' The appellants have preferred this appeal against the decision dated 5th December, 1977 of the learned Punjab Labour Court No, 7 Gujranwala, whereby the respondent was ordered to be reinstated in service with full back benefits.
2. The respondent was appointed as a Godown Keeper on 9th November, 1974 for the Godown, in which the appellants had stored paddy. However, the respondent was made to work as a Clerk and the pay was given to him of the said post out of the Bank's accounts. His post of the clerk on which he was made to work was permanent. His services were terminated as no longer required on 5th August, 1975. It was alleged against the respondent that he had committed a fraud with management by giving age in the application for service.
3. The learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the pay was givan to the respondent from the Bank's accounts, because no transaction of paddy took place. The pay of Godown Keeper was to be charged from the parties to the transaction of paddy. He further says that the Manager without any authority seated the respondent on the post of Clerk. He also says that since for the paddy season the respondent was employed, on the close of the season he was rightly removed from service. The contention of the learned counsel that the Manager without authority seated the respondent on the post of Clerk is unestablished on the record. The Manager was not examined and there is no evidence to the effect that without the consent of the appointing authority, the respondent was made to work as a Clerk. Since the respondent worked on a permanent post from the very beginning and was paid from the accounts of the Bank he became permanent on the expiry of the period of probation, which had ended about three months before the respondent was removed from service. The mere fact that he was shown in the record to have been appointed as Godown Keeper is not sufficient. here could be necessity of a Chowkidar to look after the Godown but the work of Godown Keeper could have started when any transaction of paddy had been made. Obviously, the duties of a Godown Keeper are to maintain register and other record, in which entries are made when paddy is brought to the Godown or when it is removed. The name of the person who makes transaction of paddy is also entered and the amount which he pays is also brought on the said record. There may be other entries also which are necessarily made in the record. Since no transaction was made, obviously there was no necessity of Godown Keeper and only to prevent the respondent from demanding the right of permanency he was shown as Godown Keeper. Needless to say that the post of Clerk was lying vacant upon which the respondent was made to work. If he had been given the duties of Clerk simply to get him busy, then he would have been asked to work with a Clerk to assist him. I, therefore, hold that the lower Court has rightly held the respondent as a permanent employee.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that since the National Bank of Pakistan has been nationalized and has its own statutory rules, W. P. Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is not applicable. The representative of the respondent replies that in spite of the fact that the National Bank of Pakistan has been nationalized, Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is still applicable. The line of his argument is that where the Legislature intends to exclude the application of any law, it makes a specific provision in that regard. He goes on to say that in 1971 PLC 1 National Shipping Corporation was held to be a private establishment even though Directors were appointed by the Federal Government. He says that the simple reason that an establishment is controlled by the Government, is not sufficient to oust it from the application of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. He has made reference to Ordinance XX of 1979 (Central), whereby the National Shipping Corporation was excluded from the application of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. He further argues that the National Institute of Health was excluded from the application of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 vide Ordinance XLIII of 1980. I do not find any force in this argument advanced on behalf of the respondent. Proviso to section 1 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 clearly excludes the application of the said Ordinance from the industrial and commercial establishments carried on by or under the authority of the Federal or any Provincial Government, where statutory rules of service, conduct or discipline are applicable to the workmen employed therein, but there is no provision, in the said section, whereby the National Institute of Health or the National Shipping Corporation had been excluded from the application of the said Ordinance. This is the reason that by means of separate Ordinance the application of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 was excluded from the above-mentioned establishments. Thus National Bank of Pakistan stands excluded from the application of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that even Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 does not apply to the employees of the National Bank of Pakistan. The line of his argument is that no right has been guaranteed to the respondent under any law, award or settlement. He says that the rules of National Bank of Pakistan cannot be considered as a law even though they were made under Ordinance of 1949. In the Wage Commission Award of 1975 it is not mentioned that the Award would not apply to the Banks which have statutory rules. This direction was issued in the Award of the Second Wage Commission Award. So the first Award which was enforced in 1975 applies to the present case and its paragraphs 258(4) and (5) guarantee a right that in cases of misconduct, giving of show-cause notice and making of enquiry would be necessary. The case of the respondent falls under the first Wage Commission Award, because the second Wage Commission Award was made after the alleged misconduct took place and the enquiry was made. Since the allegation against the respondent was that he had committed a fraud with the appellant by giving wrong age in his application. It was necessary to follow the procedure given in paragraphs 258(4) and (5) of the first Wage Award. Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 applies and the Labour Court has jurisdiction in the matter.
6. So far as the factual position of the case is concerned, it was not proved by the appellant that actually any fraud was practised. In the application (Exh. R-I) for service, the age is no doubt incorrectly given, but the respondent disowned this application and the appellant did not prove that it was bearing his signatures. Since the alleged fraud was not proved, the lower Court has rightly reinstated the respondent in service with back benefits. I do not find any force in this appeal and dismiss it.