' Mr. Muhammad Nawaz, ex-Constable No, 353, Police Station City, Sargodha, has made this appeal, wherein he has impleaded Superintendent of Police, Sargodha and Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Sargodha Range, Sargodha, as respondents.
2. The appellant has prayed that the order of Respondent No, 1, dated 21st May, 1981 and that of Respondent No, 2, dated 20th March, 1982 be set aside.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant on the night between 19/20th May, 1981 while posted in Police Station City, Sargodha, clad in mufti dress but having official belt underneath it, went into the house of Mst. Salma, wife of Muhammad Nawaz Dogar in Block No,
21. The appellant, it was learnt. Had developed clandestines relations with Mst. Salma in the absence of her husband whd was reportedly away to France. The residents of the Mohallah had often seen the accused constable visiting the house of Mst. Salma at odd hours and they did not want that the atmosphere of their vicinity be polluted. On the night of the occurrence, when the appellant entered the house of Mst. Salma, the inhabitants of the Mohallah knocked at the door, whereupon, the appellant tried to slip away but was eventually caught in the street. The inhabitants of Block No, 21, City Sargodha, produced the appellant in Police Station City, Sargodha and vehemently condemned his conduct.
In this connection, a report No, 33, dated 20th May, 1981 was recorded in the daily diary of Police Station City. D. S. P./Sadar, Ch. Sultan Ahmad, suspended the appellant and directed him to report to Lines. Later on, the D. S. P. Reported the matter to S. P. Sargodha recommending discharge from service of the appellant in view of his misconduct. The appellant was summoned in the orderly room on 21st May, 1981 and heard in person by Superintendent of Police Sargodha. The appellant denied the allegations but the defence of the appellant was not considered satisfactory and the act of the appellant as taken as shameful and disgrace to the Department by the Superintendent f Police Sargodha. The appellant was, therefore, considered not fit to be detained in service and the appellant was discharged under P. R.
12.21, she had service less than 3 years to his credit vide Superintendent of police, Sargodha order, dated 21st May, 1931. The appellant made a presentation to D. I.-G. Of Police, Sargodha Range, Sargodha which was also rejected vide his order, dated 20th March, 1982. Hence this Appeal,
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the appellant has been discharged under Police Rules 12,21 which is applicable only to a constable who is found unlikely to prove an efficient police officer but in this case the appellant was discharged on the charge of misconduct, during probation and was not found inefficient in any way. Thus, discharge of the appellant under Police Rules 12.21 is illegal and unlawful as the appellant was discharged because of misconduct and the requirements of law, to charge-sheet him, holding of regular enquiry and serving of show-cause notice were not met. The reliance was made, on the observations of the Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as PLD 1974 SC 393 appearing at page 401 and also on Muhammad Zafarullah v. D. I.-G., Multan by the appellant's counsel. Relying on these judgments in identical cases, the learned counsel for the appellant prayed that the impugned orders of the respondents are unlawful, void and prayed to be quashed. Controverting these arguments the learned District Attorney argued that the appellant was on probation and under rule 7 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointments and Condition of Service) Rules, 1974, the services of the appellant could be terminated at any time without any notice. Furthermore as per section 4 (1) (b) of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, it is a matter of determining of fitness of the appellant by a competent authority to keep him in service while on probation ; hence the appeal of the appellant does not full under the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. He has also relied on an earlier decision taken by this Tribunal in case Nazeer Ahmad Chaudhry v. Secretary Law (Case No, 144/923 of 1981). Concluding his arguments, the learned District Attorney submitted, thus, the appellant has been discharged lawfully.
5. I have given my anxious thoughts to the arguments of the parties and have also consulted the record. The appellant was discharged by Superintendent of Police, Sargodha under Police Rules 12.21 which reads as follow :- "12.21. Discharge of inefficients.-A constable who is found unlikely to prove an efficient police officer may be discharged by the Superintendent at any time within three years of enrollment. There shall be no appeal against an order of discharge under this rule."
' It is clear from the above rule that the appellant has been discharged as he was found unlikely to prove an efficient police officer. The impugned orders of Superintendent of Police, Sargodha, dated 21st May, 1981 and Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Sargodha Range, Sargodha, dated 20th March, 1982. Respectively show that the appellant was found guilty of of the charge of misconduct.
But the requirements of law such as serving of charge-sheet to the appellant, holding of departmental enquiry and issue of show-cause notice, have not been observed. This Tribunal has already held, as reported in Muhammad Zafarullah v. D. I.-G., Multan that in such cases, meeting of requirements of law as to charge sheet, holding of departmental enquiry and service of show- cause notice, are must, while placing reliance on the following observations of Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as PLD 1974 SC 393 appearing at page 401 :- "In my opinion, if the service of a probationer is terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory work that will not amount to dismissal or removal from service such termination will be in terms of the contract' or the rules made by the Government but if the service of a probationer is terminated on the ground of misconduct that will amount to removal or dismissal. It will be a stigma in his favour."
6. In my opinion the ratio of the above decision clearly supports the contention of the appellant's counsel inasmuch as that the impugned orders have been passed on the basis of the1 objectionable misconduct of the appellant. I accordingly set aside the impugned orders and direct the competent authority to proceed in accordance with the law, if advised.
There will be no order as to costs. NLR 1978 Service 313