1. ' SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.-The petitioner, National Radio and Telecommunication Corporation (N. R. T. C.) seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, dated 27-5-1983 whereby a constitutional petition filed by it challenging the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, was dismissed.
2. ' The petitioner is a private limited company, all its shares subscribed by the Government of Pakistan in the Ministry of Defence and the Communication Division. It has the respondent as a union registered in the establishment which was also its collective bargaining agent. A dispute arose between the parties and it was brought before the conciliator who negotiated a settlement which was reduced to writing and confirmed by both the parties on 28th of September, 1981. One of the terms of the settlement (clause 3) related to increase in house rent allowance and it provided as follows :- "Increase in House Rent Allowance.-It is agreed and settled that the rate of House Rent Allowance will be @ 45% instead of 40% of the basic pay/wages w,e,f, 1-7-1981."
3. ' The petitioner interpreted this clause of the settlement to imply that the workers were entitled to 450/0 of the minimum of the revised national scale of pay while the respondent wanted it to be 45 4, of the basic pay of the wages. As the two interpretations of this clause were at variance a reference under section 50 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was filed by the respondent before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Two objections were taken by the petitioner to the competence of that reference under section 50. The first was that the petitioner was an establishment or installation which was rendering services in connection with the Defence and as such was exempt from the application of Industrial Relations Ordinance under section 1 (3) (a). The second was that a reference under section 50 was incompetent. According to the petitioner, an application should have been made under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance for the implementation of the award instead of for its interpretation under section 50. The Labour Appellate Tribunal rejected both these objections and interpreted the settlement in the manner sought for by the respondent rejecting the interpretation given by the petitioner. A constitutional petition was thereafter filed by the petitioner but the same was dismissed as without merit.
4. ' The learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated his objections. In support of the first objection with regard to the non-applicability of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, the learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a number of documents which were not in fact before the Labour Appellate Tribunal or before the High Court. In this respect is to be mentioned an application made by the petitioner for de-registration of the respondent union and an order of the Labour Court, dated 19-2-1984 allowing that application. He has also filed a statement of Major Waqar Hussain, dated 22-10-1983 to establish that armed personnel is posted in the petitioner's establishment in order to ensure the quality and the standard of its products. He has also filed the notification of the Government, dated 25-6-1981 exempting certain products of the petitioner from certain duties and taxes in so far as these products are to be supplied for use by the armed forces.
5. We find that with regard to the non-applicability of the Industrial Relations Ordinance a factual objection had been taken. It had a background that a registered union existed in the establishment since long without any objection by the petitioner. The petitioner had entered into a negotiation with the collective bargaining agent under the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. A settlement had come to be recorded under the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. A dispute had in fact arisen over the interpretation of clause (3) of that settlement. The petitioner sought to give it a meaning different from that given by the respondent. In this background of commitments by the petitioner itself there was required some evidence to establish the factual objection taken by it. None was produced before the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the High Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal justifiably rejected this objection of the petitioner.
6. ' As regards the second objection that it was not a case under section 50 of the Ordinance but of under section 34, we find that on the position taken by the petitioner and the respondent it was a question of interpretation of the clause and nothing more. The petition, therefore, under section 50 was competent.
7. ' The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that though the expression "basic wages" was used in the settlement, it had a background and it meant the minimum of the revised national pay scale. It could not mean anything else. This contention has no merit because the settlement contains the expression "basic wages." Basic wages have a fixed identity and it may be different in an individual case from the minimum of the revised national pay scale. There is no rule of construction whereby an expression used in the settlement should be altogether ignored and substituted by another expression not used when the meaning of the two expressions is distinct and there is no difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of the expression. In the circumstances we find that the decision given by the Labour Appellate Tribunal was not liable to interference and the judgment of the High Court suffers from no legal infirmity.
8. ' As regards the proceedings taken by the petitioner for de-registration of the union and non- applicability of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance started subsequently, we are told that the matter has not yet concluded and the constitutional petition challenging the de- registration of the .Respondent union is-under examination by the High Court. The petitioner is free to pursue that remedy and to avail of the benefits of the litigation wherever it attains finality. We cannot' give effect to that adjudication when it is itself sub judice ' It is not a fit case for grant of leave to appeal which is hereby refused.