' These two revision cases arise out of Suits Nos. 329 and 330 of 1982. These two suits were disposed of by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court on 22-10-1983, by different judgments passed in these two suits though the contents of those judgments are the same. All these two Revision Applications will, therefore, be dealt with by me in this one judgment and will be disposed of accordingly.
2. The brief facts in Revision No, 210 of 1983 are that the applicant was tenant of the respondent in respect of tenement House No, 3/B, 16/5, Nazimabad, Karachi, at the rate of Rs,150 per month. The Martial Law Authorities on the application of the respondent directed the applicant to vacate the tenement up to 31-3-1983. The applicant vacated the said premises and handed over the vacant premises to the respondent. The respondent filed suit being Suit No, 329 of 1982 against the applicant for recovery of Rs,4,443.12. The details of the aforesaid amount are as under:- Rent for the month of March, 1982Rs.100.00 Electric charges. Rs.418.32 Gas charges. Rs. 74.80 'The applicant damaged the property details thereof as averred in pants 4 and 6 of the plaint are reproduced as under:- "That at the time of vacating the said portions of plaintiff's house, it was found that the defendant had removed 2 doors of the rooms and one door of the kitchen, worth Rs,2,400 and Rs,400 respectively and also broken or removed W:C. pipes of 3" diameter and gas pipe and fittings worth Rs,800 and Rs,200 receptively."
Rent for the month of March, 1982. Rs. 150.00 Outstanding electric charges. Rs. 418.32 Outstanding gas charges. Rs. 74.80 Cost of two doors or rooms. Rs.2,400.00 Cost of one door of kitchen. Rs.4,400.00 Cost of 3" diameter W . C . pipe and labour charges.Rs. 800.00 Cost of gas pipe and fittings. Rs. 200.00 Rs.4,443.32
3. That the applicant in Suit No,329 of 1982 filed his written statement denying the various allegations made therein arid stated that no cause of action is accrued to the respondent/plaintiff and the plaintiff/respondent was not entitled to any relief.
4. Revision No, 211 of 1983 the brief which gives rise to this revision are that the applicant was tenant of respondent in respect of a portion of ground floor or House No, 3/B, 16/5 Nazimabad, Karachi at a monthly rent of Rs,350. The Martial Law Authorities on the application of the respondent directed the applicant to vacate the tenement. The applicant vacated the premises and handed over vacant possession thereof to the respondent. The respondent filed Suit No, 330 of 1982 for recovery of Rs,4,104 against the applicant in the Court of Small Causes Court, Karachi. The details are Rent for March to June, 1982 Rs,1,400, electric charges Rs,704 (a) Cost of 3" diameter pipe connecting the W.C. and other pipe Rs,1,400 (b) Cost of repairing the floor of the portion in his occupation Rs,500,
(e) Cost of Glass panes Rs,100 total Rs,4,104.
5. The defendant/applicant filed his written statement and denied the allegations made In the plaint and stated that no cause of action is accrued to the respondent and he was not entitled to any relief,
6. The learned Small Causes Court Judge on the basis of evidence produced by the parties and taking into consideration the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties decreed the suits for sums of Rs,4,443.12 and Rs,4,104, respectively with costs by his judgment, dated 22-10- 1983. The applicants, abovenamed, being aggrieved by the judgments/decrees, dated 2'210 1983 or the learned Small Causes Court Judge preferred these revisions on the grounds mentioned in the revisions.
7. Mr. Mumtaz Ahmed, learned counsel for the applicant has urged that the suits are barred by provisions of sections 15 and 23 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887. It is advantageous to reproduce these sections as under:- Section 15(1).-- "A Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the second schedule as suits accepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes."
(2) "Subject to the exceptions specified in that schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force, all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed two thousand rupees shall be cognizance by a Court of Small Causes."
(3) "Subject as aforesaid, the Provincial Government may by order in writing direct that all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed (five thousand) rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes, mentioned in the order."
Section 23(1).-- "Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing portion of this Act, when the right of a plaintiff and the relief claimed by him in a Court of Small Causes depend upon the proof or disproof of a title to immovable property or other title which such a Court cannot finally determine, the Court may at any stage of the proceedings return the plaint to be presented to a Court having jurisdiction to determine the title."
(2) "When a Court returns a plaint under subsection (1) it shall comply with the provisions of the second paragraph of section 57 of the Code of Civil Procedure (1882) and make such order with respect to costs as it deems just, and the Court shall for the purposes of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, be deemed to have enable to entertain the suit by reason of cause of nature like that of defect of jurisdiction."
' Besides these sections the learned counsel for the applicants also relied on Articles 11, 13, 19, 30, 83 of the Second Schedule to the Act. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the applicants are devoid of any force. Suits filed by the respondent/plaintiff are not barred by the provisions of section 15 and are not hit by the various Articles of Schedule II.
' The respondent/plaintiff has claimed rents in respect of the houses which were in possession of the applicants/defendants. The suits for recovery of rent are cognizable by the Small Causes Court.
I am fortified in my view with the principles laid down in the decisions reported in PLD 1960 Dacca 907 arid PLD 1958 Dacca 43. These are simple suits for recovery of rent in respect of house are not barred. Suits for damages are also not barred by the provisions of section 15 read with Schedule 11 to the Act. The suits against the applicants were filed for recovery of certain amounts on the ground of damages to the property of the respondent/plaintiff. According to the learned counsel, the loss suffered by the respondent/plaintiff falls within the meaning of the words 'injuries to the persons', learned counsel was not able to explain how the damages done to the property or for recovery of house rent would amount to an injury to the person of a respondent. Article 35(j). It is advantageous to reproduce as under:- "for illegal, improper or excessive distress, attachment or search, or for trespass committed in; or damage caused by the illegal or improper execution of any distress, search or legal process"
' This clause applies only to the cases where the suit is brought for damages to the property. The frame of suit itself is necessary to be taken into consideration before deciding whether the suit is of the nature tribal by the learned Small Causes Court or not.
8. Mr. Mumtaz Ahmed, the learned counsel for the applicants has contended that the suits do not fall within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court and as such should not have been tried by the learned Small Causes Court Judge in view of the fact that Articles 11, 13, 19, 30, 32 and 83 of the Second Schedule of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, 1887, for the trial of 'a suit for recovery of amount on account of rent and damages caused by the tenants of the respondent/landlord. It is difficult to agree with the learned Advocate for the applicants on this point. Section 15 subsection (1) of the Provincial Small Causes Act, 1887 clearly stipulates that a Court of Small Causes is not permitted to take cognizance of the suits which are specified in the Second Schedule of the Act. Subsection (2) of this section lays down that subject to these exceptions and subject to the provisions of any other law all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed five thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes.
' In the instant case the applicant has filed the suits for recovery of rent for recovery of gas and electricity charges consumed by the applicants/tenants and also for costs for repairing the damaged articles like pipes, glass pans, doors and other items. I am of the view that a suit for house rent is cognizable by Small Causes Court. I am fortified in my view with a case of Niaz Ali v.
Bashir Ahmed and others P L D111 1978 Lah.
221.
' The costs of repairing the other items which were damaged by the applicants/tenants while they were occupying the houses and handed over the vacant possession thereof to the respondent /landlord. A reading of Article 35 of Second. Schedule of the Act will clearly show that suits for damages for criminal acts have been excluded from the ambit of Article 35. It is abundantly clear from this that suits for damages for criminal acts are not tribal by a Small Causes Court. Article 11 is only a general article which refers to other matters relating to the determination or enforcement of any other right to or interest in immovable property. The wordings of Article 35 clearly stipulate that a suit for compensation for loss occasioned by the death of a person caused by actionable wrong for wrongful arrest, for malicious prosecution and for libel. The words 'injury to person' in Article 35(ii) Second Schedule, are used in reference to personal injuries as distinct from injury to property as held by a decision of this Court in the case of Haji Rehmatullah and another v. Standard Bank Limited, Karachi, reported in PLD 1970 Kar.
577. It is obvious, therefore, that in view of the provisions of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Provincial Small Causes Court of Small Causes, 1887, such suits are cognizable and triable by a Court of Small Causes. In view of the above, I am constrained to hold that the arguments of the learned counsel for the applicants on this point have no substance.
9. Mr. Mumtaz has next contended that the suits involved complicated questions of title as such the learned Small Causes Court Judge had no jurisdiction to try the same.
' From the reading of the facts and circumstances of the instant cases it is obvious that the defendant/applicant did not challenge the title of the premises in recovering the arrears of rent, electric charges and the loss or damages to the doors breakage was caused during the continuance of their occupation. In the case of Messrs Habib Industries Ltd. v. Pakistan reported in PLD 1962 SC 83 Cornelius, C.J. in delivering the decisions of the S.C. observed as follows:- "It will also be convenient to consider here an argument raised on behalf of the respondent, namely the Pakistan Government, that the suit was not competent in a Small Causes Court because it was in fact a suit asking for a declaration. As has been stated, the suit was framed as a suit for the refund of money overpaid, and a ground was stated for the belief that there had been overpayment. This objection, it appears to us, amounts to making the jurisdiction depend not upon the subject-matter but upon the correctness of the plaintiff's contention as respects the subject- matter, the very procedure which was deprecated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Raleigh Investment Company case. We do not consider that any substance can be allowed to the objection."
' In order to resolve the controversy it is necessary to examine the nature of the suits that have been brought. In my opinion, the nature of the suits can be best ascertained by examining the subject-matter that were brought before the Court. In deciding the nature of the suits or the subject-matter before the Court undoubtedly the plaints have to be taken into consideration. Not only the prayer in the plaints is to be examined but also the basis on which such prayer is founded.
From the facts and circumstances of the case it is obvious that the plaintiff claimed Rs,4,443.12 and Rs,4,104 on account of rent, electric charges, gas charges and on account of breakage, loss and damages up to the date of vacating the house by the appellant. From this it is obvious that the suits are only for recovery of Rs,4,443.12 and 4,104. In the case of Elahi Bukhsh Mendel and others v.
Ram Narayan 16 D.W. Notes 288, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows:- "The plaintiff sued for Rs,5 as damages for fish said to have been caught by the defendants from a certain tank in the month of Chaitra 1316 (March-April 1910). The main point in the suit was in whom the title to the tank. The Small Causes Court Judge was (we are told) asked to return the plaint for presentation to a Court having jurisdiction to determine the title but he declined to do so and proceeded to investigate the question of title himself. This he was no doubt competent to do for the purpose of determining the question of the defendants' liability for damages, but if he did so, it was incumbent on him to decide the question correctly and according to law."
' In view of the above it cannot be said that the finding arrived by the Small Causes Court was illegal or without jurisdiction.
10. In order to resolve the controversy it is necessary to examine the nature of the suits that have been brought. In my opinion, the nature of the suit can be ascertained by examining the subject matter that was brought before the Court. I have to look into the plaints. From the facts and circumstances of the instant cases it is obvious that the respondent/plaintiff claimed of rent and damages from the applicants/tenants. The questions, therefore, that require to be decided in the suits is whether the learned Judge, Small Causes Court, could adjudicate and decide the suits under section 23(1) of the Act, the provisions of section 23 of the Act are not applicable to the facts of the instant case as the respondent/plaintiff has not claimed any relief on account of title to immovable property which cannot be finally decided by such 3 Court. The plaintiff/respondent filed the suits for recovery of rent and for damages to the property.
' The respondent has contended that the jurisdiction of this Court in dealing with a provision under Order 25 of the Small Causes Court is considerably restricted that a revision under Order 23 is not to be disposed of in the same manner as a first appeal referred to High Court under Civil Procedure Code.
' Section 25 of the Act is in the following terms: "The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree/order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit."
' What the section contemplates is that when the High Court takes action under Order 25 or in cases where the jurisdiction of the High Court is involved under that section, the purpose is that the High Court should satisfy itself that a decree made in the case decided by the Court of Small Causes was according to law. The question that falls to be determined is when a decree be said to be in accordance with law ? It is not difficult to enumerate the cases covered by the section the cases may be catalogued. These are:-
(1) "Where the decision of the Small Causes Court is based on endue.
(2) Where the decision is based on an erroneous appreciation of the endue on read, amounting to a gross mis appreciation of the endue.
(3) Where the decision is based on endue which no reasonable man, on consideration of the same, come to the conclusion reached by the learned Small Causes Court.
(4) Where the decision is based on an erroneous view of the law." Section, I believe, received the most accurate exposition at the hands of Beaumont, C.J. in Bell and Co. v. Waman Hemraj reported in A I It 1938 Born.
223. The learned Chief Justice expressed himself as under:- "The object of S. 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does, section 115, C.P.C. and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders, Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere, merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have motived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at."
It is correct that section 25 should not be construed on point of fact. I am of the opinion that this Court under section 25 cannot constitute itself a Court of appeal and that it has no right to reverse the trial Court on question of fact unless the trial Court has given a perverse judgment or has overlooked essential evidence in the case.
After a careful and thorough study of the evidence led by the parties in support of their rival contentions, I have come to the conclusion that the findings of the trial Court are in accordance with law. I am not prepared to interfere.
' In the result, I dismiss the revision petition but under the circumstances without costs.