' The above captioned appeal is directed against the decision, dated 17th February, 1983 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 4, Faisalabad, directing the re-instatement of the respondent in service with back benefits.
2. The respondent is a IIIrd Class Officer. His services were terminated vide order Exh. P.
10. Dated 17th January, 1982 as no longer required. Firstly, he was charge-sheeted on 10th September, 1981 for gross negligence and an enquiry was held but no action was taken.
3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned lower Court has wrongly held the respondent as a workman. According to the evidence on the record, the respondent's duty was to see the cash seal maintained by the branches and follow up entries reported by the Head Office in the reconciliation statements. This work is done by the respondent in the Zonal Office and he does not go to the branches. This kind of duty does not amount to supervision of employees. Checking the work done by the employees is of supervision over the employees. While doing this duty, he only makes reports about the mistakes etc. But has no direct contact with the employees concerned. He thus cannot be said to have been employed in supervisory capacity. Even if is not doing clerical work, yet he is a workman because doing of clerical work is necessary to attract the definition of workman given in section 2(i) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 but the said Ordinance is not applicable to the nationalized banks. The learned lower Court has thus rightly held the respondent as workman.
4. The other point argued is that since the respondent was terminated under para. 234 of the first Wage Commission Award giving of reasons was not necessary and it was immaterial that previous to it the respondent was charge-sheeted for misconduct and enquiry was held against him. The argument is without any force. Para. 234 does not give arbitrary powers to the Banks to shunt out employees without giving cogent reasons. Paras. 233 and 234 when read together make it clear that without cogent reasons the services of the banks' employees cannot be terminated. Para. 233 says that if work of a probationer is unsatisfactory, the period of probation may be extended or he may be terminated. Obviously, while extending the period of probation reason will be given that the work is not satisfactory. When for extension of probationary period reason is to be given, naturally while terminating the services of a probationer the same reason is to be given that his work is not satisfactory. If it be held that while terminating an employee under para. 234 reasons are not to be given, it would mean that services of a probationer are protected but not of a confirmed employee.
It would thus lead to absurdity to hold that while applying para. 234 reasons are not to be given.
Now 'no longer required' is no reason because still question arises, why no longer required? Explicit reasons should be given. Where no cogent reason is given, it would mean that there is no reason and arbitrarily the employee is to be shunted out for nothing.
5. The next point argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Labour Courts cannot on the basis of Wage Commission Award grant relief, inasmuch as such an award is the award of the N. I. R. C. This is true that the Wage Commission Award is the award of the N.I.R.C. But the very section 38-D of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 says that all the provisions of the Ordinance would apply to such an award. Section 25-A is one of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and by virtue of section 38-D is applicable to the award of the Commission and the Labour Courts have jurisdiction to grant relief on account of the violation of the rights guaranteed by such an Award.
6. The last point is that a dismissed person is not included in the definition of workman as defined in section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. This argument too is not tenable. The word 'is employed' do not mean that only that person is workman who is in service. Not only in section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 but in other laws also while defining a workman or an employee, present tense has been used such as section 2 (i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, section 2 (n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, section 2 of the Factories Act, section 2 of the Civil Servants Acts (Central as well as Provincial), sections 3 (4) and
(5) and section 148 of Railways Act. Since in all these enactments while defining a workman or employee present tense is used, it would mean that under no law a person removed from service has no remedy to ask for re-instatement. This does not appear to be the intention of the Legislature, otherwise there was no purpose in promulgating special laws, establishing of special Courts and tribunals such as Labour Courts, Services Tribunals. The relief of claiming damages for wrongful termination under the ordinary law would have been considered sufficient. The respondent, therefore, is covered by the definition of workman as defined in section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
7. As a result, the appeal being without any force is dismissed.