1. ' Rehmat Ali P.W. Is concerned, he might have made the same because there was some compromise effected between the parties. He did not disown the making of the affidavit in the cross-examination but told the truth by stating that he was made to make that affidavit. This in fact is a further proof that he was making a correct statement before the trial Court and not a false statement. So, in my view the ocular testimony was rightly believed in the instant cases. Anyway, the ocular testimony is further corroborated by the recovery evidence. Learned counsel submitted that the recovery evidence was of a doubtful nature for the reason that the sole public attesting witness of this recovery produced was a man of no substance being a shopkeeper, he did not reside at the place of occurrence but he was living at as distance of three miles from the spot from where the recovery wat effected and finally the recovery was made after five days from a spo.
2. Which did not appear to be a place inaccessible to the general public I have carefully considered this aspect of the case. In my view the ocular testimony is by itself sufficient to sustain the conviction and sentence in the instant case and it does not require any corroboration. But I do not agree with learned counsel about his assertions in respect of the recovery evidence. In my view the recovery is not of a doubtful nature and it was made in the presence of the Investigating Officer who attested the same as well as Muhammad Sharif (P.W. 8), the recovery witness, who had no motive to falsely implicate the appellant. In the end learned counsel vehemently argued that there is a document placed on the record, namely, Ex. D.W. 3/3 which is a compromise between the parties and that in the light of this compromise the sentence of the appellant be reduced. I am afraid, I cannot do so. Learned counsel submitted that the case be brought under " sudden provocation " in the sense that it was the deceased who abused the appellant and also threw him out of the house and it was in retaliation of the same that the appellant was suddenly provoked and caused injuries to her with a hatchet. Learned counsel wants me to bring- this case under one of the Exceptions to section 300, P.P.C. So that he could be convicted and sentenced under section 304, Part 11, P.P.C. In my view this is not possible. In fact it was a case of deliberate murder performed in a gruesome manner and even if the motive, as set up by the prosecution, could not be established in the light of thee ocular testimony, it was a case in which extreme penalty could have been awarded under section 302, P.P.C., but the trial Judge has already taken a lenient view by awarding lesser penalty to the appellant. The compromise can have only this effect in the instant case that instead of awarding the extreme penalty to the appellant the trial Judge has awarded lesser penalty. The same is the effect of the motive not being established. Since this is the position, in my considered opinion the prosecution has succeeded in establishing its case as against the appellant beyond .Any shadow of doubt. In the circumstances, his conviction as well as the sentence awarded to him are quite proper and they are accordingly maintained. The result is that this appeal is dismissed. However, the Jail authorities are directed to grant the benefit of the provisions of section 382-B, Cr. P. C. To the appellant at the time of computation of his sentence of life imprisonment. With this observation this appeal is dismissed.