1. MUHAMMAD SHARIF, C. J.--The suit land measuring 9 kanals 2 marlas situate in village Katha Piran was purchased by the appellants by a registered sale-deed on 15-10-1964. Abdul Ghafoor respondent brought a suit to pre-empt the sale and a decree was passed in his favour. In the first appeal before the learned District Judge the vendee raised two law points that had not been raised in the trial Court viz. : (1) that the suit was time barred and (2) that the plaintiff-pre-emptor had failed to deposit the Zar-e-Khumas of the purchase price within the time fixed by the Court and therefore the plaint should be rejected. The learned District Judge overruled the first objection of the vendee but dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to deposit the Zar-e-Khumas within the fixed time The plaintiff-pre emptor then came up in second appeal before this Court and a learned Single Judge of this Court by his judgment and decree dated 7-7- 1970 accepted the appeal holding that the plaintiff had deposited the Zar-e-Khumas within time and setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court restored the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The vendee has now come up in further appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge.
2. The plaint in this case was put in the trial Court on 4-10-1965. The order written on the plaint by a Clerk of the Court and signed by the Revenue Assistant reads "Presented by the counsel for the plaintiff. The Sub-Judge is on leave. To come up for proper orders on 3-11-1965". On 3-11-1965 the plaint was put up before the learned Sub-Judge who passed the following order :- "Plaint presented. To be registered. The plaintiff shall deposit the Zar-e-Khumas by the next date, 29-1-66."
3. Learned counsel for the vendee-appellant argues that the plaintiff failed to deposit the Zar-e- Khumas by this date and that he made an application on 15-4-1966 showing that he had been ordered to deposit the Zar-e-Khumas and that he had brought the money and that an order shall be made to deposit the amount. The learned Sub-Judge wrote an order on the same day "allowed". Learned counsel's contention is that there was no prayer by the plaintiff for an extension of time for depositing the Zar-e-Khumas and that there should have been an express order extending time otherwise the deposit would not avail and the suit should have been dismissed. He cited AIR 1938 Lah. 606 in which it was laid down that time once fixed cannot be extended.
4. Learned counsel for the pre-emptor-respondent replied that AIR 1938 Lah. 606 was a case dealing with section 22 (5) (b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act and not a case dealing with section 22 (4).
5. The time fixed under section 22 can be extended under subsection (4) but time fixed under subsection (5), clause (b) cannot be extended and the learned Judges deciding AIR 1938 Lah. 606 held this much only that if any security so furnished for any cause becomes void or insufficient, the Court shall order the plaintiff to furnish fresh security or to increase the security, as the case may be, within a time to be fixed by the Court, and if the plaintiff fails to comply with such order, the suit shall be dismissed and time so fixed cannot be extended. Learned counsel for the plaintiff- respondent also pointed out that the learned Sub-Judge was on have and the next date fixed by the office was 16-4-1966 but the plaintiff made an application a day earlier on 15-4-1966 for order to make the deposit and that the learned Sub-Judge when he passed the order "Allowed" extended the time.
6. Section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act corresponding to section 21 of the Jammu & Kashmir Right of Prior Purchase Act has been added to safeguard the vendee against speculative, frivolous, mala fide and vexatious pre-emption suits. As pointed out by the learned Single Judge the vendee had not appeared in Court on 29-1-1966 or 16-4-1966 but for the first time appeared in November 1966. Subsection (4) provides that if the plaintiff fails within the time fixed by the Court or within such further time as the Court may allow to make the deposit or furnish the security mentioned in subsection (1) or (2), his plaint shall be rejected or his appeal dismissed as the case may be. The plaintiff had been required by order dated 3-11-1965 to deposit the Zar-e-Khumas by the next date, 29-1-1966. On 29-1-1966 the learned Sub-Judge was on leave and the case was adjourned to 16-4- 1966. The plaintiff made his application on 15.4-66 showing that the order had been passed requiring him to deposit the Zar-e-Khumas and that he had brought with him the Zar-eKhumas. It is requested that an order be passed to take in the deposit. The application shows that the plaintiff-pre-emptor was making a request for extension of time and the learned Sub-Judge granted extension when he passed the order "allowed". Subsection (4) also requires that the plaintiff shall make the deposit within the time fixed by the Court or such further time as the Court 'may allow'. The case cited by the learned counsel for the appellant has no bearing on the case before us because that case deals with subsection (5), clause (b) and not with subsection (4). The case before us is covered by subsection (4). We hold that the `Zar-e-Khumas' had been deposited within such further time as the Court had allowed.
7. Now we take up the other point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant with regard to the presentation of the plaint. He cited AIR 1934 Lah. 622(1). The facts of this case were that the Subordinate Judge of Samrala used to sit for a week every month at Ludhiana. During his absence at Ludhiana, the plaintiff presented his plaint at Samrala, which was accepted by the Naib-Sheriff of the Court. No arrangements had been made for the reception of plaints during the absence of the Subordinate Judge from Samrala. The suit was within time when the plaint was presented, but had become time-barred when it was placed before the Subordinate Judge on his return from Ludhiana and was therefore dismissed. Bhide, J. held that :-- "The plaint was not properly presented to the Naib-Sheriff as he was not authorised to receive plaints under Order IV rule 1 ; but the Court at Samrala must be taken to have been closed in computing the period of limitation. The suit was therefore within time."
8. In the case before us the plaint was presented within the prescribed period of limitation on 4-10- 1965 a day when the Presiding Officer of the Court was on leave. The plaint was received by the Clerk of the Court and signed by an officer who had been authorised to carry on the routine duties of his Court. There are two aspects of the case. One is that the Clerk receiving the plaint or the officer signing the order must be deemed to have been so authorised since all official acts are presumed to have been done correctly. The other aspect is that if the Clerk was not authorised to receive the plaint and no arrangements had been made for receiving the plaints, the Court must be deemed to have been closed during the time the Presiding Officer was on leave and the plaint shall be treated to have been presented within time when the learned Sub-Judge returned from leave and made an order on 3-11-1965. We have a Division Bench case of our own High Court, Civil Appeal No, 1-A of 1964 'Azad Kashmir Govt. v. Shaheen Timber Trading Corporation' decided on 6- 4-64 which has a bearing on this point. Learned counsel for the respondent had taken a preliminary objection to the appeal filed by the Government that the appeal though filed within the prescribed period of limitation should be treated to be beyond time because the appeal had been received by the Reader of the Court who was not authorised to receive the memoranda of appeals.
9. It was laid down in this D. B. judgment that in the absence of any rules authorising any official of the Court, the practice of the Court should be allowed to prevail. On inquiry it was found that there was no order authorising the Reader of the Court to receive appeals. Even the Registrar of the High Court had not been authorised to receive the appeals or petitions though the practice was that the Registrar received the appeals or petitions and in his absence the Office Superintendent or the Reader received the appeals or petitions. Order IV, rule 1 provides that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf. When the Sub-Judge is on leave the office remains open and the plaints are received by his Clerks. It shall be presumed that the Clerk has been authorised to receive the plaints. It does not require a formal order in writing. The Clerk can be authorised even verbally to receive the plaints. As pointed out by the learned Single Judge the objection was not raised in the trial Court and was not the subject of an issue. The presumption being that all acts of Government officials are done properly, it is not necessary to frame an issue on the point and remand the case for evidence. At worst it shall be said that the Clerk of the Subordinate Court was not authorised to receive plaints and no arrangements had been made for receiving the plaints in the absence of the Presiding Officer.
10. Then the Court shall be deemed to have been closed during the time the Presiding Officer was on leave as was held by Bhide, J. in AIR 1934 Lab. 622(1) and under section 4, Limitation Act this time shall be deducted in computing the period of limitation. The suit shall, therefore, be held to be within time when the plaint was placed before the Sub-Judge on his return from leave.
11. There is no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs.