' This appeal arises from the decision dated 19th November, 1978 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 4, Faisalabad, whereby the grievance petition of the respondent was accepted and he was directed to be reinstated in service with back benefits.
2. The allegation against the respondent was that when the bus conducted by him was checked two lady passengers travelling from Kabirwala to Haveli Bahadur Sbah and a child travelling from Multan to Faisalabad were found ticketless. After the issuance of form TT-40, the respondent was charge-sheeted and considering his reply as unsatisfactory, an enquiry was held, which culminated in his dismissal.
3. The learned trial Judge held that according to the settlement Exh. P-7, the charge-sheet was to be delivered within 15 days of the misconduct and, therefore, it was time-barred. Only on this ground the learned trial Judge directed the reinstatement of the respondent. He, however, held that all other legal formalities contained in Standing Order 15 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 had been complied with. The learned trial Judge failed to consider that the settlement was between the P.R.T.B. And Hyderabad union, whereas the present case pertains to Ghulam Muhammadabad depot at Faisalabad. The representative of the respondent has argued that at the two on the settlement was made there was West Pakistan, therefore, the settlement was effective upon other depots also and the same position exists even now. I cannot agree with him.
This is true that at the time the settlement was made, there was only one Province in West Pakistan but Hyderabad depot being separate from other depots, the settlement made between R. T. C. And Hyderabad Depot union would not be binding upon other depots, unless it had been adopted and enforced in the other depots. Firstly, there is no evidence on the record that the settlement was made effective and applicable to ahulam Muhammadabad depot even at the time when there was only one Province, and secondly, after disintegration it ceased to remain applicable to other depots.
4. The representative has argued that the appeal is not competent, inasmuch as it is not signed by the Chairman, who alone had been empowered by the Board and there is no document on the record that the authority who signed the appeal had been delegated powers. Even this is not known as to what is the designation of the authority who signed the memorandum of appeal, because under the signatures designation has not been given. The other signatures are of Shafique A. Malik, Law Officer, but there is nothing on the appeal to show that he had been authorised to sign and present the appeal. The objection was taken by the respondent in cross- objections, copy of which was duly delivered to the learned counsel for the appellant. Since the appellant had the knowledge of this objection, he had opportunity to bring necessary documents to show as to who was the authority who signed the memorandum of appeal and that he was competent to do so. Likewise, there was ample opportunity to bring some documents on the record to show that Shafique A. Malik had been duly authorised. In the absence of any such material on the record, I am left with no other alternative but to hold that the appeal was not brought by some authorised person and thus is not maintainable.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that although the allegation is not against the respondent that he had realised fare from the without ticket passengers, yet since the distance of the place of checking was considerable from the place where the passengers got into the bus, the presumption is that the respondent had bad intention and had caused loss to the Board. I do not find any force in this argument. The respondent may be guilty of negligence in not issuing tickets for such a long time, but it cannot be said that he had bad intention. The question of misappropriation could arise only if he had realised the fare. Even the charge is not of misconduct, but of negligence in the discharge of duty. The words are {{URDU TEXT}} ' Both the allegations do not amount to misconduct. Negligence should be habitual and non- compliance with the rules is covered by Standing Order 15 (1) (ii) (a) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. In these circumstances the respondent was rightly reinstated in service. As the very appeal is incompetent, the question that back benefits could not be allowed also cannot be considered.
4. As a result of the observations made above I do not find any force in the appeal and dismiss it,