' MUHAMMAD ZAHOORUL HAQ, J.--In this petition the petitioner has challenged the orders passed by Deputy Registrar Co-operative Housing Societies, Karachi dated 15-1-1974 whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner against the majority award of the Arbitrators was found incompetent, as well as the order passed by the Secretary, Government of Sind, Co-operation Department dated 16-11-1974 whereby the revision filed by the petitioner was also dismissed.
' The facts are that Plot No,84-L/2, P.E.C.H.S., Karachi measuring 400 sq. yds was allotted by respondent No,3 to the petitioner on 25-1-1953 and registered sub-license was executed in his favour and registered on 22-11-1955. The petitioner was given the possession of the Plot. In 1967 the original documents of the petitioner appear to have been lost and he, therefore, applied to Society for issuance of duplicate allotment order on 21-1-1967 and the same were granted to him.
' On 27-8-69 the petitioner found that some construction work was in progress over his plot. He came to know that respondent No,5 had purchased the said plot from respondent No,4 Jalil Ahmed on 19-3-1969 and that before this the name of respondent No,4 had been mutated in respect of this plot on 6-2-1969. The petitioner alleges that the mutation in favour of respondent No,4 had been made on the basis of documents which had been forged.
' The petitioner lodged a complaint with the Police in respect of the same and also filed an application under section 54 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 before the Registrar of Co- operative Societies. The same was referred by the Registrar to his nominee and the parties also appointed their nominees. After recording evidence of the defendant persons the panel of Arbitrators gave a majority award on 17-8-1970. The nominees of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 agreed with the Registrar and dismissed the application of the petitioner whereas the nominee ,,f the petitioner dissented.
' The petitioner challenged the said award before respondent No,2. The respondent No,2 by order dated 15-1-1974 in Appeal No,39 of 1970 passed the following order:-- "The appeal is for setting aside a majority award, given by the Arbitrators under section 54 of the Co-operative Societies Act VII of 1925. It becomes incompetent under section 56 of the said Act.
Besides, there are no cogent reasons to alter the decision of the Arbitrators".
' The petitioner thereafter filed Revision Application under section 69-A of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 before the Secretary of respondent No,1. The same was however, dismissed on 16-11-1974.The Secretary of respondent No,1 held that appeal under section 56 does not lie if the award is made under section 54 by a panel of Arbitration but the appeal is competent under section 56 if the award is made only by the nominee. The Secretary of the Co-operation Department made observations against the petitioner on the factual side of the case and observed as under:-- "On the factual side of the case, I have found that the stand taken by the applicant in the present case is against his own conduct and the same seems to be an afterthought. There is sufficient substance on record to show that respondent was a bona fide transferee of the share and the Plot No,84-L allotted to the applicant by the respondent, Society. Not only this respondent 3 was made by the applicant, as his nominee the original membership application he filled in, in the year 1952 and also his general attorney some time later on. This plot afterwards transferred to respondent 3 by respondent 2 who has now completed the building thereon".
' Mr. Shahanshah Hussain, tlie learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the view of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that appeal against the decision of the Panel of Arbitrators under section 56 is not competent is not in accordance with law. The learned counsel submitted that in this case it was only the decision of the nominee with whom the nominees of the respondents 4 and 5 had agreed whereas the nominees of the respondents 4 and 5 had agreed whereas the nominee of the petitioner had dissented. Consequently the decision was merely the decision of the nominee and not of the Arbitrators as such. We do not agree with this submission of the learned counsel. Section 56 0 the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 is as under:-- "56. Appeal against award of arbitrator. Any party aggrieve by any decision of the Registrar's nominee made under section 54 (or subsection (3) of section 54-A) of an order pass under section 55 by the Registrar's nominee or arbitrators ma within one month of the date of the award or order appeal t the Registrar and the Registrar shall decide the appeal."
' The above provision makes it quite clear that the registrar can hear only appeal against the decision of the nominee of the Registrar made under section 54 but the decision of the Pane of Arbitrators is not made so appealable. The mere fact that the decision has been written by the nominee of the Registrar with which the other nominees have concurred or dissented does not make the same as decision of the nominee only and i is the decision of the majority of the Panel of Arbitrators, 1 was held in PLD 1975 Kar. 12(17) that where a majority decision of Panel of Arbitrators is given where the Registrar i a member of the Panel then it is not the decision of the registrar only but it is a decision of the Panel of Arbitrators, We respectfully agree with that view and find that the view respondents Nos.1 and 2 that the appeal against the decision of Panel of Arbitrators was not competent under section 56 the Co-operative Societies Act was correct.
' The counsel for the petitioner then contended that the petitioner had challenged the decision of the Arbitrators on different points and, therefore, the respondent No,2 should have exercised the jurisdiction under section 54-A of the Co-operative Societies Act and should have set aside the award as the same was perverse. The petitioner however, has not filed copy of the petition/application/appeal, whatever it may be called by the petitioner, which he had filed before the respondent No,2 in order to enable us to know whether the petitioner had sought an order under section 56 of the Co-operative Societies Act or he had sought an order under section 54 of the Co-operative Societies Act. Mr. Abdul Naseer Khan, counsel for the respondent No,5 has drawn our attention to the title of the order passed by respondent No,2 which shows that it was Appeal No,34 of 1970. Even the substantive portion of the said order shows that the appeal was being considered by the respondent No,2. Moreover, the petitioner has nowhere stated in the petition that he had specifically moved an application under section 54-A of the Co-operative Societies Act, before respondent No,2 and, therefore, it is possible for us to hold that the petitioner had sought an order under section 54-A of the Co-operative Societies Act. The counsel for the petitioner had argued that the petitioner had sought setting aside of the award and setting aside could be both under section 56 as well as under section 54-A of the Co-operative Societies Act. We cannot agree with this submission that by merely asking the setting aside the award the provision of section 54- A had been invoked. In this respect another fact of importance is that in the order of respondent No, 1 which is a detailed order nowhere there is mention that the petitioner had contended before the respondent No,2 that he should take action under section 54-A of the Co-operative Societies Act. Even the Revision Application filed by the petitioner before the respondent No,1 has not been filed before us from which we can peruse that the point now raised before us is the same point which had been raised by the petitioner before respondents Nos.1 and ,2 whose orders he seeks to challenge in this petition. And it, therefore, appeared to us that the petitioner now wants to advance an argument which he had not raised before the respondents Nos.1 and 2 and he cannot be allowed to do the same.
' On the merits of the case no arguments had been advanced by the petitioner as he stated that his case had not been considered by the respondent No,2. We, however, find that respondent No,2 had observed that there were no cogent reasons to alter the decision of the Arbitrators, This observation may not be considered to be conscious application of the mind by the respondent No,2 but it does show that the respondent No,2 was satisfied with the decision of the Arbitrators, ' However, more important are the observations made by respondent No,1 in his order dated 16-11- 1974 which had been reproduced by us earlier. The respondent No,1 found that the submissions of the petitioner were against his own conduct and were an afterthought. He also found that respondent No,4 was bona Tide transferee of the share of the petitioner. He also found that the respondent No,4 had been made his nominee by the petitioner in his application of membership made in 1952 and he was also his attorney general some time later on. Most important observation of the respondent No,1 was that the respondent Nr.5 had been transferred this plot by respondent No,4 and respondent No,5 and completed the building thereon.
' We have perused the petition and we do not find anywhere stated in the petition that whatever has been observed by respondent No, 1 was factually incorrect. We do find in the petition that there is a good deal of challenge against the decision of the Arbitrators but the same appears to be based on technicalities rather than on substance. We find that the award made by the Panel of Arbitrators is quite a considered one and the Arbitrators have considered the stand of petitioner as well as of the defendants in a 20 pages judgment and their findings are quite detailed. We find that respondent No,4 Jalil Ahmed had appeared before the Arbitrators and had made a statement that he has purchased the plot from the petitioner. He had also stated that the petitioner Nafees Baig Mirza was his nephew. Jalil Ahmed had also produced the original receipts and the Panel of Arbitrators has considered the different aspects of the case in a 20 pages judgment and gave findings against the petitioner.
' The petitioner had sought a declaration that the award was illegal but he had not impleaded the arbitrators as respondents and hence the award could not be declared to be illegal. In any case it appears to be well-reasoned award and this High Court would not, in its constitutional jurisdiction deal with disputed facts which have received consideration from a panel of arbitrators who had the exclusive jurisdiction to decide this dispute. Another important factor militating against the petitioner is that he had allowed the raising of a building on the disputed plot by respondent No,5.
' We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that this petition is not sustainable and it is, therefore, hereby dismissed.
1984 M L 1)814 [Karachi] Before Haider Ali Pirzada, J Messrs ALLAH WASAYA WAJID ALI--Petitioner versus KARACHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION -Respondent Civil Revision No,175 of 1974, decided on 22nd January, 1984.
(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-- ---S.115, O.XXXIX, rr.1 & 2--Revision--Suit for declaration and permanent injunction--Application for temporary injunction in such suit dismissed by lower Courts--Land/plot belonging to Municipal Corporation not shown to have been allotted to petitioner firm and no licence or lease existing in their favour--Municipal Corporation specifically pleading that there was no privity of contract between parties--Petitioners also not bringing any document on record of lower Courts to show that plot was leased out to them or they had at any time paid rent to Municipal Corporation-- Findings of Courts below that prima facie no case made out in favour of petitioners qua possession of plot, upheld. [p. 817] A 1980 CLC 513, 1980 CLC 1830, PLD 1981 SC,545, 1982 CLC 1647, 1982 CLC 2188, PLD 1975 Kar. 608, PLD 1975 Kar. 373, PLD 1983 SC 693, PLD 1978 Lah.
1124, PLD 1970 SC 139, PLD 1981 Kar. 613, PLD 1972 Kar. 571, PLD 1983 Lah. 546, PLD 1983 Lah. 365 and PLD 1981 CLC 901 ref.
(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-- ---S.115-- Discretion to grant or refuse interim injunction--Must be exercised by Courts below judiciously and not arbitrarily--Discretion when exercised judiciously High Court, held, would not interfere to substitute its decision for that of Courts below in revisional jurisdiction. [p. 817] B
(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-- ---S.115 & 0.XXXIX, rr. 1 & 2--Revision--Discretion to grant or refuse interim injunction exercised by Courts below, held, should not be interfered with in revision--Courts below must have discretion to decide questions for themselves and unless Courts travel beyond limits within which discretion might be reasonably exercised or take a perverse or absurd view, exercise of discretion by Courts below could not be inter fered with in appeal much less in revision--Wrongful and improper orders passed by Courts below would however justify interference by appellate Court. [p. 8181 C & D
(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-- ---5.115--Revision petition--Maintainability--Courts below neither exercising jurisdiction not vested in them by law nor failing to exercise jurisdiction so vested nor acting in exercise of their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity--Case of petitioner not covered by 5.115, C.P.C.--Revision, held, would not lie against such order of Courts below. [p. 818] D & E N.S. Venkatagiri Ayyanger and another v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board Madras AIR 1949 P C 156; Joy Chand Law Bahu v.
Kamal Ali Shah Choudhry and others AIR 1949 P C 239; I.L.R. 11 Cal. 6; AIR 1917 P C 71 and Umar Dad Khan and another v. Tila Muhammad Khan and 14 others PLD 1970 SC 288 ref.
(e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-- ---5.115 and O.XXXIX, rr. 1 & 2--Temporary injunction--Courts having jurisdiction either to grant or refuse temporary injunction--Exercise of such powers even if erroneous, held, would not attract provisions of S.115 (1), C.P.C. [p. 819] F
(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-- ---S.115 (1)(c)--Illegality and material irregularity--Court, held, acted with material irregularity when it committed error of procedure which might affect ultimate decision in case. [p. 819] G
(g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-- --5.115 (1)(c)--Words "illegality" and with "material irregularity" used in S.115(1)(c), .]igh4, did not cover either errors of facts or law nor referring to decision arrived at but merely to manner in which it is reached. [p. 819] H
(h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-- ---S.115 and 0 . XXXIX, rr. 1 & 2--Application for temporary injunction--Order of Courts below refusing grant of temporary injunction to petitioner based on material before them--Jurisdiction not exercised by Courts arbitrarily--Interference declined in revisional jurisdiction. [p. 820] I Muhammad Umer Beg v. Sultan Muhammad Khan PLD 1970 SC 139 ref. A .F . Mokarim for Appellant.
S.M. Muslim Naqvi for Respondent. Date of hearing: 28th November, 1983.
' This revision arises out of judgment dated 4-7-1974 passed by the Ist Additional District Judge, Karachi, in C .M . A . No,207 of 1971, whereby the C .M. . No,207 of 1971 was dismissed by judgment/order dated 4-7-1974.
' The brief facts which give rise to this revision are as under:-
2. That the applicant filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the respondent Corporation seeking a declaration that they are in lawful possession of property of Survey No,714, Survey Sheet No, K-13-II.S-II, Lyari Quarters with its permanent structure since long and a permanent injunction seeking to restrain the respondent Corporation directly or through its employees or persons claiming through it from interfering with the possession of the applicants or to demolish the existing construction on the plot in suit. The applicant is duly registered firm carrying on charcoal business on the plot in suit and in occupation thereof for the last 25 yeaRs, The respondent has been granting licences to carry on the business of charcoal to the applicants.
On 1-1-1965 the respondent Corporation passed a resolution deciding to grant 99 years lease to the occupants of the land at the rate of Rs,6 per square yard. The applicants, therefore, claimed that by virtue of this resolution they are entitled to the lease of the plot and construction made thereon. It was stated by the applicants that the respondent Corporation carried out survey of the said area and was taking necessary steps for implementation of its resolution in respect of grant of 99 years lease to the applicants and other plot holders, All of a sudden about 2 days prior to the institution of the suit some employees of the respondent Corporation visited the site and wanted to disturb the possession of the applicants and have threatened to demolish the structure. The applicants, therefore, filed a suit being Suit No,1688 of 1971 in the Court of VIth Civil Judge, 1st Class, Karachi. It was averred that no show-cause notice was served on the applicants and the respondent Corporation had no authority to demolish the permanent structure in a summary manner. Along with the plaint the applicants moved an application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. seeking temporary injunction pending decision of the suit which was resisted by the respondent Corporation. The case of respondent Corporation as disclosed in their counter-affidavit is that the premises in dispute were offered on temporary lease to one Allah Wasaya on 14-10-1954 vide resolution No,393, dated 23-7-1954 but the said Allah Wasaya neither paid the rent nor executed any lease deed. Therefore, the respondent Corporation determined the grant vide notice dated 19- 1-1964 as it was required for public purpose. The said Allah Wasaya instead of handing over the vacant possession filed a Suit No,62 of 1964 on 13-2-1964 which was ultimately dismissed in 1970 by the IXth Civil Judge along with seven other suits filed by different charcoal dealers, It was averred by the respondent that the applicants have no private of contract with the Corporation and the applicants are neither lessees nor licensees of the Corporation as such they have no vested right to reoccupy the plot in suit. As regards, the occupation the respondent averred that on 25-8-1971 they had taken over the vacant possession of the said plot and temporary structure standing thereon had already been removed. As regards to the resolution it was explained that the respondent will regularize only those structures which were not hit by the lay out plan and which exist since long. In the present case though the respondent according to their own showing had taken over possession the question of regularization did not arise as the plot in dispute was reserved for public market. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering material on record the learned Civil Judge vide his order dated 11-10-1974 dismissed injunction application and vacated the order passed earlier maintaining status quo. The applicants being aggrieved by the said order dated 11-10-1974 preferred an appeal being C.M.A. No,207 of 1971 before the District Judge, Karachi, which was ultimately transferred to the Court of 1st Additional District Judge, Karachi.
3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and examining the relevant documents on record of the lower Court, the learned 1st Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal by his judgment dated 4-7-1974 and confirmed the order passed by the learned Vlth Civil Judge, Ist Class, Karachi.
4. The applicants being aggrieved with the judgment dated 4-7-1974 have preferred this revision on the grounds mentioned in the memo. of revision.
5. Mr. A.F. Mokarim, the learned counsel for the applicants has contended that the judgment and order of the Courts below are contrary to law and facts on the record of case. In support of his arguments he has relied on 1980 CLC 513, 1980 CLC 1830, PLD 1981 SC 545, 1982 CLC 1647, 1982 CLC 2188, PLD 1975 Kar. 608, PLD 1975 Kar. 373 and PLD 1983 SC 693.
6. On the other hand, Mr. Muslim Naqvi, learned counsel for the respondent Corporation has urged that the concurrent findings of the learned Courts below cannot be interfered in revision. He has also urged that the discretion exercised by the learned Courts below cannot be interfered in revision. In support of his arguments the learned counsel has relied on the following decisions.
' PLD 1978 Lah. 1124, PLD 1970 SC 139, PLD 1981 Kar. 613, PLD 1972 Kar. 571, PLD 1983 Lah. 546, PLD 1983 Lah. 365 and PLD 1981 CLC 901.
7. It is clear from the record that the applicants were dispossessed on 25-8-1971 prior to the filing of the suit. The learned Ist Additional District Judge appointed Mr. Khuda Bux Umrani Advocate as Commis sioner to inspect the site and submit his report. In his report dated 23-1-1974 he submitted that the property in dispute was an open big plot of land covered by cement blocks walls on three sides and the plinth level wall of southern side. The report of the Commissioner was silent on the point as to which of the parties was in actual or constructive possession of the premises. That report even otherwise was not capable of explicit reliance for the reason that the site was inspected in the absence of any notice to the respondent Corporation and the survey number inspected by the Commissioner shown in his report is 715 whereas the number of plot in suit shown in the plaint is 714. As such the report which was submitted by the Commissioner was ignored by the learned 1st Additional District Judge. It is pertinent to note that the plots were allotted to one Allah Wasaya and not to the applicants firm. No license or lease in respect of the plot in suit was issued in favour of the applicants firm and the respondent Corporation specifically pleaded that there was no private of contract between the parties. Applicants have not brought any document on record of the lower Courts to show the plot was leased out to them or that they have at any time paid the land rent to the respondent Corporation. The learned Courts below came to the conclusion that no prima facie case has been made out. I have perused the record with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the judgment/order of the learned Courts below and find that the Courts below have exercised discretion judicially.
8. 1 have referred at some length to the reasons upon which the Ii Courts below based their conclusions because it must, in my opinion, be borne in mind that I have asked to interfere in this case with orders made by the Courts below in the exercise of their discretion. That discretion must of course be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily but if these have been exercised judicially this Court cannot, in opinion, substitute its decision for that of the Courts below, for a was stated by Asquith L.J., in Bellenden v. Sattar Waite, 1948 (1) AER 343 at 345.
"We are here concerned with a judicial discretion, and it is of the essence of such a discretion that on the same evidence two different minds might reach widely different decisions without either being appealable. It is only where the decision exceeds the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible, and is, in fact, plainly wrong, that an appellate body is entitled to interfere. That is, I think, the principle which emerges from the decision of the House of Lords in Evans v. Bartlam 1937 A.C. 473 and Odenton v. Johnston & Co. v. Johnston 1942 A.C.
130."
8. The discretion exercised by the Courts below should not be interfered with in revision. The Courts below must have the discretion to decide the questions for themselves, and unless the Courts below travel beyond the limits within which discretion may be reasonably exercised, or in other words, unless it can be said that the Courts below have taken a perverse or absurd view, the exercise of th discretion by the Courts below will not be interfered with in appeal much less in revision.
9. In cases falling under this class the exercise of discretion b the trial Court is in law wrongful and improper and that would certainly justify and call for interference from the appellate Court. These principles are well-established; but as has been observed by Viscoun Semion L.C. in Charles Odenton & Co. v. Johnston 1941-2 A.E.L.R. 245 at page 250 as follows:- "The law as to the reversal by a Court of Appeal of an order made by the Judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well-established, and any difficulty which arises is due only to the application of well-settled principles in an individual case. The appellate tribunal is not at liberty merely to substitute its own exercise of discretion for the discretion already exercised by the Judge.
In other words, .appellate authorities ought not to reverse the order merely because they would themselves have exercised the original discretion, had it attached to them, in a different way. If, however, the appellate Tribunal reaches the clear conclusion that there has been a wrongful exercise of discretion, in that no weight, or no sufficient weight, has been given to relevant considerations such as those urged before us by the appellant, then the reversal of the order on appeal may be justified."
10. Mr. Muslim Naqvi, learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection that no revision lies in this case. He ha contended that the case is not covered by section 115, C.P.C. as the learned Additional District Judge and the learned Civil Judge have neither exercised the jurisdiction not vested in them by law nor have failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested in them nor have in an way acted in the exercise of their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. According to the learned counsel at most the decision can be said to be an erroneous decision on a question of law and there are concurrent findings of facts and on that ground no revision lies to the High Court.
11. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the preliminary objection must prevail. The leading decisions on the question of the scope of section 115, C.P.C. are two decisions decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council reported in N.S. Venkatagiri Ayyanger and another v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board Madras AIR 1949 P C 156, PLD 1949 P C 26 and Joy Chand Law Bahu v. Kamal All Shah Choudhry and others AIR 1949 P C 239 and PLD 1949 P C 114. Their Lordships in these two cases reiterated the views expressed in 1 L R 11 Cal. 6 and AIR 1917 P C 71 that section 115 applies to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it, or the illegal assumption of it. The section is not directed against conclusion of law or fact in which no question of jurisdiction is involved. In Umer Dad Khan and another v. Tile Muhammad Khan and 14 others PLD 1970 SC 288, the Supreme Court of Pakistan approved the decision of Privy Council.
12. There can be no two opinions that the learned Courts below had the jurisdiction to grant or refuse temporary injunction. The exercise of such power, even if erroneous would not attract the provisions o section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as far the first clause of the said section is concerned. Normally absence of jurisdiction connotes an absence of power to deal with a particular case of exercise o powers in excess of power conferred by law. Since Court has power t F grant injunction or to refuse injunction it cannot be said that the order is without jurisdiction.
Whether an order of a Court proceeds on illegality or with material irregularity, the question would always depend upon the provisions of law that have been disregarded. Often times the adoption of a precisely prohibited course is construed as an illegality. Obviously, this is not so in the instant case. It then remains to been whether the Courts below acted with material irregularity.
13. The learned Additional District Judge appears to have examined the case more elaborately in the light of the material on record.
14. The words "material irregularity" have come up for consideration by the superior Courts of this country and a fair summary of the decisions would indicate that a Court would be said to have acted with material irregularity when it commits an error of procedure which may affect the ultimate decision in the case. The illegality must be in the mariner of arriving at a decision as distinct from arriving at conclusion. If a Court has jurisdiction, its conclusions whether on a matter of law or fact, cannot be questioned in revision, unless such conclusions affect that decision of a case. It is well-settled that where a Court or tribunal has jurisdiction and it determines the question, it cannot be said that it acted illegality or with material irregularity because it came to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even law.
15. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words "illegally" and with "material irregularity" as used in this clause do not cover either errors of facts or law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this clause may, in my view, relate either' to breach of some provisions of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with.
16. In the circumstances mentioned above, it appears to me that the Courts below were justified on the materials placed before them t arrive at the tentative findings on the basis of which they refused the relief of temporary injunction and no interference is called for in the revision jurisdiction of this Court. It was held in Muhammad Umer Beg v. Sultan Muhammad Khan P L 9 1970 SC 139, that the limited jurisdiction in revision under section 115, C.P.C. is meant primarily for correcting errors made by the subordinate Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction and not those which are made in their discretion, unless the discretion is found to have been exercised fancifully or arbitrary. No such arbitrary exercise has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicant. It is, thus, difficult to interfere with the decision of the learned Courts below. From the foregoing discussion, I am of the view that the subordinate Courts have exercised their discretion on sound principles of law on the materials placed before them.
17. The result is that this revision stands dismissed with no orders as to costs.