' This is a revision against the decree, dated 20th September, 1975 passed by the Additional District Judge, Multan, who dismissed the appeal of the petitioners against the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, First Class passed on 27th February, 1975 whereby suit of the respondent was decreed.
2. Respondents filed a suit for possession through pre-emption claiming that he had superior right against the petitioners being a co-sharer in the Khata, as khewat dar in the estate and is a tenant in cultivating possession of the suit land. The trial Court found that respondent was not a co-sharer in the Khata and did not possess a right superior to the petitioner as khewatdar in the estate but held that respondent was entitled to the decree in his capacity as tenant in cultivating possession of the suit land. The suit of the respondent was decreed and appeal filed by the petitioner against it was dismissed by the lower Appellate Court.
3. It has been argued that the suit land was sold on 6th July, 1972 but the provisions contained in paragraph 25 of the Martial Law Regulation No, 115 giving right of pre-emption to the tenant in possession of land was enforced from Kharif 1972. The submission was that Kharif crop commenced after the date of sale. Reliance was placed on Allah Rakhi and another v. Malik Khan
(1) in which it was held that Kharif crop means that which falls between summer and winter and the sale which took place, on 27th July, 1972 was held to be not pre-emptible.
4. In the case of Abdul Rashid Shah v. Khurshld Ahmad and another (2) it was held that Kharif crop commenced from 15th June, and the sale
(1) PLD 1979 Lah. 23 (2) 1980 CLC 977 ' effected in August, was held to be pre-emptible. In the case of Muhammad Aslam v. Muhammad Akram and another (1) a Division Bench of this Court held that like agricultural year Kharif crop commences from 16th June. In the case in hand the sale took place on 6th July, 1972 when the Kharif crop had already commenced. In the circumstances of the case I hold that the sale was pre-emptible by the tenant.
5. It was further contended that on the aforementioned amendment coming into force the revision pending in this Court stood transferred to the Board of Revenue. The amendment in paragraph 25 provided for transfer of the pending suits before the Collector and for the first time made provision for filing appeals before the Additional Commissioner and revision before the Board of Revenue. It was held in the aforementioned case of Abdul Rashid Shah v. Khurshid Ahmad and another that pending appeals were not transferred by the amendment. I am of the view that the revision pending before this Court at the time when the amendment was introduced has to be disposed of and it was not transferred to the Board of Revenue.
6. It was also urged that the civil Court had no jurisdiction because when Martial Law Regulation No, 115 was enforced giving right to the tenant to pre-empt the civil Court had jurisdiction only to adjudicate matter under the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The contention has no force. The civil Courts are Courts of general jurisdiction. The right of pre-emption given to the tenant was enforceable in the civil Court.
7. For the aforesaid reasons the revision petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
(1) 1966 Law Notes (Lah.) 176