DECISION ' This appeal by six workmen is directed against the common decision given by the learned Third Labour Court on 20th December, 1982 dismissing their separate grievance petitions challenging the termination of their services.
2. The facts which have given rise to this appeal, shortly stated, are that the six appellants were employed as workmen in the different departments of the Sufi Textile and Printing Mills Ltd., the respondents herein. By notice, dated 5th June, 1982 there was lay off of the workmen in certain departments of the respondent mills with effect from 6th June to 10th June, 1982. The ground given in the notice for the lay-off was that there was want of work in these departments and hence the Management had been compelled to resort to lay-off for a period of fourteen days. On the conclusion of the period of lay-off 1. e. On 20th June, 1982, out of the 65 workers who were laid off the services of 39 workmen were said to have been retrenched by the Management on account of lack of sufficient work and orders. Aggrieved by the termination of their services the six appellants preferred grievance petitions against the respondents before the learned Third Labour Court. The remaining 33 workers appeared to have been satisfied with their lot. At any rate they did not approach the learned Labour Court to challenge the orders of their termination from service. In their grievance petitions the appellants took the plea that their services were terminated orally and no reasons for the termination of their services have been given to them. It was further alleged by the appellants in their grievance petitions that neither any show-cause notice nor charge-sheet was issued to them. The respondents in their reply statement, denied the allegations contained in the grievance petitions of the appellant and submitted that due to shortage of work in the respondent mills, lay-off of 65 workmen was ordered for a period of fourteen days in the hope that the situation would improve but as the situation did not substantially improve, the services of 39 out of the 65 laid-off workers had to be terminated and the orders of termination of their services were sent to the concerned workmen at their residential addresses available on record by registered post, acknowldgment due. It was strongly denied that the appellants were gate- stopped or their services were orally or illegally terminated. The learned Labour Court, in the impugned decision, has held that the respondent mills had issued orders in writing terminating the services of the appellants and in this order they had stated the reason for the termination of their services which was shortage of work. It has further held that these orders in the case of appellants Ahmed and Muhammad Ahsan were personally delivered to them while in the case of the remaining four appellants the discharge orders were sent to them by registered post, acknowldgment due, and the acknowldgment receipt in the case of Qamaruddin was also produced, which bears his signature.
3. I have heard Mr. Ch. Rasheed Ahmed, the learned counsel for the appellants, and Mr. Muhammad Khursheed Ahmed Siddiqui, who appeared for the respondent mills. Before examining the various contentions of the two learned counsel it may be pointed out that the appellants were not cross-examined by the respondent in the learned Labour Court as the respondents remained absent on the hearing which was fixed for their cross-examination. The respondent submitted an application to the learned Labour Court for reopening the side of the appellants and for being allowed to cross-examine the appellants but this prayer of the respondents was rejected by the learned Labour Court by its order, dated 20th october 1982. This order was not further challenged by the respondents and it has attained finality. It may further be pointed out that the respondents examined their witness Abdul Haleez who is stated to be a Director of the respondent Company only in the case of appellant Qamaruddin but by consent it was agreed that his evidence was to be deemed as evidence in the cases of all the six appellants.
4. It was contended by Mr. Ch. Rasheed Ahmed, the learned counsel for the appellant, that none of the appellants had been communicated their orders of termination of their services and hence the alleged discharge of the appellant was invalid. It may, however, be pointed out that according to the respondents, they had sent the orders of discharge of the appellants by registered post, A/D, to the addresses of the appellants as available with them on the record. I find that in the case of three appellants, namely (1) Muhammad Saleem, (2) Abdul Lateef and (3) Muhammad lqbal, the respondents have produced the original covers containing the orders of the discharge of the said appellants. The addresses on the registered covers and the acknowledgment receipts accompanying the registered covers are identical with the respective addresses of these three appellants in their recruitment forms, which not only bears their signature/ thumb-impression but also their photos however the registered covers containing the discharge orders were returned undelivered by the postal authorities with their endorsement that the addressees were not available or residing at the addresses shown on the covers. In the case of Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Guftar Shah , it was observed that the law did not require or contemplate that notices should be actually served and received' by the workmen but it was a sufficient requirement of law if the notices were sent to the workmen by the ordinary usage of mankind that is by post. It was held by this Tribunal in the case reported in 1980 PLC 699, which has been relied upon by the learned Labour Court, that the orders of dismissal should be deemed to have been intimated to the workmen if the dismissal orders were sent to him by registered post in a cover which bore his correct address. In the instant case, as already stated, the discharge orders were sent by registered post to the appellants Muhammad Saleem, Abdul Lateef and Muhammad lqbal, at the addresses as given by them in their recruitment forms. They are thus -deemed to have received the discharge orders although the covers containing the discharge orders were returned by the post office undelivered. It was sought to be argued by Mr. Ch. Rasheed Ahmed that even if the1 discharge orders were sent by the respondents by registered post the same were not sent to the correct addresses of the appellants. I have already pointed out that in the case of the above three appellants the covers containing the discharge orders were sent to the addresses of the appellants as given in their recruitment forms. If the appellants have shifted from their addresses as given in their recruitment forms they should have communicated their fresh addresses to the respondents and since there is no evidence to this effect nor it is claimed by the appellants that they communicated any other address the respondents are deemed to have sent the discharge orders to the correct addresses of the three appellants concerned. In regard to appellant Qamaruddin although the cover containing his discharge order has not been produced but the respondents have produced the postal acknowledgment receipt as well as the registration receipt in respect of the cover containing the discharge orders. As the acknowledgment receipt seems to indicate that the cover to which the acknowledgment receipt relates was delivered to the addresses the respondent obviously could not produce the said cover. The postal receipt and the acknowledgment receipt, however, establish that a registered cover was sent to the appellant Qamaruddin at his local address. As the only communication which was sent to the appellants was the discharge order it would appear that the postal receipt and the acknowledgment receipt are in respect of the cover containing the discharge order. The acknowledgment receipt bears the address of appellant Qamaruddin as is given in his recruitment form. It is, therefore, to be deemed that he too received the cover through post which contained his discharge order and was communicated the reasons for the termination of his services.
5. There remains the cases of the other two appellants, namely Ahmed and Muhammad Ahsan. In their cases neither their recruitment forms have been produced nor the covers containing the orders of their discharge. It is, however, claimed by the respondents, that the orders of their discharge were personally delivered to them and their signatures were obtained on the discharge orders. The two discharge orders have been filed by the respondents with their reply statement.
Both these appellants, however, had denied that any written orders of their discharge were communicated to them or served upon them. Furthermore, they were not confronted with their discharge orders in their evidence before the learned Labour Court nor were they asked whether the signatures thereon were theirs, as they were not cross-examined at all on account of the absence of the respondents on the date when the appellants were called for cross-examination.
There is, thus, no tangible evidence to show that the signatures on the two discharge orders are of appellants Ahmed and Muhammad Ahsan or that the discharge orders were personally delivered to them as claimed by the respondents. It may be pointed out that the sole witness examined by the respondents, namely Abdul Hafeez, has not stated or claimed that appellants Ahmed and Muhammad Ahsan were delivered the discharge orders in his presence. Mr. Muhammad Khursheed Ahmed Siddiqui, the learned counsel for the respondents, however, sought to rely on the statements made by these two appellants in their affidavits before the learned Labour Court to the effect that on 20th June, 1982, the respondents had obtained their signatures on a paper stating that this was a letter of resuming duties after the expiry of the lay-off period. It was claimed by Mr. Muhammad Khursheed that this paper in fact was the discharge order of the two appellants.
However, there is nothing to indicate from the affidavits of Ahmed and Muhammad Ahsan that the papers that they were required to sign were in fact their discharge orders. Both these appellants asserted that they are illiterate and they do not know what was written in the papers they were required to sign. There is, thus, no tangible evidence to establish that the orders of discharge were served upon or delivered to Ahmed and Muhammad Ahsan.
6. It was also sought to be argued by Mr. Ch. Rasheed Ahmed that the orders of discharge of the appellants were mala fide but as this plea was not raised by the appellants in their grievance petition they cannot be allowed to raise this plea at this late stage. As already indicated the only grievance made by the appellants in their grievance petition was that their services were terminated orally and neither they were charge-sheeted nor any enquiry was held against them.
7. The upshot of the above discussion is that I would dismiss the appeals of appellants Qamaruddin, Muhammad Saleem, Abdul Lateef and Muhammad Iqbal and would allow the appeals of appellants Ahmed and Muhammad Ahsan and would direct respondent to reinstate them in service with full back benefits within one week from the date of this order. PLD 1981 SC 225