' S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).-Muhammad Qayyum and 34 others filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act of 1974, in which they have impleaded the Additional Chief ' Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Services, General Administration and Information Department and Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Finance Department as respondents.
2. By virtue of this appeal they have prayed that the impugned order, dated 26th September, 1981 be declared as illegal, null and void, without any lawful authority and be set aside. It has been further urged that a declaration be granted in favour of the appellants that they are entitled to the concession of all the four Advanced Increments extended vide letter, dated 15th January, 1981 issued by the respondent No, 2.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellants are either Personal Assistants or Senior Scale Stenographers and are working under the administrative control of respondent No,, 1 who is their Appointing Authority for all intents and purposes. Respondent No, 2 issued letter No, P.R-16-12/72, dated 15th January, 1981 to the effect that with effect from 15th January, 1981 four Advance Increments in the existing pay scales shall be allowed to the serving incumbents of all the posts of Personal Assistants and Senior Scale Stenographers, etc. In the Secretariat as well as in the field offices subject to the condition that the pay inclusive of four Advance Increments will not exceed the maximum of the existing pay scale in which an official is drawing. When this letter was issued some of the appellants had reached maximum of their N.P.S. Whereas others had only 1 to 3 stages below the maximum of the scales on the said date. In consequence of the said letter, dated 15th January, 1981 some of the appellants who could derive the benefit of 1 to 3 increments out of four increments contemplated in the aforesaid Government letter while the others could not avail of any increment whatsoever on account of the condition mentioned in para. 3 above because they had already reached the maximum of their pay scales and if any increment had been allowed to them, it would have exceeded the maximum of their pay scales. Hence this appeal.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, as well the learned District Attorney, assisted by the representative of the Finance Department and have perused the record of this case with their assistance.
5. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellants that although the letter, dated 15th January, 1981 specify the starting point that is 15th January, 1981 from four advance increments in question were admissible but which does not indicate any terminous point. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that according to the said letter the concession so allowed could be claimed even after 15th January, 1981. The appellants have assailed the order so passed against them as illegal, capricious and discriminatine. They have relied on provisions contained in Note 11, below rule 4.4
(b) (2) of C.S.R. (Pb.) Vol. 1, Part I for their stand and it has been submitted that under the said rules a Civil Servant is directed to post-date his substantive promotion to a higher post to a date when it would be more beneficial to him under the operation of the said rules. They have also relied on precedents in the Government of this issue and have submitted that a liberal view should be taken in their favour.
6. On the other hand the learned District Attorney, assisted by the Finance Department has submitted that the benefit so bestowed was one time benefit and the same cannot be extended at the choice of the appellants. It has been further urged that the benefit of four advance increments was extended to the existing officials at one time concession only, therefore, the existing officials could not defer the receipt of the benefit for a period later than 15th January, 1981. The learned District Attorney has urged that policy so settled by the Government was uniform, based on justice and fair play and could not be changed for the benefit of few officials because such a step shall have ill-effects for its implementation. He has also vigorously controverted the arguments advanced by the appellants that on the analogy of the postponement of promotion this benefit could also be postponed and can be availed by the appellants at their discretion. He has argued that since the concession of advance increments was not at all, a promotion it would be a misconception on their part to back their case on the said rule.
7. We have given our anxious thought to the arguments so raised by both the parties before us and find that there are about 900 Stenographers in the Province working both in the Secretariat as well as the Field Offices. A majority of the class has been benefited by the grant of four advance increments. Therefore, it would be unfair to say that stipulation so made by the Government was unjust and improper. We are also of the considered opinion that the Government was quite within its policy to specify the scope of its policy and make its application subject to fulfilment of certain conditions. This prerogative of the Government cannot be taken away by this Tribunal as the same would result into chaos.
8. After taking into consideration the plea of the appellants that they have discriminated and a policy which was a sort of incentive to the appellants has resulted in their frustration. We are unable to agree with their point of view so advanced before us as we find that the main objection of the said policy was that an incentive be offered for the post of Stenographer as well as the existing incumbents and they may be allowed similar benefit to a considerable extent. The said policy envisaged these concessions to this class but with certain limitations. We are conscious of such policies of the Government which we have come across and feel that checks. And balances are always must if the Government finds it necessary. It is a matter of chance that certain appellants who had reached the maximum could only avail a few increments and some of them could not who had already reached the saturation point. The such like persons who have reached the said saturation point are those who have already served the department for pretty long time and have benefited from the terms of their services, therefore, it would be fair to presume that no further incentive was required in their cases.
9. We have carefully examined the plea of the appellants with regard to the allegation of discrimination and find that the respondents did keep principle of justice and fair play as this formula was applicable in the case of every Government Servant of course subject to certain conditions.
10. In view of above we have no reason to take exception to the decision of the respondents which to our considered view is fair, equitable and just.
11. The result is we dismiss the appeal as being without any merits. However, there will be no order as to costs.