' This is IInd Appeal under West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 from the order of learned Additional District Judge, Karachi, dated 19th October, 1981 whereby he had dismissed the appeal of the respondent which was filed against the order of the Rent Controller, dated 25th March, 1979. The learned Rent Controller by his aforesaid order had allowed the ejectment application of the respondent and directed the appellant to vacate the premises in dispute within 90 days and hand over its possession to the respondent.
2. The premises consisted of a house situated in Nazimabad. The description of the house is given in para. 1 of the rent application filed by the respondent. The ground floor and first floor of this house were given on rent to the appellant by the respondent in 1971 at Rs, 350 per month. The respondent herself alongwith her children was living in a rented house belonging to Evacuee Trust Board. It was alleged in the ejectment application that the appellant had committed default and that the house in question was required by the respondent in good faith for herself and her children who were seven in number, some of whom are going to be married, while others have been married and have sons and daughters of marriageable age. Due to this increase in the number of members of family the landlady is now in need of her own house for the purpose of her residence.
3. The application was resisted by the opponent, who denied that any default was committed in payment of rent. It was also denied that any bona fide requirement existed justifying the respondent's claim for possession of the house in question.
4. After recording evidence the learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that there was no default on the part of appellant so far as payment of monthly rent was concerned. This issue was, therefore, decided against the landlady. However, on the question of bona fide requirement it was held that there was sufficient evidence in favour of the appellant to hold that her bona fide requirement was proved.
5. The appellant had filed appeal against this order before the Additional District Judge. The landlady i. e. Respondent did not challenge the finding of the Rent Controller on the question of default. The learned Additional District Judge, in order to assertain the bona fide requirement of the respondent inspected the premises in which she was living alongwith her children: He had also recorded site inspection notes from which it transpires that the Evacuee Trust Property presently occupied by the respondent consists of one big hall and some outhouses. On the basis of this inspection the learned Additional District Judge was of the opinion that the present rented accommodation in possession of the respondent was not sufficient for the requirement of her large family.
6. There are concurrent findings of the two Courts below on the question of facts regarding bona fide requirement of the respondent.. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the case of Abdul Majid and others v. Khalil Ahmad (1) in which it has been held as under :-- "The High court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross and inexcusable the error may seem to be, unless there is an error in the procedure provided by law, which may possibly have produced an error or defect in the decision of the case on the merits.
' A fallacy in appraising the evidence as to a fact, unless it amounts to a material mistaken assumption, is merely an error in coming to a finding as to that fact, and such error has never been held to be an error of law justifying interference in second appeal."
It may be observed that since the appeal was filed under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, hence it shall be decided under the provisions of the said Ordinance although it has been repealed. Subsection (3) of section 15 of the said Ordinance lays down that the procedure in respect of hearing of second Appeal shall be the same as provided by section 103 of the C. P. C. In view of the above provision, the observations of the Supreme Court which apply to second appeal under the C. P. C. Shall equally apply to second appeal under the said Ordinance of 1959. Learned counsel for the appellant has failed to show that there has been any misreading of evidence or that finding of fact is perverse and contrary to evidence. In view of this legal position I do not find any reason for interfering with the concurrent findings of facts of the two Courts below.
' The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. The appellant is, however, granted three months time to vacate the premises in question.
(1) PLD 1955 FC 38