1. K. HOSSAIN, J.-The petitioners are Area Manager and the Managing Director of Merck Sharp and Dohme of Pakistan. Ltd. The company terminated the service of M. A. K. Chowdhury a worker, who was working as medical representative. The employee was appointed by the Company on 22-10- 62 with effect from 1-11-62 petitioner-Company was a foreign company in Pakistan with its incorporation in U. S. A. and became a Pakistani company on 28-6-62, the date of its incorporation in Pakistan.
2. The employee's service was terminated with one month's notice dated 1-6-66 which was received on 4-6-66 and the termination of service was to take effect from 1-7-66. On 14-6-66 the employee protested against his termination with two main contentions -amongst others viz. (1) he was entitled to benefits provided under section 19 of the East Pakistan Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965 and. (2) that since the employee was working with the present company before it became a Pakistani Company since 1952, his length of service should be counted from 1952 and not from 1-11-62 his date of appointment, with the Pakistani company. The petitioner-Company by their letter dated 23-6-66 accepted in substance the first objection and stated to treat his termination under section 19 of the said Act. The company accordingly sent a detailed account of payment under different heads on 27-6-66 and by two cheques paid the employee Rs. 5,799.79 which was duly received by him. The employee however, by his letter dated 10-7-66 protested about his total length of service, but the company by their letter dated 21-7-66 informed their refusal. The employee moved the First Labour Court, Dacca on 19-8-66 by an application under section 25 (1) (b) of the Act.
3. The company appeared and raised a preliminary objection that the application was barred by limitation under the said Act. The Labour Court after long discussion has overruled the contention of the company. Against this order the petitioner company has moved the High Court and obtained the present Rule.
4. A short question of law regarding the question of limitation under section 25(1) (a) (b) of the East Pakistan Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965 is involved. It is well settled that the period of limitation fixed by a statute shall ordinarily be mandatory. The point here is not whether the period fixed in the said Act is mandatory or directory but what` will be the starting point of limitation-terminus a quo. To appreciate this point the relevant part of section 25(1) (a) (b) may be referred to-- "25(1).-Any individual worker who has a grievance in respect of any matter covered by this Act and intends to seek redress thereof under this section, shall observe the following procedure -
(a) the worker concerned shall bring his grievance to the notice of his employer, in writing within fifteen days of the occurrence of the cause of such grievance and the employer shall, within thirty days of the receipt of such grievance, enquire into matter and give the worker concerned an opportunity of being heard and communicate his decision in writing to the said worker:
(b) if the employee fails to give a decision under clause (a), or it the worker is dissatisfied with such decision, he may make a complaint to the Labour Court having jurisdiction within thirty days from the last date under clause (a) or within thirty days from the date under clause (a) or within thirty days from the date of the decision as the case may be unless . . . . . .--- It the above provision is analysed, we get the following:
(1) Within 15 days of the cause of grievance the-worker shall bring it to the notice to the employer.
(2) Within 30 days of the receipt of such grievance the employer shall inquire and thereafter give hearing and communicate his grievance in writing to the worker.
(3) Failure of employer to give a decision.
(4) Communication of the decision by the employer.
5. Following the ordinary rule of interpretation that the period of limitation is mandatory we find "15 days" for the worker to bring his cause of grievance to the notice of employer, and "30 days" for the employer after receipt of such grievance to start enquiry. Failure on the part of the employer to start enquiry within 30 days of the receipt of grievance will give the worker right to move the Labour Court. The worker cm also move the Labour Court if the employer starting the enquiry within 30 days of the receipt of grievance gives and communicates his decision in writing to the worker; then within 30 days from the date of the decision.
6. In computing the period of limitation, the starting point we find is flexible and once starting point is fixed the sub--sequent period of limitation is no doubt fixed and rigid and shall be observed strictly.
7. The starting point therefore is a question of fact which must depend on the merits of a particular cage according to variable circumstances.
8. In the present case the questions are when the grievance was caused to the worker and when the employer is said to have given their decision. Both the questions are questions of fact. The statute provides that a worker shall bring to the notice of -the employer "his grievance" within 15 days of "the occurrence of the cause of grievance". The word "grievance" has not been defined in the Act nor in the Rules framed there under. We are, therefore, to give the word its ordinary meaning as understood in common parlance -and with reference to the context of the enactment. Grievance ordinarily is understood to mean "annoyance." One of the dictionary mean--ing is `cause of uneasiness and complaint; wrong' taking this or--dinary and dictionary meaning of the word `grievance' in the con--text of the section we find under section 25(1) that "grievance in respect of arty matter covered in this Act" are matters which a worker can agitate first to the employer then before the Labour Court. It is not each and every cause of uneasiness and com--plaint or wrong but only such of them as are covered by the Act that the worker can agitate. Judged in this light there may be cases where an act may give rise to different causes of wrong and at different dates and in such cases all the dates are to be regarded as the starting point of grievance, but once the worker has of the different dates of causes of grievance chosen any one of them then he is bound by it by his own action. In the present case applying the principles aforesaid we find that the employer in their letter dated 1-6-66 which was received by the worker on 4-6-66 terminated his service from 1-7-66. And so the cause of grievance against termination which is covered by the Act under section 19 to the worker occurs when the order is passed on 1-6-66. On 4-6-66 when the worker actually receives the termination order and on 1-7-66 when the termination actually takes effect. Any one of these dates is the cause of grievance to the worker.
9. As to the decision of the employer we find that the worker by his letter of grievance dated 14-6-66 raised substantially two main points: one being the benefits under section 19 (b) of the Act he was entitled to and the other being his length of service with the Employer-Company. The employer accepted his first contention and gave him benefits as communicated by their letter dated 23-6-
66. The worker agitated his second paint of grievance by his letter dated 10-7-66 and the employer, replied to that by their letter dated 21-7-66. The worker moved the Labour Court on 19-3- 66 within 30 days from 21-7-66. It cannot be said that by their letter dated 23-6-66 the employer decided all the grievance raised by the worker, nor can it be said that the grievance of length of service not decided by the employer is not covered by the provisions of under section 19 (1) of the Act. The employer also did not after their letter dated 23-6-66 treat the matter closed but gave an opinion and decision in their letter dated 21-7-66. In this view of the matter it cannot be said the letter of the worker dated 10-7-66 and the reply of the employer dated 21-7-66 were merely futile correspondences.
10. Mr. Hafiz's contention that the learned Labour Court was wrong in not taking the letter dated 23-6- 66 as the decision by the Employer is a question of fact and we have already found that it cannot be conclusively said that the said letter contained the full and final decision of the Company.
11. As we have stated above that these are questions of fact and the Labour Court upon the facts before him has come to a finding that 21-7-66 was that date of Employer's decision. For different reasons we also find that in the circumstances it can be taken to be the date of the full and final decision of the employer. In any event sitting in writ jurisdiction we cannot disturb this finding of fact and therefore the rule is discharged without any order as to cost.
12. SIDDIKY, C. J.-I agree.