' The respondent, Ghulam Rasul Zahid, was serving as Chief Officer of the District Council, Rahimyar Khan, when his services were terminated by the Government of the Punjab, by order, dated 29th June, 1979. Thereupon, he filed a suit against the petitioner, Province of the Punjab, seeking a declaration to the effect that the said order was illegal, arbitrary, mala fide and without jurisdiction and as such it was void and ineffective as against him and he continued to be in the service of the petitioner as Chief Officer. By way of consequential relief, he prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the petitioner from implementing the said order. Alongwith the suit, he filed an application for grant of temporary injunction to the above effect which was granted by the Civil Judge before whom the suit was instituted. His order in this behalf was assailed by the petitioner by taking an appeal before an Additional. District Judge but without success. The petitioner has, therefore, come up in revision to this Court.
2. It was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the suit inasmuch as the dispute involved therein related to the terms and conditions of service of the respondent and was, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted under the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, hereinafter referred to as the said Act. It was maintained by him that if the respondent was aggrieved by the order of the Provincial Government by which his services were terminated he should have challenged the order by filing an appeal before the Tribunal instead of bringing suit before the learned Civil Judge. It was urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of the learned trial Court was without jurisdiction. He relied on subsection (2) of section 3 and subsection (1) of section 4 of the said Act to support his plea.
3. In reply, it was argued by learned counsel for the respondent that the question raised in the present case was with regard to the fitness of the respondent to hold the post of Chief Officer and, therefore, it could not be agitated before the Tribunal by means of an appeal. In this connection, he invited my attention to paragraph (b) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 4 of the said Act. It was also submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner could go before the Tribunal if he had been removed from service as a result of disciplinary action but since the termination of his service was ordered otherwise than on disciplinary ground, he was justified in seeking redress from the civil Court instead of invoking appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
4. The assertions made by respondent are that he was initially appointed on 26th November, 1976 as Chief Officer, Municipal Committee, Sadiqabad, in Grade-16, under the West Pakistan Local Councils and Municipal Committees Services Rules, 1963. Before his appointment as such, he was interviewed and he satisfied all the conditions for appointment to the above post. Having served the Municipal Committee, Sadiqabad, for some time he served the Muncipal Committee, Bahawalnagar, as well, in the above capacity. He was then posted as Chief Officer, District Council, Rahimyar Khan. Before the termination of his services, he had put in more than two years of service and was automatically confirmed as Chief Officer and as such his services could not be terminated as done by the petitioner. While terminating his services he was treated as a temporary civil servant holding a leave vacancy although there was no order to that effect and he was serving as Chief Officer on regular basis for having earned his confirmation as such. No notice was served on him before terminating his services nor any reason was assigned for so doing.
5. Subsection (2) of section 3 of the said Act reads as under : " (2) A Tribunal shall have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants, including disciplinary matters."
' The provisions of subsection (1) of section 4 of the said Act, on which too reliance was placed by learned counsel for the petitioner, are to the following effect : "(1) any civil servant aggrieved by any final order whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service may, within thirty days of the communication of such order to him or within six months of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, whichever is later, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal,: ' Paragraph (b) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 4 of the said Act reads as under : "(b) no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a departmental authority determining fitness or otherwise of a person to be appointed to or hold a particular post or to be promoted to a higher grade;"
6. Admittedly, the respondent had not been removed from service in consequence of disciplinary action but, it is also evident from his own averments that his services were not terminated on the ground that he was unfit to hold the post of Chief Officer. What has been stated by the respondent in the plaint of his suit indicates that the dispute involved in his suit is with regard to the nature of his appointment. According to the order by which his services were terminated, he was holding appointment against leave vacancy but his plea is that he was holding a substantive post for having earned confirmation as a result of having served for a period of about two years for which directly recruited officers are usually placed on probation. This dispute in regard to the nature of his appointment relates to the terms and conditions of his service and does not appear to fall within the purview of paragraph (b) of the proviso to subsection (I of section 4 of the said Act because it does not pertain to his fitness to hold the post in question. Therefore, prima facie, even on his own showing, the act ion raised by the respondent is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the jurisdiction of the civil Court in the matter I barred by section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this view of the matter, the interim injunction granted by the learned Civil Judge appears to be without jurisdiction.
7. I am unable to agree with learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent could go before the Tribunal only if he had lost his job as a result of some disciplinary action. A bare perusal of subsection (2) o section 3 of the said Act would show that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal extends to all matters relating to terms and conditions of service, in clouding disciplinary matters, and it is not confined to disciplinary matter alone. If a person is deprived of his job and he takes exception to the order made in this behalf, the dispute thus raised by him would be in respect of the terms and conditions of his service even though the impugned order is not based on any disciplinary ground.
8. Even if his jurisdiction to hear the respondent's suit is conceded, there are other reasons for which the stay order should not have been issued by the learned Civil Judge. The law is well-settled on the point that a temporary injunction cannot be granted unless the plaintiff has a prima fade case, the balance of convenience is in his favour and he is likely to suffer an irreparable injury if such injunction is withheld. Assuming, for the sake of discussion, that in view of the facts alleged by the respondent he had a prima facie case, no irreparable injury is likely to be caused to him in the absence of a temporary injunction because in case of his success in the suit he will be able to claim arrears of pay for the period for which he will not be allowed to serve a Chief Officer. The balance of convenience is also in favour of the petitioner because the stay order is likely to disturb the working on administrative machinery of the Provincial Government. This view o mine is supported by Supreme Court's judgment in Mashkoor Khan and others v. Province of Sind and others . While deciding the case under report, the Supreme Court had made reference to the case Province of West Pakistan v. Malik Asghar Khan (Civil Appeal No, K-41 of 1970), in which it had ruled as follows : " Issuance of temporary injunction to the Government Departments' in respect of service matters is bound to disturb their working and they should not ordinarily be issued unless there are compelling reasons to do so because balance of convenience ordinarily would not lie in disturbing the administrative arrangements of a Department."
' It was also observed in the case of Province of West Pakistan that refusal of temporary injunction would not cause any irreparable injury to the respondent "as we can claim a monetary compensation in case he succeeds in his suit and the orders of the appellant reverting the respondents to his original post of Forester are finally held as illegal and without jurisdiction by the competent Court." Since the respondent did not satisfy two of the three conditions for grant of temporary injunction, the learned Civil Judge committed a material irregularity in issuing that in junction.
9. The upshot of the above discussion is that the order of the learned Civil Judge allowing temporary injunction to the respondent not only appears to be without jurisdiction but also suffers from a material irregularity. I, therefore, accept this civil revision and set aside his order as also the order of the learned Additional District Judge by which he had dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
10. For the purpose of this civil revision I could not possibly help making some observations on the question of jurisdiction. Although I have used guarded language in this regard yet, out of abundant caution, I would like to say that the learned Civil Judge shall decide the suit pending before him in accordance with law and it will not be necessary for him to follow the view expressed by me on the above question. 1971 SCMR 5721 1