1. ' S. A. NUSRAT, J.-This appeal by special leave is from the order of the N.-W. F. P. Service Tribunal dated 2-1-1982 whereby the appellant's appeal challenging the order of termination of his services dated 27-1-1980 passed by the Inspector-General of Police, N.-W. F. P. (first respondent herein) was dismissed.
2. ' The appellant held the post of Motor Vehicles Examiner. While serving at Kohat he was charge- sheeted in 1979 for having indulged in corrupt practice of issuing fitness certificates in respect of public vehicles without adhering to the rules and regulations and for doing so with ulterior motive, recording entries in relevant papers/record in an unprocedural manner which amounted to grave misconduct and having persistent reputation of being corrupt. The appellant furnished his reply to the charge-sheet whereupon an Enquiry Officer was appointed, who after conducting regular enquiry found the appellant guilty on the charges framed against him. The Inspector-General of Police, after perusal of the enquiry report and granting personal hearing to the appellant, terminated his services by his order dated 27-1-1980. Having felt aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred two petitions, which were captioned as mercy petitions, dated 4-2-.980 and 19-2-1980 respectively, to the first respondent requesting for reconsideration of his case by showing mercy to him and ordering his re-instatement in service. The said petitions were rejected by the first respondent on 12-4-1980. The appellant thereafter filed a service appeal against the said order of the first respondent before the N.-W. F. P. Service Tribunal which was dismissed on the ground that the appellant had failed to prefer a departmental appeal as required under section 4(a) of the N.-W. F. P. Service Tribunals Act, 1974 and his appeal, therefore, was incompetent.
3. ' The leave granting order in the case reads as follows : "Learned counsel appearing in support of this petition for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Service Tribunal referred to rule 11(c) of the N.-W. F. P Police Rules, 1975, in support of the submission that the only departmental remedy provided against the impugned order of the Inspector-General of Police was review petition and this remedy was indeed availed of by the petitioner. The point raised deserves consideration. Leave is granted."
4. ' The contention noted in the leave granting order has been raised for the first time as otherwise the appellant's case was that the mercy petitions/ review applications filed by him before the first respondent were by way of appeal but were wrongly addressed and the first respondent was, therefore, obliged to forward the same to the Governor, N.-W. F. P. This contention which was pressed with some force before the learned Service Tribunal was more argumentative than real and was found to be untenable on factual plain. Such contention, therefore, now stands abandoned and the case of the appellant is to be examined as set out in the leave granting order.
5. Rule 11 of the N.-W. F. P. Police Rules, 1975 on which reliance has been placed is as under :- "11. Appeal.-(a) An appeal shall lie only against the orders of dismissal, removal from service, compulsory retirement reduction in rank or time scale, forfeiture of approved service and imposition of fine ;
(b) there shall be one appeal only from the original order, and the order of the appellate authority shall be final ; (c)the appeal shall lie to the officer one step higher than the one who passes the original order provided that in case of orders passed by I. G. P., only a review petition would be admissible."
6. ' As the argument with regard to the applicability of the rule appeared to be attractive we straightaway called upon Mr. Bashirullah Khan, the learned Assistant Advocate-General to make a reply. It was, however, contended by the learned Assistant Advocate-General that the N.-W. F. P.
7. Police Rules, 1975 were not At all applicable to the case of the appellant who was not a Police Officer' and held the post of Motor Vehicles Examiner. He invited our attention to the definition of the word "Accused" given in rule 2(1) of the Rules which is as under "2. < i>Definition.-In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires :-
(i) "Accused" means a Police Officer against whom action is taken under these rules ;".
8. ' He then referred to the Police Act, 1861 where in section 1, which is the interpretation clause, it is provided that the word "police" shall include all persons who shall be enrolled under this Act." The same clause finally contains the following explanation :- "References to the subordinate ranks of a police force shall be construed as references to members of that force below the rank of Deputy Superintendent."
9. It was stated by the learned Assistant Advocate-General that the appellant was appointed as a Motor Vehicles Examiner by the first respondent as provided under rule 35(1)(2) of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969. The proviso to the said rule 35 also provides that "the Regional Transport Authority may anthorise any licensed Automobile Workshop to perform the functions of a Motor Vehicles Examiner."
10. ' The above contention, that the appellant was not member of the Police establishment as a Police Officer, further finds support from the Transport Department. Delegation of Powers Rules, 1958 issued vide Notification No, Integ. 15/7-57, dated 25-10-1958 by the Services and General Administration Department' of the Government of West Pakistan. According to the said Rules, Motor Vehicles Examiners were to be appointed by the Chairman, Provincial Transport Authority and the appellate authority in the case of their removal was Government.
11. ' In the light of the above submissions, it was contended by the learned Assistant Advocate- General that the appellant was a "civil servant" within the meaning of N.-W. F. P. Civil Servants Act, 1973 and accordingly he had to first avail the right of appeal, as provided in section 22 of the Act read with N.-W. F. P. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 before approaching the Service Tribunal.
12. ' The learned counsel for the appellant was unable to show that the case of the appellant was governed by the N.-W. F. P. Police Rules, 1975 and that he was not a civil servant. The applicability of the said Rules to his case was considered doubtful by the appellant himself as would appear from paragraph 4 of the memo. Of his petition for leave to appeal which is reproduced below :- "At this juncture it will be pertinent to submit that in police rules all the categories appointing Authorities and higher forum to hear the appeals have been mentioned but the post of Motor Vehicles Examiner has not been included in the police rules."
13. In the light of the above discussion we are in agreement with the learned Assistant Advocate- General that Police Rules were not applicable to the case of the appellant who was a civil servant within the meaning of N.-W. F. P. Civil Servants Act, 1973. The two mercy petitions filed by the appellant, which could have been as well treated as applications for "Review", were therefore of no avail to him as he was required to file a departmental appeal as provided in section 22 of the N.-W.
14. F. P. Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the relevant Rules. The said two applications, were clearly termed as mercy petitions and were directly addressed to the first respondent seeking relief from him and it cannot be disputed that the said respondent was fully competent to treat them as such and pass necessary order thereon.
15. ' For the reasons mentioned above, we find no merits in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.
16. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.