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1984 PLC 2430

MUHAMMAD SALEEM AKHTAR vs FAISALABAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND

Citation1984 PLC 2430
CourtLabour Appellate Tribunal
Judge(s)Sardar Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi
ResultAppeal accepted

1. ' The appellant was appointed as Building Inspector allegedly on ad hoc basis in N. P. S. 11 on 10th July, 1978 on the condition that he had to appear before the selection board. When the meeting of the Board was held. He continued in service till 9th February, 1980 when his services were terminated on account of certain allegations. The main allegation was that, he had delivered possession of excessive area to the allottees of Plots No, 61-B, 240-B, 221-A, 207-B and 259-B Gulfishan Colony. The appellant submitted reply but without any inquiry he was terminated.

2. ' The case of the respondent is that the appellant was appointed on ad hoc basis and was not regularised since he did not appear before the selection committee so making of inquiry was not necessary. First point to be decided is if he was not a regular or permanent employee. No doubt in appointment letter it is written that he was appointed on ad hoc basis but since it is also mentioned that he shall have to appear before the selection committee it is clear that the post was permanent. Since he admittedly remained in service for two years (more than 9 months) and post was permanent. Ad hoc appointments are made for a fixed period against temporary posts and if it is desired to continue the post sanction is obtained for some further period. Since in the present case no period was fixed the post as mentioned above was permanent. No doubt the condition was that the appellant had to appear before Selection Board but there is no evidence that meeting of such a Board was ever actually held and that the appellant was directed to appear on a particular date. If no meeting of the Board was held or. Even no such board came into existence, the appellant was never asked to appear then I am at a loss to understand how it can be said that be did not appear. Not to speak of the production of evidence on the point by the respondent even to the appellant it was not suggested in cross-examination that he was asked to appear before the board on a particular date and he did not appear. Since the post was permanent having lost for more than nine months and as the appellant continued the service on it for two years be became permanent satisfying the condition given in Standing Order 1 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. While arguing the learned counsel for, the respondent did not say that the appellant was not workman as defined in section 2 (i) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 but in written arguments filed thereafter this plea has been taken. It is said in the written arguments that according to the duties the appellant is not covered by the definition of workman. This is question of fact and shall have been raised in the written statement and the evidence should have been produced on the point of duties. No such plea is contained in the written statement nor there is an iota of evidence on the record. If such a plea had been taken the appellant would have opportunity to lead evidence about his duties. Now it is too late to raise such an objection. The appellant made application for additional evidence which has been opposed by the respondent. The appellant wants to produce a certificate issued by Director Town Planning Faisalabad Development Authority.

3. It is to the effect that the appellant is a regular employee of the Director of Town Planning. Even if this document is ignored as discussed above the appellant was a permanent employee.

4. According to R. 3 the allegation in the opinion of the respondent amounted to corruption and misconduct meaning that the appellant was stigmatised. So holding of regular inquiry was necessary before terminating his services. No doubt, the appellant in cross-examination said that there were no service rules and that rule of master and servant applies but this admission does not create any estoppel as there cannot be any estoppel against law. Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 granted rights to the appellant. According to Order 12 (3) and Order 15 (4), making of inquiry was necessary.

5. ' Even on merits the respondent has no case. According to the evidence of Muhammad Abbas Building Inspector F. D. A , R. W. 2 possession of excessive area can be given to the allottee of common plots, according to the practice of the F. D. A.

6. The Order of termination of service on the ground of the allegations made against the appellant, therefore, is not legal. I accordingly D accept the appeal and setting aside the impugned order and the order of termination direct the re-instatement of the appellant with back benefits.

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