These are two applications for review of my orders dated 16th April 1969. By my orders dated 16th April 1969, I had allowed the appeals of the District Manager, Government Transport Service, Sukkur, on the ground that the applications under section 31 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, which is equivalent to section 38 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, were not maintainable, inasmuch as the applicants were not dismissed for misconduct connected with the industrial dispute.
2. Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi, the learned Representative, who appears for the two applicants in the review applications, submitted that there was another aspect of the case also, which requires consideration, namely that the condition of service of the applicants was changed inasmuch as they were dismissed in violation of section 7 of the Road Transport Workers Ordinance, 1961. In this connection, he relied on section 7 of the Ordi--nance. It reads as under "(1) The services of a worker shall not be terminated without sufficient cause nor unless and until one month's previous notice or one month's pay in lieu thereof has been given to him and he has been paid his pay for any period of leave admissible to him of which he did not avail himself while in service.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall apply to the case of a worker whose services are terminated on account of his having been found guilty of misconduct."
3. It was submitted, relying on the above provision of law, that in the case of Faiz Muhammad there being no proper enquiry it cannot be said that Faiz Muhammad, appli--cant, was dismissed for sufficient cause. Similarly, in the case of Jaiud Ali, applicant, also the domestic enquiry was defective. In the absence of proper enquiry, it is urged, it can--not be said if the applicants had committed any misconduct, so as to justify their dismissal for sufficient cause.
4. The most 'important question is as to whether anew point of law, which was not raised earlier at the time of the hearing of the appeals can be a ground for review of my orders. Order XLVII, rule I of the Civil Procedure Code constitutes an exception of the general rule that once the judgment is signed and pronounced, it cannot afterwards be altered or added to, and hence a right of review is exercisable only where the circum--stances are distinctly covered by the provision of Order XLVII, rule 1. The circumstances under which an order, which has become final, can be reviewed are these:-
(1) The discovery of new and important matter or the evidence, which was after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was passed.
(2) When there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record.
(3) An order can be reviewed for any other sufficient reason.
5. In Chhajju Ram v. Neki and others (1), their Lordships of the Privy Council, after reviewing the case-law, declared that the expression "sufficient cause" should be interpreted as meaning a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously. It cannot also be said that there is an error on the face of the record. The error must be so evident that it does not require any extraneous circumstance to show its incorrectness. The fact that a point, which should have been taken and was not taken, cannot be said to be an error which is so clear that no Court should permit such an error to remain on record. Whether the applicants were dismissed for sufficient cause or not requires consideration of facts. The investigation of this fact cannot amount to an error apparent on the face of the record. The applicants cannot be said to have been dismissed for insufficient cause. I am of the view that these are not fit cases for review of my orders dated 16th April 1969. These are also not cases where" any injustice is involved. The applications are dismissed.
(1) AIR 1922PC112