' This appeal arises from the decisions, dated 18th March, 1980 and 19th June, 1978 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 6, Rawalpindi, vide order, dated 19th June, 1978 preliminary objections were disposed off and vide decision, dated 18th March, 1980 the grievance petition of the respondent was accepted and he was directed to be re-instated in service.
2. The respondent was an Assistant employed in Satellite Town Branch, Rawalpindi and the allegations against him were of dishonesty, fraud and misappropriation. He was given a charge- sheet on 30th January, 1974, which is Exh. R-1. He submitted his reply Exh. R-2. An enquiry was held which culminated in his dismissal. He made departmental appeal on 7th May, 1976 and it was rejected on 31st May, 1977. The grievance notice was served on 10th August, 1977 followed by the institution of the grievance petition.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the grievance notice was not given to the proper authority and was given to the Zonal Office. In the written statement this plea was not taken, therefore, it cannot be agitated now. It was agitated before the lower Court but the learned Presiding Officer missed to see that no plea was taken in the written statement. The other argument of the learned counsel is that the grievance petition was not made against the proper authority, which, according to him, was either Head Office, Karachi or Principal Office, Lahore, whereas the petition was made against the National Bank of Pakistan through its Vice-President, Head Office, Islamabad. The learned counsel says that there is no Head Office at Islamabad, but he has not been able to point out any evidence on the record to the effect that there is no office at Islamabad and that the 'Head Office is at Karachi and the Principal Office at Lahore. He ha also said that the N. I. R. C. Had appointed the Vice-President, Principal Office, Lahore as C. B. U. And the employer and in this respect also he has not pointed out any documentary evidence on the record.
However, R. W.-1 Mr. Salim Akbar stated that the Satellite Town Branch of National Bank of Pakistan is in Rawalpindi Zone and there is no question to describe as the respondent in the grievance petition. In cross-examination he said that Mr. Zafar lqbal Salim is the Vice-President of National Bank of Pakistan, Secretariat, Islamabad and that it is controlled by the National Bank of Pakistan.
The objection of the learned counsel is that the grievance petition is not made against the proper authority. He says that the dismissal order was passed by the Head Office, Karachi, therefore, either the Head Office, Karachi or the Vice-President, Principal Office, Lahore should have been sued. The dismissal order is Exh. R-7 but it does not disclose by whom it was issued. It was passed by the Vice-President Administration but it is not mentioned whether he is at Head Office, Karachi or the Principal Office, Lahore or at Rawalpindi. Since one office of the National Bank of Pakistan is at Rawalpindi also, therefore, in the circumstances, when the dismissal order does not reveal by which authority it was passed, it cannot be said that the grievance petition was made against the wrong person. The very appeal is by the same authority which was sued in the grievance petition. The appeal is from National Bank of Pakistan through its Vice-President, Head Office, Islamabad. If there is no Head Office, at Islamabad and if there is no Vice-President there, then the very appeal is incompetent. It, therefore, appears that the Vice-President, National Bank of Pakistan, Islamabad was rightly sued.
4. As I have mentioned above there is no documentary or oral evidence on the record that the Vice-President or any other authority of the Principal Office, Lahore was appointed as the C. B. U. For the employer by the N. I. R. C., nor any copy of the said order is on the record. Learned counsel has cited 1980 PLC 568 (r) in which it has been observed :- "The application which was allowed by respondent No, 1 by ordering the re-instatement of respondent No, 2 cannot, therefore, be said to be binding on any of the petitioners. Since in the case of petitioner No, 3 the application was not directed against, the petitioner and since the relief sought was not against petitioners Nos, 1 and 2, it was also not binding on them."
' No such question arises in this case. In the present case if the order of re-instatement is upheld, only that authority will be responsible to implement the order which was made respondent in this case. The appellant cannot for his own fault blame the respondent. When the very order of dismissal does not show clearly by which authority it was made, the objection that the appellant was not the proper authority to be sued has no force.
5. The other objection of the learned counsel is that the grievance petition was time-barred. This objection is also not tenable and was rightly repelled back by the learned trial Judge. The dismissal order was conveyed to the respondent, as mentioned in para. 3 of the grievance petition on 7th May, 1976. The respondent brought the departmental appeal which was rejected on 31st May, 1977.
The cause of grievance arose from the rejection of the appeal. First of all the grievance notice was sent and then the grievance petition was made on 9th October, 1977. However, the learned counsel has argued that the appeal was incompetent since it was not made to the proper authority, therefore, it was rejected and thus from the rejection of the appeal, limitation could not be taken. I cannot agree with him. In the order, copy of which is Exh. A-5, it is mentioned that the appeal had been decided and turned down by the competent authority. There is no such thing that the appeal was made to incompetent authority and that for this reason it was rejected. So the appeal was made to the competent authority and it was rejected by the said authority, thus the period of limitation would start from 31st May, 1977 and from this date the grievance notice as well as the grievance petition both are within time.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction and the N. I. R. C. Has jurisdiction. In this respect he has made reference to section 22-B of the Industrial Relations Ordinance,. 1969 but this section empowers the N. I. R. C. To hear the cases of unfair labour practices and not of other grievances. Section 22-B (3) (a) is relevant in this respect and it reads as under : "The Benches shall,-
(a) In relation to cases based on allegations of unfair labour practices brought before the Commission for trial of offences, or enforcement of, or for redress of individual grievances in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to any employer or worker by or under any law or any award or settlement, perform such functions and exercise such powers as are performed and exercised by a Labour Court."
It is clear from the reproduction of clause (a) that only in relation to unfair labour practices brought before the Commission for enforcement of, or for redress of individual grievances in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to any employer or worker by or under any law or any award or settlement, the N. I. R. C. Has to perform such functions and exercise such powers as are performed and exercised by a Labour Court. Learned counsel says that since there is mention of right guaranteed or secured by any law, or any award or settlement, the N.
1. R. C. Has power to deal with every kind of cases and not only o unfair labour practices. From the very section it is apparent that only in relation to unfair labour practices power has been given to the Commission. The first requirement is that the cases brought to the N. R. C. Should relate to unfair labour practices and there should be for the enforcement of, or for the redress of individual grievances in respect of any right guaranteed or secured by or under any law, award or settlement, to challenge the unfair labour practice. The powers therefore, are restricted and relate only to the unfair labour practice. Under clause (a) powers have been given to the Commission relating to unfair labour practices in respect of trial of offences also. However, clause (b) gives general powers to the N. I. R. C. To perform functions and exercise such powers as are performed and exercised by a Registrar, a Labour Court or a Tribunal but those relate to industrywise trade union, Federation of such trade unions and Federation at the National level. The powers which a Registrar, a Labour Court or a Tribunal has in relation to trade unions and Federation of trade unions within a province are to be performed by the N. I. R. C. Under clause (b) in relation to industrywise trade union, Federation of such trade unions and Federation at the national level and in respect of cases specially referred to the Commission. I, therefore, do not agree with the learned counsel that the N.
1. R. C. Has jurisdiction and not the Labou courts.
7. The other point argued by the learned counsel is that the respondent is not covered by the definition of workman given in section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The line of arguments of the learned counsel is that only those employees are workmen who are I service and not the ones who have been removed from service. Learned counsel interprets the words 'is employed' to mean that the person coming to the Labour Court must be in service, otherwise he is not workman. I have already expressed my opinion elaborately in other cases such as National Bank of Pakistan v. Muhammad Haleem Chohan and National Bank of Pakistan v. Sadat Hasan Khan. In the definition of workman given in the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and in the definition of civil servant given in the Civil Servants Act also, present tense has been used. If the view expressed by the learned counsel is accepted, then no employee wherever he is employed cannot seek redress against his termination or dismissal. But this does not appear to be the intention of law. The provisions of a Statute cannot be self-contradictory. In subsection (6) of section 25-A, which no stands deleted, it was provided that dismissal, removal, discharge or termination a workman can challenge the order before the Labour Court within two months of the accrual of the cause of action. If section 2 (xxviii) is interpreted to mean that dismissed and removed persons are not workmen then this provision becomes contradictory to the provisions of subsection (6). Subsection (6) was inserted in section 25-A to make a ,provision that in cases of dismissal and termination, without service of grievance notice as required by section 25-A (1) a grievance petition could be brought, provided the workman comes to the Labour Court within two months of the order of dismissal etc. If only that person who is in service could be a workman, then the subsection (6) dismissed, discharged, retrenched and removed persons would not have been described as workmen, nor a provision made that they within two months of the accrual of the cause of action could challenge the order. I, therefore hold that not only those persons who are in service but dismissed, discharged and removed persons also are workmen and the words 'I employed' mean the person who once had been employed.
8. On merits the learned counsel has not argued the appeal and has said only this much that the learned lower Court, after the decision of the preliminary objections, did not afford opportunity to produce evidence. This is factually wrong. The appellant did produce evidence thereafter by examining Sh. Muhammad Jamil (It. W.-1) and M. Salim Akbar, Welfare Officer (R. W.-2). The statements of these witnesses were recorded on 26th January, 1981, whereas the preliminary objections were decided by the learned lower Court on 19th June, 1978. However, the respondent did not produce evidence. Mst. Zarda Begun), account holder, gave affidavit, which is at page 39 of the enquiry proceedings. She stated therein that there was no illegal withdrawal from her account and that the complaint against the respondent was based upon some misunderstanding. When the very complainant gave affidavit to the effect that no amount from her account had been withdrawn illegally, there remained nothing in the case. She even disowned the complaint saying that the same was based upon some misunderstanding. Although the complainant was not anxious to proceed with the case and to support the case of the prosecution, yet the Enquiry Officer said that the lady being related to the respondent had been won over and, therefore had withdrawn her complaint. The Enquiry Officer, as mentioned by the lower Court, had enquired from certain branches of the bank about the other charge but received reply from five branches to the effect that their D. D. Ps. Belonging to the respondent had been realised. From the remaining branches no reply had been received. The Enquiry Officer without waiting for the reply from those branches and without sending reminders completed the enquiry returning the verdict of guilty against the respondent. It is thus apparent that so far as the Enquiry Officer is concerned, he returned the verdict of guilty without any evidence and so far as the lower Court is concerned, the appellant did not establish the charges against the respondent. The Enquiry Officer appearing as R.
W.-I on 26th January, 1980 stated in cross-examination that no prosecution witness was produced by the appellant in the enquiry. It is thus apparent that the Enquiry Officer without any evidence found the respondent guilty of the charges. M. Salim Akbar, Welfare Officer, R. W.-2, stated nothing on the merits of the case, therefore, his evidence also did not bring any material against the respondent on the lower Court file. The learned lower Court, therefore, rightly accepted the grievance petition of the respondent by ordering his reinstatement. However, since the complaint had been made against the respondent and the possibility cannot be excluded that on account of making good the loss, the complainant gave affidavit in his favour, the respondent was not entitled to back benefits. I, accordingly, partly accept the appeal and modify the impugned decision of the learned lower Court by disallowing back benefits to the respondent.