' The facts leading to this writ petition briefly are that State land comprising Khasras Nos. 20/29/1 to 12, 13/1 measuring 12 acres situate in Chak No, 389/W. B. Was allotted to Bashir Ahmad (respondent No, 4) on 6-3-1960 by the Co-operative Farming Society of the village. Circle Officer of the Co- operative Department after a detailed inquiry found that the aforesaid land was unlawfully occupied by Muhammad Shafi etc. (petitioners Nos. 1 to 3) and therefore, desired their ejectment therefrom vide report dated 27-9-1980. At this the village Society also through its Resolution dated 5-10-1980 recommended that the petitioners be dispossessed and Bashir Ahmad (respondent No, 4) its actual allottee, be put into possession. G. A. R., Multan laid the papers before District Collector, Multan, suggesting that the case may be sent to Assistant Commissioner, Lodhran for taking necessary action under section 32 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 (hereinafter called the Act) after examining the legal, aspect. The District Collector accordingly sent them to Assistant Commissioner, Lodhran on 6-5-1981 for "examination and report", who instead of making a report to the Collector passed the impugned ejectment order dated 7-5-1981 directing the Tehsildar to immediately take the possession of the land in question from the petitioners reported to-be the illegal occupants. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners filed appeal before Commissioner, Multan, who found that the area in dispute belonged to the Society of Chak No, 389/W. B. Gharbi and the Society of Chak 389/W. B. Sharqi was not competent to grant lease to Muhammad Shafi on 5-3-1980, who was a non-member on the relevant date and consequently upheld the ejectment order and dismissed the appeal, on 27-7-1982, hence this writ petition, wherein it has been prayed that both the above-mentioned impugned orders be declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and also perused the record produced by the officials of the Co-operative Farming Department.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, first argued that the Assistant Commissioner, Lodhran, was asked by the District Collector only "to examine and report" but the former overstepped the direction and passed ejectment order against the petitioners under section 32 of the Act which he was otherwise not competent to pass since he did not enjoy the powers of a Collector. In reply, learned counsel for the respondents produced Notification No, 7955- 69/158-CV, dated 8-11-1969 issued by the Government of West Pakistan, Colonly Department, wherein the Governor of West Pakistan invested all the Assistant Commissioners in Multan Division, holding charge of Sub-divisions, with the powers of a Collector to be exercised by them within the limits of their jurisdiction subject to the control of the A Collector of the district with effect from the date of issuance of the notification. Serial No, 7 of the schedule attached with the notification powers to reenter in case of squatters and trespassers and to resume possession of their lands under section 32 of the Act have been specifically given. In view of this notification, the objection of incompetency does not hold water and is therefore, repelled.
4. It is next argued that the impugned ejectment order was passed at the back of the petitioner by the Assistant Commissioner, Lodhran therefore it suffers from principle of natural justice i,e, audi alteram partum (no body is to be condemned unheard) hence it is liable to be struck down. I have examined the language of section 32 of the Act. It says that the Collector, "if satisfied" About certain person that he is in possession of Colony land without any right or title therein, then the Collector can forthwith re-enter upon the land and resume its possession. It is nowhere provided that the Collector would hold a full-fledged judicial inquiry affording opportunity of hearing to the trespassers/squatters, for gaining "satisfaction" in the matter. It is true that the principle of natural justice even if not provided expressly in any statute should be read into it. The record shows that although the petitioners were not heard by the Assistant Commissioner, Lodhran, but the Commissioner, Multan, before whom the appeal was taken had granted "full hearing" to the petitioners to their satisfaction and having considered their view-point at length dismissed their appeal vide his judgment dated 27-7-1982. In concluding para. Of the judgment, he remarks as under : "I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the impugned order was passed without due application of mind but now that the appellants had full opportunity to present their cases, this plea is of no consequence."
5. In the circumstances, therefore, the petitioners cannot make grievance of remaining "unheard"' by the Assistant Commissioner since their view-point was heard and considered by the appellate authority and thus no prejudice appears to have been caused to the petitioners due to, non- hearing by the authority which passed the original order of ejectment. In my view the Assistant Commissioner while passing impugned ejectment order has not defied any absolute statutory requirement and the principle of audi alteram partem having been observed at the appellate stage, the defect if any, stood remedied and calls for no interference. In support of this, the following observation made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Atta Muhammad Qureshi v.
The Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and 2 others (1) is reproduced with advantage :- "The argument that the appellant had an opportunity of being heard by the Settlement Commissioner, which is a sufficient redress for his grievance, may be well-founded when the grievance is made to rest on the principle of natural justice viz. Audi alteram partem (no body is to be condemned unheard). But when an absolute requirement of the statute has been defied, the order passed is a nullity."
6. For the above discussion, I find no merit in this petition, which is hereby dismissed. However, there is no order as to cost.
(1) PLD 1971 SC 61