' This appeal arises from the decision dated 5th March, 1981, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 5, Faisalabad, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his re-instatement was dismissed.
2. The appellant was Officer Grade-III. He was dismissed on 27th October, 1979 on the ground of misconduct. The allegation against him was that he had altered and tampered with the Bank's record by making unauthorised and illegal double entry with mala fide intention after conspiring and collaborating with Israr Hussain for the misappropriation and fraudulent use of Bank's money.
The facts are that on 22nd March, 1978 a credit voucher worth Rs, 34,500 Exh. D. 2 was credited in Account No, 62 of one Hassan Muhammad. The same voucher was entered in Account No, 63 of Messrs Rafique Cloth House changing the account number from 62 to 63. Israr Hussain is alleged to have got a cheque of Rs, 34,000 shown to have been drawn by Rafique Cloth House and got the cheque cashed. The appellant had given the information of the fraud to the higher authorities on 2nd October, 1978, vide Exh. P.
2. Israr Hussain was charge-sheeted and enquiry was held against him and it is learnt that he has been dismissed. The appellant was charge-sheeted on 19th January, 1979. The charge-sheet is Exh.
P. 3 received by him on 2nd January, 1979. After making preliminary enquiry by the Divisional Inspection Team, the appellant was charge-sheeted. The appellant had demanded the copy of the preliminary enquiry report but his allegation is that he was not supplied the same. He participated in the enquiry. Israr Hussain who till then had not been dismissed had appeared in the enquiry, and had made statement against the appellant.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that respondent No, 4 was not competent to charge-sheet, appoint enquiry officer, give show-cause notice and to pass dismissal order because the appellant was at the relevant time posted at Bhakkar, Sargodha Zone whereas respondent No, 4 was not Zonal Head and that to overcome this difficulty document Exh. D. 11 whereby the Vice-President, Karachi authorised respondent No, 4 to charge-sheet the appellant, was issued. Likewise through letter Exh. D. 21, the Head Office Karachi authorised respondent No, 4 to convey the dismissal order. He says that the dismissal order Exh. P. 11 and the authority letter Exh. D.
21 bear the same date. It was, therefore, not possible to prepare both the documents on the same date. This is noteworthy that the dismissal order Exh. P. 11 which is dated 27th October, 1979 was conveyed to the appellant on 6th November, 1979. After sending letter Exh. D. 21 from Karachi Mr. Nazir Jamal-ud-Din, Vice-President Jhang Zone, could be informed on telephone from Karachi to the effect that he had been authorised to convey the dismissal order to the appellant, therefore, the dismissal order could be prepared on the same date i. e. 27th October, 1979. The receipt of Exh.
D. 21 may have been awaited and after it was received the dismissal order Exh. P. 11 was conveyed on 6th November, 1979, so, there is no abnormality. If in cross-examination such question were put, the matter would have been clarified. Of course, if dismissal letter Exh. P. 11 had been conveyed to the appellant on 27th October, 1979 it would not have been possible, because the letter of authority Exh. D. 21 dated 27th October, 1979 could not have reached the Vice-President, Jhang Zone on the same date. Since the respondent No, 4 has been duly authorised by the competent authority, therefore, there is no illegality in framing of the charge-sheet, appointment of the enquiry officer and conveying the dismissal order to the appellant by respondent No,
4. The other argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that opportunity of personal hearing was given to the appellant on 25th October, 1979 and on 27th October, 1979 dismissal order was passed from Karachi. He says that this was not possible. I do not find any force in this argument. Since respondent No, 4 had been authorised, therefore, be had to consider the matter after giving opportunity of personal hearing to the appellant and since he was not posted at Karachi but at Jhang, it was not possible for him to consider the case and to prepare the dismissal order, on 27th October, 1979. The next point argued by the learned counsel is that according to Exh. P. 11 the appellant is alleged to have provided opportunity to Israr Hussain to misappropriate the money, but charge-sheet Exh. P. 3 is to the effect that the appellant conspired with Israr Hussain and collaborated with him in the misappropriation and fraudulent use of Bank's money. Firstly this is wrong that in Exh. D. 11 it is mentioned that the appellant provided opportunity to Israr Hussain to misappropriate money. In Exh. D. 11 at item No, 2 it is written that Mr. Nazar Abbas should also be charge-sheeted for his collaboration in the entire fraudulent transactions. Moreover, by Exh. D. 11 Mr. Nazir Jamal-ud-Din has been authorised to charge-sheet the appellant and in brief the facts were expressed in respect of which the appellant was to be charge-sheeted, while charge-sheeting, the entire report of the preliminary enquiry board was to be considered and the charge framed accordingly. So, there is no illegality. The other point raised is that according to Exh. D. 22 respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were jointly competent to take action and that no order was placed on the record to the effect that they delegated powers to the Vice-President, Karachi or respondent No,
4. Respondent No, 4 is the Zonal Head, Mang and in Exh. D. 22 it is written further resolved that all administrative actions, suspension, pending enquiry and all punishments including dismissal and termination of services of officers upto and including Grade I Officers shall be served on the officers concerned by the Zonal Head on the specific authority of the Head Office in each individual case from time to time." It is also thus clear that the Zonal Heads had been authorised to serve the orders of dismissal etc. So, the respondent No, 4 being the Zonal Head was competent to serve the order of dismissal. There is, therefore, no force in this objection of the learned counsel. The other argument of the learned counsel is that the original order of dismissal passed by the competent authority mentioned in Exh. D. 21 has not been produced nor its copy was delivered to the appellant. If the appellant needed the copy of the original order of dismissal it could have been supplied to him on his request but since no request was made it was not necessary.
4. It has been argued by the learned counsel for appellant that the enquiry report is based on extraneous matters. He says that the charge was that the appellant afforded opportunity to Israr Hussain Manager to make double entry but the finding is that the appellant posted the credit voucher for Rs, 34,500 for the second time in the Credit Account No, 63 with the knowledge that the voucher pertains to Account No,
62. The charge against the appellant was not as pointed out by the learned counsel. It is clear before charge-sheet Exh. P. 3 that the allegation against the appellant was that he had altered and tampered with the Bank record by making unauthorised and double entry with mala fide intention. There is no such defect as pointed out by the learned counsel. Learned counsel has further argued that Sajjad Hussain Cashier who appeared as R. W. I.
Stated before the Labour Court that the appellant had made double entry in the ledger but before the enquiry officer he had stated that he did not know who made the second entry. The witness no doubt stated before the enquiry officer that he did not know who made the second entry but what he actually stated before the lower Court is that the entry is initialled by the appellant. It appears that before the enquiry officer the question put to him was who had made the entry but not by whom it was initialled but the question before the lower Court was that who initialled the double entry, therefore, the witness identified the initials and stated that the entry was initialled by the appellant. So, there is no contradiction. Sajjad Hussain is not the only witness in this respect. The other witness is Mr. Javed lqbal Naqvi and he stated before the enquiry officer that the double entry in the ledger was made by the appellant and it was initialled by him. Even Mr. Israr Hussain who was the principal offender and it was he who misappropriated the amount also deposed against the appellant saying that on the appellant's assurance he had done every thing. Learned counsel says that since Israr Hussain said that he had done every thing it means that the double entry was made by him. I cannot agree with him. Israr Hussain said "that he did every thing" not in the sense that he had made the double entry. Learned counsel says that since Israr Hussain and the appellant were co-accused, therefore, statement of Israr Hussain could not be used against him.
Not only Israr Hussain out two other witnesses namely Sajjad Hussain and Mr. Javed Iqbal Naqvi also stated that the double entry was made by the appellant and that it was initialled by him.
' The evidence is this that also account number of the voucher from 62 to 63 was changed by the appellant. Since there is no evidence that some one else had changed the number of voucher from 62 to 63, the evidence that it was changed by the appellant is believable. Unless the number had been changed, the deposit could not have been shown in Account No,
63. It is thus clear that intentionally double entry was made.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has said that when the appellant was charge-sheeted he had demanded the copy of the report of the preliminary enquiry but the same was not supplied to him.
According to him for giving reply to the charge-sheet it was necessary to see the said report.
Without seeing that report the appellant could give an effective reply to the charge-sheet.
Obviously, the reply was to be in negative and for denying every thing the perusal of that report was not indispensible.
6. As a result of the discussion made above, I am of the opinion that the appellant was rightly made responsible for the misappropriation made by Israr Hussain and in reality the appellant had posted the same voucher for the second time in the ledger changing its number from 62 to 63 whereas the amount of the said voucher had already been deposited in Account No, 62 by a different person and it could not be deposited in any other account. I find no force in the appeal and dismiss it.