' Briefly stated the facts forming background of the grievance made In this constitution petition are that one Mst. Alam Khatoon owned' I a bungalow bearing No, 163-A, Satellite Town, Sargodha. She allege sold the same through some oral transaction to Shamas-ul-Haq respondent No, 1 through Khizar Hayat her general attorney and id rother of Shamas-ul-Haq, respondent. It is also mentioned the petition that on an alleged dispute having arisen between the aforesaid lam Khatoon and Shamas-ul-Haq respondent No, 1, the matter was eferred to an arbitrator who gave the award in favour of Shamas-ulaq respondent. The award was given on 16th March, 1982 and on the same day an application under Arbitration Act for getting the said ward made rule of the Court was filed by respondent No,
1. The trial ourt directed issuance of notice to Mst. Alain Khatoon for 14th April, 982. It is further asserted that though the case was fixed for 14th April, 1982 an application was filed on 27th March, 1982 by Khizar ayat, the real brother of respondent No, 1, and the general attorney f aforesaid Alam Khatoon, stating that Mst. Alam Khatoon accepts he award of the arbitrator. Alongwith this application, reply to the application for making the award rule of the Court was also filed dmitting the award. It is claimed by respondent No, 1 that the reply filed conceding the claim and admitting the award bears the thumb-impression of Mst. Alam Khatoon, the signatures of Khizar Hayat and the learned counsel engaged by them.
' Learned trial Court after recording the statement of the general attorney, Saleh Muhammad arbitrator and Mr. Insar Ahmad, Advocate fixed 14th April, 1982 for orders. On 28th March, 1982 Mst.
Alam Khatoon died and Muhammad Yaqoob petitioner made an application for impleading him as a party to the proceedings. This request was allowed by the learned trial Court vide order, dated 24th June, 1982. Shamas-ul-Haq respondent feeling aggrieved of the said order impleading the petitioner as a party to the proceedings, preferred a revision petition before the learned District Judge, Sargodha. This revision petition was accepted vide, judgment, dated 22nd May, 1983 and the order impleading the petitioner was set aside with the direction to the trial Court to proceed and decide the case in accordance with law.
3. This constitution petition was then filed to assail the judgment, dated 22nd May, 1983 and in support of this petition it was argued that in the given case hearing of the suit had not concluded as the application of the petitioner for impleading as a party was filed, heard and adjudicated upon, though earlier the matter had been adjourned for pronouncement of order. Reliance was placed on Kehr Singh v. Chand Singh (1). It was argued that the learned District Judge had erred in law in applying the provisions of rule 6 of Order XXII, C. P. C. As in the facts and circumstances of the case the provisions of rule 4 of Order XXII, C. P. C. Were applicable. Lastly, it was contended that the undue haste with which the trial was conducted manifests that an old ailing lady was being defrauded and that the Courts have invariably refused to lend their support to a transaction based on fraud. The exclusion of the petitioner from the proceedings would facilitate the practicing of fraud.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that (a) constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked for correcting mere errors of law and as no jurisdictional defect has been pointed out, the constitution petition is not maintainable, (b) alternate remedy being available under section 12 (2), C. P. C. Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked, (c) the case was fixed for orders only and as the hearing had concluded earlier to the demise of Mst. Alam Khatoon, the petitioner could not in law be impleaded as a party to the proceedings at that stage. The order of the trial Court impleading the petitioner was illegal and without jurisdiction.
' In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the order impleading the petitioner as party to the proceedings was not a case decided and, as such, the same could not have been interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. This plea was neither raised before the learned District Judge at the time of hearing of the revision petition nor was included in the grounds of the writ petition. Learned counsel, however, conceded that the remedy provided by section 12 (2), C. P. C. Is available and that such an application can still be moved by the petitioner wherein he will also have the right to lead evidence. With respect to the merits of the controversy raised, he reiterated the plea on the basis of the view expressed in Kehr Singh's case (supra).
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5. In view of the fact that an alternate efficacious remedy is$ (1) AIR 1936 Lab. 578 available under law, the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked. This is sufficient to dispose of the present constitution petition.
' On merits as well, I do not agree with the learned counsel that the petitioner had the right to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings. It is not disputed that after recording the statement of Insar Ahmad, Advocate, Saleh Muhammad Arbitrator and Khizar Hayat, the general attorney, the matter was fixed for order for 14th April, 1982. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as the application for impleading was filed and as the proceedings thereon were taken, it cannot be said that the hearing had concluded and that no judicial proceedings were taken in the interval between 27th March, 1982 and 14th April, 1982, the date on which the judgment was to be pronounced. He argued that the proceedings on the app cation for impleading having been taken, the view expressed in the case of Kehr Singh (supra) applies. In the aforenoted Lahore case, the facts were that the suit was tried and arguments were finished on 7th July, 1932 and 14th July, 1932 was fixed for delivery of judgment. It so happened that the trial Judge at the suggestion of some of the parties decided to inspect the locality. He obtained necessary permission of the District Judge and fixed a date for local inspection. The parties arid their Pleaders were which present and measurements were taken with the help of revenue records which were specially sent for. These proceedings went on right up to the month of August, 1932, and in the meantime on 22nd July, 1932 one of the plaintiffs died. His legal representatives were brought on record and the trial Court on 7th November, 1932 decreed the plaintiffs claim. The defendants in the appeal pointed out that as the legal representatives of Kehr Singh, one of the plaintiffs, had not been brought on record in the trial Court, the whole suit abated. In these circumstances, dealing with the submission that the death of Kehr Singh had not made any difference because he died between the conclusion of the hearing and the pronouncement of the judgment, as according to them the hearing concluded on 7th July, 1932, it was pointed out that a series of proceedings were taken after 7th July, 1932. In view of the above-noted circumstances, learned Judge observed that, "it cannot be said that the hearing had concluded on 7th July, 1932 and no judicial proceedings were taken in the interval between that date and the date on which the judgment was pronounced."
' Learned counsel sought to rely on the aforesaid observations by adding that judicial proceedings in the instant case were also held on the application moved by the petitioner and, as such, the rule laid down in Kehr Singh's case fully applies. The judicial proceedings contemplated in the aforesaid precedent mean "all the proceedings which lead to the disposal or decision of the suit as such" because the hearin f a case cannot be said to be concluded where anything remains B o be done or finished by either . Party as a basis for consideration hitch is to end in judgment. See Lachmi Narayan v. Balmakund (1), anohar Das v. Birandari (2) and Jungli Lail v. Laddu Ram Marwari (3).
Thus, the hearing in the context of Order XXII, rule 6, C. P. C. Refers to 11 the stages of the trial of a suit, namely, the setting of issues, taking!
(1) AIR 1924 P C 198 (2) AIR 1936 Lah. 280
(3) AIR 1919 Pat. 430 ' of evidence and hearing of arguments or other proceedings tending to a final adjudication of a suit.
6. Considered in the light of the above principles, it will be seen that in the instant case tearing of the application for being impleaded as a party, cannot amount to holding of judicial proceedings tending to finally adjudicate the suit or to holding the proceedings which will lead to the disposal or decision of the suit as such. The hearing in the instant case concluded on 27th March, 1982 and the death having occurred thereafter on 28th March, 1982 the petitioner could not legally D be impleaded as a party and the judgment in the case was to be pronounced notwithstanding the death and the judgment so pronounced is to have the same force and effect as if it had been pronounced before the death took place. The order passed by the learned trial Court impleading the petitioner was thus illegal. This illegality was set right by the learned District Judge by passing the impugned judgment and for this reason too, I am not inclined to interfere in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. The petitioner, as noted above, has the right, to move the Court in case the final order to be pronounced goes against, under section 12 (2), C. P. C., and in case any such application is filed, the same will have to be disposed of. Of course, all the pleas available to the petitioner under law shall remain available and shall be disposed of in accordance with law.
' With these observations, this petition is dismissed without there being any order as to costs. n