' RAJA MUHAMMAD KHURSHID KHAN, C. J.-Through this petition the petitioner seeks review of the judgment, passed by this Court on 7-4-1979, on venous grounds which need not be recapitulated here.
2. The petitioner, it may be stated, was respondent in the appeal (Civil Appeal No, 24 (R.
0.) of 1978) and was represented by Ch Muhammad Taj, Advocate while Muhammad Ibrahim, non- petitioner herein (the appellant in the appeal), was represented by Raja Muhammad Siddique, Advocate. The appeal ended in success and the judgment passed by a learned single Judge of the High Court on 18-7-1973 against Muhammad Ibrahim, respondent herein, was discharged vide judgment dated 7-4-1979.
3. This petition which, without the permission of the Court as stipulated under the Supreme Court Rules, was drawn up and moved by Qazi Abdul A Ghafoor, Advocate, on 20-5-1979 fat" it's being contrary to law, is liable to dismissed on this short ground.
4. Besides, the review petition, it is, significant, pertains to the period when this Court had no review powers. The question as to whether the review of an order pertaining to the period when this Court was not clothed with the powers of review is competent came up for consideration in a review petition titled Ajaib Hussain v. Muhammad Fazil (Civil Review No, 1 of 1980). The petition, vide order dated 17-5-1983, was disallowed with the following observations :- "Considering the proposition in the light what has been stated above is necessary to examine the language used in the Act 1980. It reads a already stated in the earlier part of this judgment :- `The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall have power subject to the provision of any law and of any rule made by the Supreme Court to review any judgment pronounced or any order made by it.'
' From the plain reading of the Act it becomes clear that the words used are clear, precise and unambiguous. The language used is a clear manifestation of the fact that the Legislature intended it to be prospective in operation. In this view of the matter the review petition would be permissible in respect of only those judgments and orders which have been passed after the Act was legislated. A judgment of this Court which is now being sought to be reviewed was passed o 30-5- 1979. At the time it was passed, the Supreme Court had n power of review either under the provisions of Interim Constitution Act or under any other law. The matter in dispute had finally been decided and the controversy set at rest vide the impugned judgment. It was only in June 1980, when the Supreme Court for the first time got invested with the review powers. As the Act has no retrospective effect so the Supreme Court could not therefore, be asked to exercise its newly- acquired jurisdiction and power under the Review Power Act, 1980, to correct the alleged errors and illegalities committed before the commencement of the Act. To hold otherwise would not only amount to putting a construction on the Act not warranted by the language used in it but it would lead to absurdity as there will be no limit to its going backward.
' In the ultimate analysis we find that Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Review Power Act, 1980 was prospective in operation. Only the judgments and orders passed after the Act could be open to review."
5. Before proceeding further we may state here that an application drafted by Mr. Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, the learned Advocate, on 23-8-1983, was received in the Registry. The application contained a request that permission may be given to the learned Advocate to appear and argue the case for the petitioner. This application was disposed of vide order dated 31-1-1984. The disposal was in terms that if the review petition is not competent there hardly arises any occasion to give special permission to Mr. Muhammad Yusuf Saraf to appear and argue the case. Copy of the order was also sent to the learned Advocate.
6. Now another application has been left by Mr. Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, Advocate, in the Registry which, today, is placed before the Court for consideration. This application wants the Court that Mr. Saraf may be allowed to argue the petition as amicus curiae.
7. We have given our due consideration to this application but we could not persuade ourselves to accept it. In the first instance it is only the Court' prerogative to ask a counsel to act as amicus curiae. A counsel, on his own, c cannot be allowed to say that he may be heard as amicus curiae.
There is no case in our knowledge in which such a method may have been approved by the Court.
8. Let us now determine the scope of the duties of an amicus curiae. - Amicus curiae, according to the Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary, means- `'a friend of the law-Court: a disinterested adviser, not a party to the case: (wrongly) a friend in high quarters."
Similarly, in the "Reader's Digest Great Encyclopaedic Dictionary" the word amicus curiae is defined to mean :- "Disinterested adviser, (L, `friend of the Court')."
' In "Webster's Third New International Dictionary" it is defined as under:- "friend of the Court: A bystander that suggests or states some matter of law for the assistance of a Court; specify: a lawyer that files a printed brief or makes an oral argument before an appellate Court on behalf of a person affected by or interested in a pending case but not actually a party to it."
9. In view of the above it hardly needs an emphasis that only a disinterested adviser or an Advocate who has no connection with a party can be required by a Court to act as amicus curiae.
In the instant case Mr. Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, the learned Advocate, vide application dated 23-8- 1983, referred to above, sought permission of the Court to argue the review petition on, behalf of the petitioner. Undoubtedly, according to his own application, E he is interested in the petitioner. How can he be, in such position, allowed to act as amicus curiae? An Advocate, of course, can file a printed brief or make an oral argument on behalf of the person, though not a party, who stands affected by the decision . But in this case no such situation even is available to Mr. Muhammad Yusuf Saraf to allow him to act as amicus curiae on behalf of the petitioner.
10. It is elementary principle of law that only the Court which requires the services of a lawyer not engaged in a case may ask him to act as amicus curiae. That is why in a case Sir award Snelson v.
Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan Lahore (1), the learned Chief Justice observed that an Advocate appearing as amicus curiae is entitled to fee as well as other expenses permitted be the Court. In view of the above the application of Mr. Muhammad Yusuf Saraf to allow him to argue this petition as amicus curiae stands turned down.
11. On merits the review petition pertains to the period when this Court had no powers to review its order. Therefore, this review petition, while reiterating our view in the case referred to above, stands disallowed. Qazi Abdul Ghafoor, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, present in the Court, in view of the dictum in the case referred to above, does not want to mosecute this petition. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1961 SC 237 {{FOOT NOTE}}