' Gut MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.-The learned counsel challenges through this Letters Patent Appeal the order, dated 10th March, 1971, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No, 1475-R of 1964. It is contended by him that as the deceased-respondent Idda had not filed any form for the transfer of the property, the lower authorities could not have transferred any portion to him.
2. After hearing the learned counsel we find that the Additional Settlement Commissioner, though found it as a fact that the respondent had not filed any form, yet he allowed him the protection under section 30 (5) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and refused to transfer the same portion to the appellant. In revision petition the Settlement Commissioner again heard the parties, took into consideration the plea of the indivisibility, raised by the appellant but refused to accede to his request for the transfer, again on the ground that the protection afforded by section 30 (5) could not be taken away.
3. The Settlement Commissioner, therefore, maintained the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner and further observed that on repatriation of the respondent, the portion in his possession shall be disposed of either by restricted earmarking or auction between Jammu and Kashmir Refugees. The Settlement Commissioner thus indirectly accepted that the two portions are independent and separate houses and, therefore, we shall presume that the house stood divided.
Admittedly, the appellate would not be entitled to another house in such a situation, under para. 1 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. Again, the purpose of law to rehabilitate more displaced persons is served by the impugned order. Thus, an interference with the order of the learned Single Judge would mean to again displace a refugee for no valid or sound reasons. We, therefore, find no error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. He rightly concluded that mere desire to transfer the property, in such a situation, would be sufficient and so the appellant would have no locus stand! To object.
4. This appeal is consequently dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.