DECISION ' This appeal is directed against the decision of the learned Second Labour Court, given on 16th January, 1983 allowing the grievance petition have concurrent jurisdiction, therefore, if one authority has taken cognizance, the other is debarred from deciding the same matter. But here the transfer order was not challenged before the N. I. R. C. A criminal complaint was brought, which failed. The Labour Court, therefore, was not debarred from deciding whether the transfer amounted to unfair labour practice and should be set aside. The learned lower Court.. Has relied upon proviso to section 12 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969, which says ;- "Provided that no Court, including Labour Court shall take any action or entertain any application or proceedings in respect of a case of unfair labour practice which is being dealt with by the commission."
' The words 'in respect of a case of unfair labour practice' are very significant. They mean that no action can be taken by the Labour Court in respect of a case of unfair labour practice which is being dealt with by the matter. The N.I.R.C. Has not dealt with a civil case of unfair labour Commission. If a case of civil nature is being dealt with, the Labour Court will be debarred from entertaining and adjudicating the same civil practice, therefore, the Labour Court is not debarred from deciding if the transfer of the appellant amounted to of unfair labour practice and should be set aside. Let us take an example. If the N. I. R. C. Has dismissed the complaint of unfair labour practice. Question arises if the N. I. R. C. Can decide the same matter on the civil side. Obviously the answer is in the affirmative. When N. I. R. C. Can hear case on the civil side why not the Labour Court when both the Courts have concurrent jurisdiction ? If contrary view is taken then it would mean that a party is debarred from seeking civil remedy if once it has failed on the criminal side and it will be against the well-known maxim "ibi jus ibi remedium". The learned lower Court, therefore, has erred in holding that the Labour Court is debarred from deciding the petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 of the appellant.
2. As upshot of the observations made above, I accept the appeal and setting aside the impugned decision of the learned lower Court, remand the case for decision on merits.