' FAIZ MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.-These three Constitutional Petitions, bearing Nos. 326 and 447 of 1982 and 142 of 1983, arise in the following circumstances.
2. Rafiullah, petitioner in Constitutional Petition No, 326, is in possession of a shop situated in Mingora, Swat as a tenant of Muhammad Yaseen. The landlord filed before the Rent Controller a petition against him seeking his ejectment from the disputed shop on the grounds of default in the payment of rent and personal use. The pleadings of the parties were reduced to as many as six issues. The learned Rent Controller, after discussing all the issues and finding that the landlord had failed to prove his bona fides for personal use, vide his Order dated 27-4-1981, dismissed the petition filed by the landlord. The landlord, aggrieved by that Order, went in appeal to the Court of learned District Judge, who, vide his order dated 28-4-1982, while accepting the appeal, set aside the Order of the learned Rent Controller and directed the ejectment of the tenant from the disputed shop, giving him, however, four months' time to vacate the premises, provided he continued to pay to the landlord the monthly rent. Against the Order of the learned District Judge the tenant (Rafiullah) has filed this constitutional petition calling in question the said Order on the grounds set forth in his petition.
3. Muhammad Siddique, petitioner in Constitutional Petition No, 447, is in possession of a shop situated in Mingora as a tenant of Haji Saifullah. A suit for his ejectment from the disputed shop was instituted by his landlord, which was adjudicated upon under and in accordance with the provisions of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Civil Procedure (Special Provisions)
Regulation, 1975, ending in the dismissal of the suit. Later, the landlord again made against him a petition before the Rent Controller seeking his ejectment from the disputed shop on the ground of personal use. The learned Rent Controller framed as many as six issues in the case. After discussing all the issues and holding that he had the jurisdiction to entertain the petition and that the landlord did require the disputed shop for his personal use, the learned Rent Controller, vide his Order dated 9-3-1982, directed ejectment of the tenant (Muhammad Siddique) from the disputed shop giving him a period of four months to vacate the shop. The tenant went in appeal against the aforesaid Order of the Rent Controller and the learned District Judge, vide his Order dated 10-7- 1982, agreeing with the Rent Controller in his finding on the personal requirement of the landlord, dismissed the appeal, giving to the tenant a further period of four months to vacate the disputed premises. The tenant being aggrieved by the Orders made by the forums below has filed this Constitutional Petition, which has been registered at No, 447 of 1982.
4. Rehmani Gul, petitioner in Constitutional Petition No, 142 of 1983, is in possession of a shop situated in main bazar Mingora as a tenant of Purdil. A suit for his ejectment from the said shop was first instituted by the landlord under the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Regulation, 1975 which was dismissed as a result of findings given by Jurga against the landlord. This Order is dated 12-11-1979 and its copy is on the record. Against the said Order the landlord went in appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Malakand Division, which was, however, withdrawn for want of jurisdiction. Later, the landlord filed an application before the Rent Controller for the ejectment of Rehmani Gul from the disputed shop. This application was contested by the tenant on many grounds. The learned Rent Controller framed as many as eight issues in the case and after deciding material issues in favour of the landlord, he vide his Order, dated 16-1-1983, directed the ejectment of the tenant from the disputed shop, giving him a period of thirty days to vacate it. The tenant was not satisfied with the Order of the Rent Controller and he filed an appeal before the District Judge, who, vide his Order dated 24-4-1983, dismissed the appeal. The tenant (Rehmani Gul) has instituted this Constitutional Petition, which has been registered at No, 142 of 1983, calling in question the aforesaid Orders of the two forums below.
5. Since in these three constitutional petitions the arguments of the learned counsel representing the petitioners in each case remained confined to legal issues relating to res judicata and the jurisdiction of the forums below, and no arguments on facts were addressed before us, we would, while dealing with common questions of law, dispose of these three constitutional petitions by this single Order.
6. In Writ Petition No, 326 of 1982 the petitioner Rafiullah was represented by Mr. Lftikhar Butt, Advocate and respondent No, 2 was represented by Mr. Inamullah Khan, Advocate. In Writ Petition No, 447 of 1932 Mr. Hussain Khan, Advocate represented the petitioner and Mr. Nasirul Mulk, Advocate represented the respondent No,
3. In Writ Petition No, 142 of 1983 Qazi Muhammad Jamil, Advocate represented the petitioner and Mr. Salahuddin Khan, Advocate represented the respondent No,
3. The arguments of the learned counsel for the parties were beard and the record perused with their assistance.
7. Since the point involved was of considerable importance, we decided to ask the learned Advocate-General to address the Court. The learned Advocate-General confined his arguments to the point relating to the applicability of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance to that area.
8. Before we go further, it would be useful to state at this stage some undisputed facts which are material for the decision of the matters before us. The disputed shops are situated in Mingora, District Swat. The West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 hereinafter called the said Ordinance, was applied to the Tribal Areas of Chitral, Dir, Kalam, Swat and Malakand Protected Area by a Regulation called the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (Application to Certain Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier Province) Regulation, 1973 (Regulation I of 1973), which, as subsection (2) of its section 1 would show, came into force at once when gazetted on the 31st March.
1973. Sections 3 and 4 of the said Regulation, which were referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners in their arguments, are in following terms :- "3. Application of West Pakistan Ordinance VI of 1959.-The West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (West Pakistan Ordinance No, VI of 1959), hereinafter referred to as . The Ordinance, and so far as may be all rules, notifications and orders made or issued thereunder shall apply to the Tribal Areas to which this Regulation extends, subject to the modification that the expression "urban area" in the Ordinance shall mean such area as Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be an urban area.
4. Authority to exercise powers, etc.-Where under the Ordinance or under any rule, notification or order made or issued thereunder any power, function or duty is to be exercised, performed or discharged by any person or authority, such power, function or duty shall be exercised, performed or discharged by such person or authority as Government may, by notification in the official Gazette appoint."
' As was required by section 3 aforesaid, the Frontier Government in that Home and Tribal Affairs, Department, by its Notification No, 13/40-HD (TA-III-78), dated the 10th June, 1979, declared certain areas in Malakand Division to be Urban Areas for the purposes of the said Ordinance. Subsequent to the coming into force of Regulation I of 1973, whereby the said Ordinance was applied to the areas aforesaid, situated in Malakand Division, and before the issuance of Frontier Government notification referred to above, some procedural changes were introduced in Malakand Division for the disposal of civil as well as Criminal cases. By means of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Regulation, 1975 (Regulation II of 1975) a special procedure for the adjudication of disputes on certain matters to meet the special requirements of those areas was introduced in that Division. This Regulation created special forums for the adjudication of the disputes mentioned in the Schedule appended to this Regulation and also provided for a special procedure to be followed by such forums. Later, however, this Regulation was amended, insofar as it related to the Tribal Areas of Dir, Chitral, Kohistan and. Swat (which included Kalam), by the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Special Provisions (Amendment) Regulation, 1976, whereby, besides other amendments, the Schedule was omitted and subsection (1) of section 3 of Regulation II of 1975 was also amended to read as under :- "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, all suits by a landlord for arrears of rent or the money equivalent of rent, or for sums recoverable under section 7 of the North-West Frontier Province Tenancy Act, 1950 (N.-W. F. P. Act XXV of 1950), and all cases of a civil nature shall, save as otherwise provided hereinafter, be referred to a Jirga constituted under% and adjudicated upon in accordance with, the provisions of this Regulation."
' The words "save as otherwise provided hereinafter" used in subsection (1) quoted above relate to the following cases :- "(a) cases in which the interest of a minor or of a person of unsound mind is involved ;
(b) cases where provision for arbitration has been made in a contract between the parties ;
(c) cases by or against the Federal or the Provincial Government or a public corporation or a public servant acting in the discharge of this duty."
9. Before dealing with the common question of law urged by the learned counsel for all the three petitioners, we would first like to dispose of the plea of res judieata urged by the learned counsel for Muhammad Siddique and Rehmani Gul petitioner. The learned counsel argued that since the forum of competent jurisdiction had dismissed the suits for ejectment filed by the landlords under Regulation II of 1975, the subsequent ejectment petitions filed by the landlords under the said Ordinance could not proceed before the Rent Controller against the same tenants in respect of the same property. The learned counsel while so advocating invoked the rule laid down in section 14 of the said Ordinance.
9. It is true that in the case of Muhammad Siddique petitioner the suit instituted by the landlord under the said Regulation was dismissed and no appeal or revision was filed by the landlord against the said decision, but in the case of Rehmani Gul petitioner after the suit for ejectment filed against him was dismissed under the said Regulation, the landlord had gone in appeal to the Court of the Additional Commissioner, Malakand Division, where the appeal and the suit were stated at the Bar to have been withdrawn on account of formal legal defect. Tnere remained, therefore, no decision in the field in the case of Rehmani Gul petitioner which could have been considered while considering the question of constructive res judieata urged by his learned counsel. Be that as it may, both the learned counsel representing Muhammad Siddique and Rehmani Gul petitioners failed to notice the significant words 'under this Ordinance' appearing in section 14 of the said Ordinance. Since the decisions of the ejectment suits under Regulation II of 1975 were not the decision under the said Ordinance, the rule laid down in section 14 was not attracted to both the cases. The argument was, therefore, without substance.
10. We now come to the point of jurisdiction which was vehemently pressed by the learned counsel for the three petitioners. The learned counsel argued that no doubt the said Ordinance was applied to that area in the year 1973, by Regulation I of 1973, but it did not come into actual operation in that area from the date of its enforcement because, as was required by section 3 of the said Regulation, the Provincial Government had not declared which areas in the Malakand Division were to be the 'urban areas' for the purposes of the said Ordinance. They contended that until the declaration of 'urban areas' was made by the Provincial Government in the year 1979, the disputes relating to the ejectment of the tenants from the rented property remained to be disposed or under the normal law as was operating in that area. They further contended that before such notification was issued by the Provincial Government a special law for the adjudication of the disputes of a civil nature was applied to that area by means of Regulation II of 1975, which after amendment made in the year 1976 in subsection (I) of its section 3 came to govern all disputes of a civil nature, including those relating to the ejectment of the tenants from the rented premises, which became adjudicatable under the said Regulation. The learned counsel contended that Refutation II of 1975 being later in point of time and the words "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force" employed in its section 3(1) had the effect of implied repeal of Regulation I of 1973 whereby the said Ordinance was applied to that area. The learned counsel further submitted that if the Principle of implied repeal was not applicable, then by the doctrine of eclipse Regulation I of 1973, whereby the said Ordinance was applied to that area, ceased to remain in force, or was rendered dormant, till such time Regulation II of 1975 remained in force, and no proceedings, therefore, could be taken by the Rent Controller under the said Ordinance, no matter the Provincial Government in their wisdom, by means of notification issued on the 10th June, 1979, declared, besides other areas, Mingora in Swat District as 'urban area' for the purposes of the said Ordinance.
The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the impugned Orders of the appellate Judge and the Rent Controller being without jurisdiction were without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
11. The learned Advocate-General argued that despite the language used in amended subsection
(I) of section 3 of Regulation II of 1975 the disputes between landlords and tenants, which were exclusively triable under the said Ordinance, remained to be tried, after the 10th June, 1979 when the Provincial Government issued notification declaring 'urban area' for the purposes of the said Ordinance, under the said Ordinance and at the relevant time the Rent Controller and the appellate Authority constituted under the said Ordinance, and no other forum or Court, had the jurisdiction to decide the disputes of such a nature. He further argued that Regulation I of 1973, whereby the said Ordinance was applied to Malakand Division, was a law of special nature covering only one category of cases and the Regulation II of 1975, applied to that area, was a law of general nature for that area as it covered all categories of cases. The learned Advocate-General contended that according to the settled principles of interpretation of statutes a law of general nature, though later in point of time, cannot by reason of that fact repeal the earlier law of special nature applicable in that area, unless the repeal is specifically provided for or it becomes imperative by reason of the fact that the two laws cannot co-exist. He submitted that since Regulation I of 1973 and Regulation II of 1975 could co-exist, so the question of implied repeal of Regulation I of 1973 did not arise. He further submitted that if the law-maker had intended the repeal of Regulation I of 1973 a provision to that effect could have easily been inserted in Regulation II of 1975. Respecting the words "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force" used in section 3(1) of Regulation II of 1975, after amendment, the learned Advocate- General contended that such words used in a law of general nature do not have the effect of expressly or impliedly repealing the law of a special nature. He supported his arguments by citing the authorities reported as AIR 1938 Born. 372, AIR 1955 Tray.Co. 269 and AIR 1949 Cal.
323. His last argument was that the doctrine of eclipse was also not attracted to the matters before us and that the learned Rent Controller and the appellate Authority, therefore, had the jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment matters filed before them,
13. The learned counsel representing the respondents adopted the arguments advanced before us by the learned Advocate-General.
14. We have carefully considered the arguments 'advanced at the Bar in the light of the provisions of law which we have already reproduced. The said Ordinance, as already mentioned, was applied to the area where the disputed shops are situated by Regulation 1 of 1973. This Regulation had come into force upon its publication in the Gazette- of the 31st March, 1973. The said Ordinance had, therefore, come into force in that area from the 31st March, 1973. When we say that the said Ordinance had come into force in that area, we would mean that all its provisions bad come into force in that area from the said date, subject only to the modifications prescribed in Regulation I of 1973. Had the modification contained in section 3 of the said Regulation not been made in the said Ordinance, then subsection (2) of section 1 thereof, which provides that "it extends to all the urban areas in West Pakistan, except the Special Areas', would have also come into force in that area with effect from the to 31st March, 1973, the words "except the Special Areas" used in subsection (2) of section 1 of the said Ordinance having automatically stood abrogated by reason of the application of the said Ordinance to that area through constitutional authority. In that case the law would have also come into full operation in that area from the date of its enforcement. The modification made in the law by section 3 of Regulation I of 1973, however, made the difference because until the "Urban Areas" were declared by the Provincial Government, the said Ordinance-did not come into full operation in that area though it stood applied to that area with effect from the 31st March, 1973.
The factual position as obtaining in that area, therefore, was that although the said Ordinance had come into force in that area from the said date, but the proceedings thereunder could not be initiated because the Provincial Government had not declared "urban areas" for the purposes of the said Ordinance, a was required by section 3 of Regulation I of 1973. Upon declaration of 'urban A areas' by the Provincial Government by the notification referred to already, the requirement of section 3 of Regulation I of 1973 was met and the said Ordinance came into full operation in that area with full force from the 10th June, 1979. After such date proceedings could be initiated and action could be taken thereunder by the persons and authorities mentioned in the law.
15. From what has been said above it is clear that at the time when Regulation H of 1975 was applied to that area, the said Ordinance was already in force in that area for regulating the special relationship between the landlord and tenant. It had, however, not cone into full operation because of the reason already mentioned. It had come into full operation with effect from the 10th June, 1979. , This law was a law of special nature, complete in all respects, dealing with only one category of cases. The Regulation II of 1975, providing for a special procedure for adjudication B through special forums of the cases mentioned in subsection (1) of section 3 thereof, was for that area a law of general nature dealing with all categories of cases falling within the purview of. Subsection
(1) of section 3 thereof. We are, therefore, of the view that the enforcement of Regulation II of 1975 in that area did not have the effect of implied repeal of Regulation 1 of 1973, or for that matter the said Ordinance. If the repeal had been intended, then the law-maker would have easily inserted a clause to that effect in Regulation II of 1975. We are also of the view that the words "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being, in force" used in subsection (1) of section 3 of Regulation II of 1975, appearing as they do la a law of general nature, do not override the provisions, or have the effect of implied repeal, of the said Ordinances which is a law of special nature, nor would these words for same reason make dormant the provisions of the said Ordinance. In taking this view we are supported by the authorities reported as AIR 1938 Born. 372, AIR 1955 Tray.-Co. 260 and AIR 1949 Cal.
323. For the same reasons doctrine of eclipse was also not attracted. This interpretation of the law makes both the laws co-exist as in our view they are not mutually destructive. There was, therefore, no substance in the aforementioned arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners.
16. The last contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that no person could exercise powers or perform functions under the said Ordinance in that area until he was appointed by the Provincial Government for the purpose by a notification issued under section 4 of Regulation I of 1973, and that the Rent Controller and the appellate Authority already notified by the Provincial Government, in that regard prior to the coming into force of Regulation I of 1973 in that area, having not been so appointed, could not exercise powers and perform functions under the said Ordinance.
Referring to section 4 of Regulation I of 1973, the learned counsel contended that the language employed therein, being unambiguous, would lead to only that conclusion. The material section in Regulation I of 1973 was section 3, which being complete in itself, per its force, brought the said Ordinance into full operation in that area after the 'urban area' were declared thereunder by the Provincial Government by a notification issued in the official Gazette. Not, only by the said section the said Ordinance was applied to that area, but rill the rules, Notifications and Orders made or issued thereunder were also applied to that area with effect from the date when Regulation I of 1973 was published. After the 'urban areas' were declared by the Provincial Government and if section 4 had not been there, then the said Ordinance would have come into full operation in that area from the date of the declaration of the 'urban areas', because the prior notification for the appointment of Rent Controllers and appellate Authorities had been applied to that area by section 3 of Regulation 1 of 1973. The question arises whether by inserting section 4 in the said Regulation the law-maker intended to put off the operation of the said Ordinance until any person was appointed by the Provincial Government under the said section to exercise powers and perform functions under the said Ordinances or the said section 4 was inserted in the said Regulation with a view to providing the Provincial Government with additional powers to appoint any person other than those already notified by it, which notifications had come into force in that area per force of section 3, to exercise powers and perform functions under the said Ordinance, keeping in view at the relevant time the non-availability or the shortage of the judicial officers in any particular district falling in that Division. If we were to accept the interpretation placed on section 4 by the learned counsel for the petitioners, then the words in section 3 whereby all the notifications issued under the said Ordinance were applied to that area would be rendered meaningless and redundant. Such an interpretation which makes one provision in the same law redundant we are not prepared to accept, as it would run counter to the settled principles of interpretation of statutes. We are, therefore, of the view that section 4 was inserted in Regulation I of 1973 not to defeat the purposes of earlier section 3 appearing in the said Regulation, but it was inserted in the law to provide additional powers to the Provincial D Government to notify any persons to exercise powers and perform functions in addition to or in substitution of the persons already notified. Section 4 of Regulation I of 1973, in our view, was supplemental and not detrimental to section 3 of the said Regulation. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was also without substance.
17. Consequently, the decisions made by= the Rent Controller and the appellate Authority impugned herein were with lawful authority.
18. In the result, these constitutional petitions, being without merit, must fail, which are hereby dismissed. Since the difficult question of interpretation of law were involved, we make no orders as to costs.