' Facts giving rise to this appeal are that the respondent, Ch.Hassan Din, made an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, against the appellant, Province of the Punjab The application was contested by the appellant. After recording of evidence, however, the respondent's plea was accepted and the matter in dispute was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator gave award and the same was objected to by the appellant. The respondent also made an application for amendment of award so as to allow him interest, costs, etc. Thereupon Ch. Ikram-ul-Haque Civil Judge 1st Class, Lahore, framed the following issues:-
(1) Whether the arbitrator has misconducted himself and the proceedings? O.P.R.
(2) Whether the award is liable to be set aside on account of objection taken by the respondent?
U.P.R.
(3) Whether the award has been improperly procured? O.P.R.
(4) Whether the petitioner is entitled to interest, costs and compensation for illegal detention and the money due to him and award is liable to be modified to that extent O.P.R.
(5) Relief.
' By his order, dated the 3rd April, 1984, the learned Civil Judge decided the first three issues against the appellant. As for issues Nos.4 and 5, he modified the award so as to allow interest to the respondent at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the institution of the suit tile the said date.
Subsequently, the respondent made an application for review of the above order. It was pointed out by him that the learned Civil Judge had omitted to direct him to pay the Court fee. On this, the learned Civil Judge reviewed his earlier order and directed the respondent to pay the Court fee within 30 days. Feeling aggrieved by the above orders of the learned Civil Judge, the appellant has come up in appeal to this Court.
2. It was contended by learned counsel for the, appellant that the arbitrator had misconducted the proceedings inasmuch as he had relied upon the evidence recorded by the learned Civil Judge on the respondent's application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act. He cited Province of Punjab through Collector, Bahawalpur v. Sufi Habib Ullah 1982 SCMR 243 to support his argument. The cited case does not relate to the point canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant. It is, therefore of no help to him. Admittedly, the appellant had not produced any evidence to substantiate the plea of misconduct and, therefore, no legitimate exception can be taken to the finding of the learned trial Court on the first issue.
3. It was also urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Civil Judge could not allow interest from the date earlier than the date of the decree. In this connection, reliance was placed by him on section 29 of the Arbitration Act. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent relied on section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the cases reported as Pakistan v. Waliullah Sufyani PLO 1965 SC 310 and Sh. Mahboob Alam v. Sh. Mumtaz Ahmad PLD 1960 Lah.
601 to contend that the learned Civil Judge could allow interest from the date of the filing of the application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure relates to civil suits and not to applications under section 20 of the said Act. The case of Pakistan v.
Waliullah Sufayani does not relate to an arbitration case and, therefore, it does not have any bearing on the question under consideration. The case of Sh. Mahboob Alam relates to the powers of an arbitrator to allow interest but the question rose before me is with regard to the powers of Court in this behalf. The case of Sh. Mahboob Alam too, therefore, is of little avail to the respondent.
The law governing the grant of interest by the Court is embodied in section 29 of the Arbitration Act and according to that law the learned Civil Judge could not allow interest from the date earlier than the date of decree. The order of the learned Civil Judge allowing interest to the respondent from the date of the institution of the suit (application under section 20 of the said Act) till the passing of the decree is, therefore, not sustainable.
4. In view of the above discussion, I uphold the orders under challenge with the modification that the respondent would be entitled to interest from the date of decree and not from any earlier date.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.