' This appeal emanates from the decision dated 31st July, 1982 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 8, Bahawalpur, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his reinstatement in service was dismissed.
2. The appellant was appointed temporarily as Field Supervisor on 25th June, 1980 by the Manager vide Exh. P-1. The said appointment order Exh. P-1 is addressed to the appellant and copies endorsed to various officers. His services were terminated vide order Exh. P-2 by the Manager. Exh.
R-1 purports to be the photostat copy of the application of the appellant for appointment. On the margin there is a photostat copy of the order of appointment as work charge. This order is contradictorily to the copy of appointment order Exh. P-1 issued to the appellant. If the appellant had been appointed on work charge basis, in Exh. P-1 it would not have been written that he had been appointed temporarily. Since the application for appointment was with the respondent, anything favourable to the respondent could be written at any convenient time. The order written on the margin of Exh. R-I, therefore, shows that the respondent did not come to the Court to defend the case with clean hands. This is, therefore, wrong that the appellant was a work charged employee. No doubt, according to Exh. P-1, the appellant was shown to have been appointed as temporary Field Supervisor but the learned lower Court has ignored this fact that the appellant worked for more than a year. If the appellant had been appointed temporarily for the season, his services would have been terminated on the close of the season and he would not have been allowed to continue for more than one year. This is now not unknown that the managements of private establishments in reality employ the workers on permanent basis but in papers that appointment is shown as temporary. There is no evidence that the work for which the appellant was employed had come to an end before the completion of nine months. It is thus clear that the work had to continue for more than 9 months and the job, therefore, was permanent. This is not the case of the respondent that the services of the appellant were not continuous. The period of probation, according to terms and conditions of service, was allegedly fixed as more than three months, but according to Standing Orders 1 and 15 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, the period of probation is three months. The terms and conditions which are against the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and detrimental to the workers are illegal. So on the completion of three months the appellant became permanent. The reason given for the termination that the season had come to an end was not cogent. If the post had been abolished, of course the services of the appellant could be terminated, but this is not the case of the respondents. In seasonal factories all the employees are not seasonal and temporary. Some are permanent also. Since the appellant worked for more than one year, it is apparent that his post was permanent. This is no ground that he was not paid from the permanent budget but from contingency. The appellant had no control over it and therefore no rule of estoppel applies against him.
3. Even if for the sake of argument it is assumed that the appellant was a temporary employee, the delivery of one month's pay in lieu of notice did not remedy the wrong. Since the order was not passed in the D terms of Standing Order 12 (1), it was an illegal order from its very inception. The remedy was to set aside the order and not to allow one month's pay.
4. As a result of the observations made above, I accept the appeal and setting aside the impugned decision of the learned lower Court and the order of termination of service, direct the re- instatement of the appellant in service with back benefits.