' Leave to appeal is sought to impugn the judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court which was announced on 7-11-1983 by the Registrar of the High Court stationed at Mirpur. By this order the petitioners, Qurban Ali and Haqnawaz, involved in a murder case under section 302/148/ 149/109, A. P. C. Read with section 5 of the Islamic Penal Laws Enforcement Act, 1974, alongwith some other persons were proceeded under section 512, Cr. P. C. In absentia and finally acquitted by the District Criminal Court vide order dated 17-8-1978. The learned Judge in the High Court quashed the acquittal order, of the petitioners passed by the District Criminal Court and the case was remanded to the District Criminal Court with the direction that the Court shall proceed with their trial in accordance with law.
2. This petition is barred by 20 days. In view of the objection taken by the Additional Advocate- General that the petition is time-barred, J have decided to hear the parties first on the point of limitation.
3. Mr. Abdul Khaliq Ansari, the learned counsel for the petitioners, while arguing on the point conceded that the petition was late by 20 days and there is no legal explanation to condone the delay but all the same since a law point of considerable importance is involved in the petition, the delay, he submitted, ought to be condoned and this would advance the ends of justice.
4. Controverting the arguments Sardar Rafique Mahmood, Additional Advocate-General, submitted that there exists no sufficient cause for condoning the delay and the petition, being clearly time- barred, does not merit consideration and is liable to be dismissed.
5. 1 have given my careful consideration to the submissions and have gone through the relevant record. For the proper determination of the point involved relevant facts may be stated. The judgment by the High Court was announced on 7-11-1983. Application for the copy of the judgment was moved by Qurban Ali on 8-11-1983 which was issued to him on 10.11-1983. The petition was dated on 2-1-1984. It would thus appear that even excluding the period which was spent in getting the copies, the petition is late by 18 days.
6. The question arises as to whether circumstances warrant condonation of delay. Out of two petitioners, Qurban All only has moved the application for extension of the period under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, read with Order XXIII, rule 2 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978, inter alia, on the grounds that the petitioners were not summoned when the judgment was announced and that the petitioners knew not the limitation and some lawyers ill- informed the petitioners that the limitation for the petition for leave to appeal is 60 days. It was also averred that the petitioner is a poor man and had to arrange for money and some time was also spent in getting the relevant documents typed.
7. Under section 5 of the Limitation Act there should be sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
Sufficient cause has always been defined as circumstances beyond the control of the party. It is correct that the Courts had been lenient and had been condoning some negligence, i. e., negligence to the extent to which it is regarded as human but gross negligence had never been condoned. The Courts had always been strict in demanding proof of sufficient cause for every day which has expired after the period of limitation. The above-stated proposition of law, however, is not strictly applicable in cases of capital sentence.
8. I believe that the ignorance of law accompanied by circumstances not indicating want of good faith and negligence may, in circumstances of a particular case, furnish sufficient grounds within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Order XXIII, rule 2 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978, but it is only correct to the extent that there is no negligence, no inaction and no want of good faith. A wrong advice given by a counsel may, therefore, in a given case, constitute sufficient cause, but a litigant, who has no knowledge of the law of limitation, as is said in the present case, does not act in good faith or with due diligence if he takes upon himself to determine the time.
9. As to what is or is not sufficient cause for the purposes of application under section 5 of the Limitation Act it would not be advisable to lay any hard and fast rule. Each case has to be considered on its own facts. What may be sufficient cause in one case may well not be sufficient in another case, In an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act it is the duty of the party seeking condonation to explain the each day's delay and unless this is done the delay should not be condoned.
10. On the above-settled principle of law, in relation to condonation of delay, let me now see as to whether any case of condonation is made out in this case. There are two petitioners and the condonation is only sought on behalf of one petitioner, namely, Qurhan Ali on the grounds referred to above. This means that the other petitioner has nothing to seek condonation. Even the petitioner, Qurban Ali, who seeks condonation, had entered such grounds in the petition which do not constitute sufficient cause even on the face of them. The application enters that he had consulted some counsel ; but who were those counsel,.Names have not been entered. Besides, the judgment was announced in presence of Abdul Khaliq Ansari, the learned counsel for the petitioners, and they cannot plead lack of knowledge of the date of pronouncement of the judgment. Therefore, explanation put forth by the petitioners does not appear to be satisfactory. In the first instance I fail to understand as to why explaining each day. Of delay has not been incorporated in the application for condonation. This omission makes the whole affair doubtful. The explanation, therefore, cannot be believed. Secondly, if a person negligently does not get the correct information of limitation with due care and caution and sleeps over the matter and allows to run out the period, he cannot afterwards seek indulgence of the Court for condonation of the delay.
Thirdly, nothing substantial is said that the petitioner, who moved the petition, in any way was hampered in moving the sank in time. The alleged plea of poverty and consultation with some lawyers does not ring true and can hardly provide a ground for extending the period of limitation.
11. Besides, the petitioner was represented by Mr. Abdul Khaliq Ansari, a very senior counsel, and naturally he was expected to consult him who, later on, has filed this petition for leave to appeal.
' The upshot of the whole discussion is that no plausible explanation furnishing sufficient cause has been brought forth to condone the delay. Each day's delay is required to be explained by the petitioners which has not been done in the present case and this omission fatally affects the petitioners' case.
12. Before parting with the case I may record my appreciations for Mr. Abdul Khaliq Ansari, Advocate, who frankly conceded that no sufficient ground has been made out to condone the delay. However, he, as said earlier, submitted that as an important question is involved in the case the Court may show its indulgence and condone the delay. I regret I cannot agree with the learned counsel. Even if an important point is involved in a case that would not, in any way, allow the Court to use its discretion in an arbitrary way to override the provisions of the Limitation Act and the Supreme Court Rules.
' For the above-stated reasons I do not feel inclined to condone the delay. The petition, being time- barred, therefore, stands dismissed.