' S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).-Syed Moazam Ali Shah, has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, in which he has impleaded the Additional Inspector- General of Police Punjab, Lahore and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore Range, Lahore, as respondents.
2. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that the order of his reversion, dated 21st January, ;974 may be declared illegal/void and appellant be held entitled to all his rights/benefits on the basis of original order, dated 12th January, 1974.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant was put on probation for 2 years from 1st January, 1974 as a temporary A. S.-I. Vide order, dated 12th January, 1974 by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Lahore Range. Lahore. However, after 9 days the same Deputy Inspector-General of Police, removed him from probation observing that he was still immature. It was further observed in the impugned order that the appellant should get his chance of substantive promotion according to his original seniority amongst his colleagues. Aggrieved against this order he filed a representation, dated 27th November, 1975, which was turned down by Mr. Jehanzeb Burki, D. I.-G. Police, Lahore, vide his order, dated 12th April, 1980. Against the said order of D. I.-G. Police, Lahore, be filed further representation before the Additional Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore, which was also rejected vide his order, dated 16th December, 1980 after giving him personal hearing once again.
Hence this appeal.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned District Attorney assisted by the represntative of the Department and have also perused the parawise comments submitted by the respondents, D. I.-G. Police, Lahore Range, Lahore.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that according to rule 13.1 (I), which governs the promotion of Police Officers, D. I.-G. Police was competent to put him on probation and once the same had taken legal effect and had created right of substantive promotion in his favour, the same authority was not legally competent to cancel or rescind or withdraw his original order of probation. For this, he has placed reliance on Pakistan v. Muhammad Himayatullah . Learned counsel for the appellant has also referred to rule 12.8 of the Police Rules, to show that reversion from probation was only provided, if the probationer failed to pass the prescribed examination including written test or was guilty of grave misconduct or he was considered unsuitable for police service. According to the learned counsel, nothing of this sort so mentioned under rule 12.8 had happened in the case of the appellant, therefore, his subsequent reversion only after 9 days of his work. Was absolutely uncalled for. In this matter he has also relied on a letter Annexure E from I.-G.
Punjab Lahore, to all the Heads of Police Offices in West Pakistan, dated 3rd December, 1960.
According to learned counsel, the letter so mentioned above, clearly depreciate the practice of reverting a probationer by the successor of one who had put him on probation, considering it as unjustified. In this matter, learned counsel has also cited the cases of two junior A. S.-Is. Abdul Qayyum Rashid and Javed Akhtar, as precedents in his case.
6. On the other hand learned District Attorney while adopting the written comments of the D. I.-G.
Police Lahore Range, has raised preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal as according to' him, the same was barred by one year and 1 month. The D. J.G.- Police Lahore Range, submitted in his parawise comments that his representation was considered and rejected vide Order No, 12068, dated 26th June, 1975. According to D. L-G. Police Lahore the final order for the purpose of section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, would be 26th June, 1975 and the appeal would be barred by a period of 6 years. However, it has been further submitted that section 4(l)(b) of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, bars jurisdiction of this Tribunal in case the matter is agitated against the order of the competent authority determining the fitness or otherwise of a person to be appointed to or to hold a particular post or to be promoted to a higher post or grade.
7. With regard to the facts of the case, it has been submitted that under rules 13.3 and 13.18 of the Police Rules and rule 7 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, the name of a probationer, can be removed from the list of probation during the said period, without assigning any reason or giving him any show-cause notice for the said purpose.
8. We have given our anxious thought to the arguments so raised by the parties and have perused the record with respect to the authority quoted by the appellant Pakistan v. Muhammad Himayatullah Khan and have also given our attention to the letter of the Inspector-General of Police, addressed to all the Heads of Police Offices in West Pakistan, dated 3rd February, 1960 and find that the appellant's first order to place him on probation was passed by Mr. Siddique Suleman, D. I.-G. Lahore Range, but the same office cancelled his earlier order when he found that the appellant was immature and was much below in seniority amongst his colleagues. The perusal of the above-mentioned rules 13.3 and 13.18 of the Police Rules as well as rule 7 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appoint. Ment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, reveals that their rules vested the competent authority with powers to cancel the order of probation after giving reasons. The authority of SC relied upon, only relates to the cases where a person has acquired a valuable vested rights after the same has taken legal effect and not to the case of the nature so before us.
The appellant just worked for 9 days only as a temporary A. S.-I. On probation and when it was found by the same authority which had promoted him as such, that the appellant was immature and has superseded 43 of his seniors the order was rescinded. The letter of the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, also lays down that there was no bar for the competent authority ,to revise his own order provided that the reasons should be recorded which has come to the notice of the1 compe tent authority after the issue of original order. In the present case the authority which has passed the impugned order, has given reasons for removal of the name of the appellant from the said probation and has thus fulfilled the conditions laid down in the letter of the Inspector-General of Police so mentioned above.
9. We have carefully read the order of D. I.-G. Police, dated 4th December, 1980 as well as the order of Additional Inspector-General of Police, dated 16th December, 1980 and -find that both these orders are well-considered orders giving reasons for the same. In the above-mentioned orders both the D. L-G. Police and Additional Inspector-General of Police, have stated that during the personal hearing the appellan was asked to let them know as to what outstanding work in this field he has performed when he had been placed on probation, on out of turn basis. According to these officers, he had none to justify.
10. With regard to legal objection on the point of limitation and maintainability of the appeal under section 4(1)(b) of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, we are of the considered opinion that the objections raised are valid on both these points. The representation of the appellant was rejected in 1975 and no further representation was permitted to him but he chose to make the same in order to extend period of limitation in his favour. In view of the above, we have no hesitation to hold, that the present appeal is hopelessly time barred.
11. With regard to the maintainability of this appeal the argument advanced by the respondent is quite forceful as section 4(1)(b) does clearly lay down that the Punjab Service Tribunal will not interfere in matters of promotion or determining the fitness of persons for promotion.
12. The result is, we dismiss the appeal as non-maintainable, hopelessly time barred as well as without being of any merits. There will be no order as to costs. PLD 1969 SC 407