' This appeal arises from the decision, dated 11th January, 1979 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 1 Lahore, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his reinstatement was dismissed,
2. The services of the appellant were terminated with effect from 31st July, 1978 vide order, dated 19th July, 1978 on the ground that the business of manufacturing of Coca Cola was given to National Bottlers, who previously were only selling Coca Cola. In the termination letter the appellant was directed to hand over the charge and cash to one Muhammad Rafiq, which the appellant did, except Rs, 1,829.29 which he could not deliver. The case of the appellant is that on 20th July, 1978 i,e, on the following day of the order of termination, he went to the factory to pay the remaining amount, but he was not allowed to enter it, whereupon he sent letter Exh. P.
1. The appellant regards his termination as a dismissal, inasmuch as a case of embezzlement was got registered against him with the police. A copy of the F.
1. R. Is Exh. P. 4, dated 20th September, 1978. Admittedly the criminal case of embezzlement was got registered against the appellant but much after the termination of his services. The case no doubt was registered against the appellant on 20th September, 1978 and a regular complaint was made to the police on 20th August, 1978, yet on 9th August, 1978 an application was made to the Elaqa Magistrate under section 190, Cr. P. C. In the form of a complaint which means that the criminal proceedings in reality had been started on 9th August, 1978. On the F. L R. The date of 12th July, 1978 is also given but it was not got explained in evidence how this date was given. Whatever, the case may be, the criminal proceedings were initiated after the termination letter, dated 19th July, 1978 was issued which was followed by another letter, dated 26th July, 1978 sent in response to the letter of the appellant Exh. P.
1. Since the criminal proceedings were started after the termination and since at the time of delivery of charge, the appellant had handed over lesser amount and also did not deliver the other record, at the time of termination, no question of embezzlement was in the knowledge of the management. There is, therefore, no scope to say that the termination was in reality a colourful dismissal. In the termination letter, dated 19th July, 1978 it is clearly written that the business of manufacturing had been handed over to National Bottlers Limited and that they had, their own cashier, therefore, they were not in need of another cashier. Since National Bottlers were not willing to absorb the appellant, therefore, he was terminated. The other reason was that it wa arranged with the bank that in future a bank employee would be takin cash to the bank, therefore, there was no need of a cashier. Oral evident was led by the respondent on the point that according to the new arrangement the post of cashier was not required but no evidence was produced that the National Bottlers were not in need of any cashier. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that no witness examined by the respondent, stated that the business of manufacturing Coca Cola had been entrusted to National Bottlers, therefore, this plea does not stand proved. Since in bot the letters the one, dated 19th July, 1978 and the other, dated 26th July, 1978, the said fact is mentioned, the production of oral evidence was no necessary. By the oral evidence it was proved that the appellant was junior most and the other cashier Rafiq Hussain Shah was senior to him. Since the business of manufacturing had been transferred to National Bottlers and since with the bank it was arranged that in future a bank employee would be transmitting cash between the bank and the management, two cashiers were not required and the appellant, being the junior of the two, was rightly terminated. The solitary statement of the appellant was not sufficient to controvert and belie the oral and documentary evidence produced by the respondent. The grievance petition of the appellant was, therefore, rightly dismissed. There is no force in the appeal which is dismissed.