment dated 6th June, 1967. The file, when submitted for confirmation, the learned Custodian after hearing the parties reversed the findings arrived at by the Deputy Custodian vide his judgment, dated 28th December, 1968. The review petition filed by the appellant-plaintiffs before the Custodian was also dismissed by the learned Custodian vide his order, dated 22nd July, 1969.
2. A civil suit was then filed by the appellants in the High Court based on identical ground to those taken by them in the proceedings before the Deputy Custodian and the learned Custodian. The suit was resisted by the respondent. The learned Single Judge in the High Court after recording evidence however decreed the suit of the appellants vide his judgment and decree, dated 12th February, 1973. On appeal by the respondents before the Division Bench of the High Court the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge was set aside by the High Court vide its judgment, dated 25th December, 1975. Feeling aggrieved by this judgment and decree passed by the learned High Court on 25th December, 1975, a petition for leave to appeal was filed by the appellants. Leave was granted by this Court for the consideration as to whether the civil Court had the jurisdiction to hear the case and allow the relief claimed by the appellants or was it within the competence of the Custodian alone to hear and decide the matter.
3. While arguing on the point of jurisdiction Mr. T. H. Tariq, the learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that although to decide and adjudicate upon question arising in any suit, appeal, application or other proceedings as to whether any person is or is not evacuee or whether any property is or is not evacuee property or what right or interest, if any, an evacuee has in any such property was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Custodian, yet in a case where the Custodian is found to have acted in excess of the jurisdiction vested in him or in a case of failure of exercise of the jurisdiction, the civil Court had the competence to entertain and allow the relief. Besides, with respect to the claim of a local relating to a property shown as an evacuee it was the civil Court alone which had the jurisdiction to bear and decide the matter. This aspect of the case, argued the learned counsel, was not taken into consideration by the Division Bench of the learned High Court.
The impugned judgment and decree, therefore, was contrary to law and could not be sustained.
4. Sh. Abdul Aziz, the learned counsel for the respondent, in reply argued that under the provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, it was the Custodian alone who could determine as to whether any property was evacuee property or what right or interest, if any, an evacuee had in any such property. The jurisdiction of the civil Courts has been expressly barred to adjudicate upon such matter. The grounds taken in the suit filed by the appellant in the High Court had already been taken by them in the proceedings before the Deputy Custodian and the learned Custodian.
The finding of the Custodian in this respect was final and conclusive. Entertaining the suit of the appellant-plaintiffs by the learned Single Judge of the High Court and then hearing and deciding it was an assumption of the jurisdiction not vested in him under law. The learned Single Judge in the High Court, argued the learned counsel, had, by hearing a civil suit and deciding it, converted the Court as a Court of appeal against the judgment and finding of the Custodian. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge was, therefore, contrary to law and the reversal of it by the Division Bench of the learned High Court was perfectly legal and open to no exception.
5. I will now proceed to examine the proposition in the light of the reasoning advanced by the learned Advocates for the parties. On careful examination of the relevant provisions contained in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, I find that any claim with respect to the right or interest in any property treated by the Custodian or Rehabilitation Authorities as an evacuee property is to be adjudicated upon by the Custodian and jurisdiction of the civil Courts in this respect has expressly been barred. Any person claiming any right or interest in any property shown as an evacuee property is to approach the Custodian for the relief. The relevant provision on the subject is section 22 of the Act which reads :- "Any person claiming any right or interest in any property treated by the Custodian or a Rehabilitation Authority as evacuee property may prefer a claim to the Custodian."
' In the present case the appellants moved the Deputy Custodian for the determination of their claim with respect to the land in dispute. The findings arrived at by the learned Deputy Custodian, on examination, having been found erroneous, were set aside by the learned Custodian and the suit of the appellant-plaintiffs was rejected. It was entirely within the competence of the learned Custodian to confirm or set aside the order of the Deputy Custodian. It is well settled that where a Court or a Tribunal ha the jurisdiction to determine the question it has got the jurisdiction t decide it rightly or wrongly. Assumption of the jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge of the High Court as a civil Court merely on the ground that conclusions, in his estimation, arrived at by the learned Custodian were wrong was unwarranted and not permissible under law. The jurisdiction of any civil Court to adjudicate upon such matter has clearly been barred under the provisions of section 41 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. For the proper appreciation of the point involved section 41 is reproduced. It reads :-
(1) Save as expressly provided in this Act no civil or Revenue Court or any other authority shall have jurisdiction :-
(a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any question arising in any suit, appeal, application or other proceedings as to whether any person is or not evacuee or whether any property is or is not evacuee property or what right or interest, if any, an evacuee has in any such property ;
(b) to question the legality of anything done under this Act by or at the instance of the Custodian ; or
(c) in respect of any matter which the Custodian is empowered by or under this Act to determine."
Powers and jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under the Code of Civil Procedure or under the provisions of Constitution are not to be used as vehicle to intervene with the decision of a Court or Tribunal having exclusive jurisdiction merely because the decision of the Tribunal, in its opinion, was wrong. The High Court will not, even in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred on it under the Constitutional provisions, interfere in any finding arrived at by any Court or Tribunal having exclusive jurisdiction except in exceptional cases and where it is found that the Tribunal having exclusive jurisdiction passed an order in excess of the jurisdiction so vested in it. The High Court will not take upon itself and convert itself to a Court of regular appeal for the simple reason that the findings arrived at by the Court or Tribunal having exclusive jurisdiction, in its estimation, are wrong.
6. I have carefully gone through the relevant record. Going carefully through the impugned judgment I find that the reasoning advanced by the learned Judges of the High Court reflects the correct legal approach to the proposition involved and I find no justification to interfere with the judgment and decree under appeal. On careful examination of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court I find that justifications shown for assumption of the jurisdiction by the civil Court are merely academic in nature and not relevant to the present case.
Nowhere in the D judgment is there any mention about the learned Custodian having acted in excess of its jurisdiction or that it was a case of illegal exercise of the jurisdiction by the Custodian.
The suit instituted by the appellant-plaintiffs in the High Court, under the provisions of section 41 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, was not maintainable. The learned Single Judge in the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The impugned judgment passed by the High Court on 25th December, 1975, is perfectly in accordance with law and I find no fault in it. The appeal having no force is dismissed with costs.