' The facts involved in the two revision applications are exactly similar except with the difference of the premises in question. Hence both the revision applications were heard together and are being decided by this order. In Revision Application No, 89 of 1984, respondent Begum Amtul Shakoor had rented out two shops situated on Survey. No, 226/C/11 in Commercial Area, Tariq Road, P.E.C.H.S., Karachi, to the appellant. In the year 1971 she filed an ejectment application against the appellant before the Rent Controller which was allowed on 30th October, 1974. The appellant preferred appeal in the District Court which was also dismissed on 23rd April, 1975. The appellant preferred second appeal before the High Court being Second Appeal No, 146/1975 which was summarily dismissed by this Court on 7th July, 1975.
2. The respondent Begum Amtul Shakoor then filed execution application for ejectment of the appellant from the shops in question. During these proceedings the appellant produced a fresh tenancy agreement dated 24-4-1976 purported to have been executed by the respondent in respect of the same shops. According to this agreement, the rent was enhanced from Rs, 125 to Rs, 250 p.m, and water charges were raised from Rs, 3 to Rs, 5 per month. The agreement also purported to show that the appellant had paid Rs, 5,000 to the respondent as expenses of litigation.
The appellant produced this rent agreement along with an application under Order XXIII, rule 3 of C.P.C. praying that in view of the fresh agreement, the execution application in respect of the ejectment order dated 30th October, 1974 be dismissed.
3. On behalf of the respondents it was alleged that the fresh rent agreement dated 24-4-1976 was a forged document and that neither any such agreement was executed nor any amount was received as alleged. The learned Rent Controller, after hearing learned counsel for the parties dismissed the application under Order XXIII, rule 3, C.P.C. by his order dated 24-5-1976.
4. The appellant thereafter filed a Civil Suit for declaration and injunction on the basis of the disputed fresh rent agreement. It was Suit No, 802/1976 and was filed on 3-5-1976 against the landlord Begum Amtul Shakoor (in Revision Application No, 89/1984), Along with the suit, the appellant also filed an application for injunction praying that the respondent may be restrained from ejecting the appellant from the premises in dispute. The learned Civil Judge issued ad interim injunction, and confirmed the same later by his order dated 28-5-1976. The respondent then preferred appeal against the above order which was allowed by Additional District Judge by his order dated 25-8-1977 and the interim injunction was vacated.
5. Against the above order the appellant filed revision application before this Court which was Civil Revision Application No, 160/1977, It was dismissed by this Court by order dated 25-1-1978 on the ground that it was not pressed by the counsel for the appellant, who had undertaken to vacate the premises within four months, if the civil suit was not disposed of within that time. As this order will be very relevant for disposal of the present revision application, hence the relevant portion of the order of this Court dated 25th January, 1978 in Civil Revision Application No, 60 of 1977 is reproduced as under:- "Mr. S. Inayat Ali, learned counsel for the applicant, after arguing the case at some length stated that he would not press this Revision Application if a direction is given to the trial Court to dispose of the suit within 3 months and if the respondent agrees to give 4 months' time to the applicant for vacating the premises and handing over its possession to him subject to the condition that in case the suit is decreed in favour of the applicant by then, he will continue to remain in possession but if the suit is decided against him, or if the suit is not disposed of within those four months, the applicant will hand over the premises to the respondent. Mr. Nizam Ahmed, learned counsel Tor the respondent landlord stated that the terms proposed by the learned counsel for the applicant were acceptable to him.
' In view of the above, this Revision Application is dismissed with no order as to costs."
' This order was later modified by this Court by order dated 29-5-1978 and the time allowed to the appellant for vacating the premises was extended up to 22-7-1978, on the joint statement of the parties. By the same order it was also directed that if the appellant failed to vacate the premises up to the above date, the respondent shall be entitled to get the ejectment order executed without further notice to the appellant.
6. The suit filed by the appellant could not be disposed of within the period specified by the High Court. However, the undertaking by the appellant to vacate the premises within the time specified by the High Court, was not subject to disposal of the suit within the specified time; hence the respondent applied to the Court of execution of the ejectment order and a notice of execution application was served on the appellant on 12-11-1981. Thereafter, the appellant filed a fresh injunction application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. read with 151, C.P.C. on 28th November, 1981 in the Civil Suit filed by him. The learned Civil Judge dismissed the injunction application by order dated 14th July, 1982 on the ground that in view of the order of the High Court dated 25-1- 1978, as modified by order dated 29-5-1978, there was no occasion for issuing any injunction and that no fresh application for injunction was maintainable after the first application for similar prayer had been dismissed and which dismissal was upheld even up to the level of the High Court.
Against the above order dated 14th July, 1182 of Civil Judge Ilnd Class, Karachi, the appellant preferred appeal before the District Judge, which was transferred to 1st Additional District Judge, Karachi, who by his order, dated 26th March, 1984 dismissed the appeal. This order has been challenged by the appellant in Revision Application No, 89/1984.
7. The facts in Revision Application No, 90/1984 are exactly similar. Appellant in both the cases is the same. The respondent/landlord was Muhammad Jamil who died at some stage of the protracted litigations and was substituted by his legal representative Begum Amtul Shakoor, who is now respondent in both the Revision applications. The premises in this case was a shop situated on Plot No, 228/C-11, Tariq Road, P.E.C.H.S., Karachi. Rest of the facts are exactly similar. Muhammad Jamil had also filed ejectment application against the same appellant which was dismissed on 30th October, 1974. Appeal against the above order was dismissed by the District Court on 23-4-1975 and second appeal (II. A. No, 145/1975) was dismissed in limine by this Court on 7-7-1975. In this case also when Muhammad Jamil started execution proceedings, the appellant came out with a fresh rent agreement dated 24-4-1976 purported to have been executed by deceased respondent Muhammad Jamil, whereby rent of the shop was enhanced from Rs, 125 to Rs, 250 and water charges were enhanced from Rs, 3 to Rs, 5 per month. The amount of Rs, 2,500 was also shown in the agreement as having been paid to Muhammad Jamil by the appellant as expenses of the litigations. In this case also the appellant made an application under Order XXIII, rule 3, C.P.C. on the basis of the said rent agreement, praying that the execution application should be dismissed but the learned Rent Controller dismissed the application on the ground that the fresh rent agreement was denied by the respondent as a forged document by his order dated 28-4-1976 and by the same order he directed that writ of possession shall issue.
8. Thereafter, the appellant filed civil suit being Suit No, 83 of 1976 on 3-5-1975 for declaration and injunction against the respondent on the basis of the alleged fresh rent agreement. Along with the suit an application for injunction was filed in this case also which was confirmed on 28-5-1976 by the trial Court but on appeal the order was set aside by the Additional District Judge by his order dated 25-8-1977.
9. The above order was challenged in the High Court in revision application being Revision Application No, 160/1977 which was disposed of on 25-1-1978 in the same terms as the revision application in the other case against Begum Amtul Shakoor. On 29-5-1978 the said order was modified by this Court in the same manner as in the other case. Time was granted to the appellant to vacate the shop by 22-7-1978. In this case also, as the suit could not be disposed of within four months, hence fresh injunction application was filed on 28th November, 1981, which was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge (in Suit No, 803/1976) by order dated 14-7-1982 and this order was confirmed in appeal by let Additional District Judge by his order dated 26-3-1984 which has been impugned in the second revision application being R.A. No, 90/1984, It may be noted that all the dates in both the applications are the same, orders passed on various applications, appeals and revisions are also the same and presently the parties are also the same.
10. Syed Inayat All learned counsel for the appellant has challenged the impugned order of the Additional District Judge on two grounds;
(1) that the learned Additional District Judge has not applied his mind properly while disposing of the appeal against the interim order; and
(2) That the order is bad due to non-compliance of Order XLI, rule 31, C.P.C.
11.I have perused the order of the trial Court as well as the impugned order of 1st Additional District Judge in both the cases. The learned District Judge has held that the appellant had no prima facie case, that the balance of convenience also was not in his favour and moreover after the orders of the High Court dated 25-1-1978 and 29-5-1978, there was no scope at all for the appellant to have filed fresh application for injunction. I have no reason to take exception to the order of the learned District Judge. Perusal of the order would show that the learned District Judge has properly applied his mind. It is pertinent to note that during the pendency of his suit for declaration on the basis of the alleged fresh rent agreement, the appellant had undertaken to vacate the shops in both the cases within the time allowed by the High Court. This order of the High Court which has been quoted above in para. 5 did not say that the appellant's handing over possession to the respondent of the shops in question, shall be subject to disposal of civil suits within the specified time. The very fact that during the pendency of the suits, the appellant had undertaken to vacate the shops of both the landlords, prima facie shows that the appellant himself was not convinced about the genuineness of the two rent agreements purported to have been executed by the respondents in these two cases. Had the fresh rent agreements been genuine documents, the appellant would not have agreed to vacate the shops during the pendency of the suits. The trial Court and the appellate Court were, therefore, justified in holding that the appellant had no prima facie case. I, therefore, do not agree with the learned counsel for the applicant that the learned Appellate Court had not applied its mind properly to the facts of the case while deciding his appeal.
12. The next objection of Mr. Syed Inayat All is that the learned 1st appellate Court has failed to comply with the provisions of rule 31 of Order XLI, C.P.C. According to rule 31, the judgment of the appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state; (a) the points for determination; (b) decision thereon; (c) reasons for the decision; and (d) the relief to which the party concerned is entitled.
According to Mr. Syed Inayat All particular points for determination have not been framed by the learned first appellate Court and, therefore, the judgment is bad and is liable to be set aside as non-compliance with the above provisions i.e, clause (a) above, would amount to a material irregularity. I do not agree with the learned counsel that the order of the learned first appellate Court is bad for any material irregularity. The substance of the order shows that the learned appellate Court had in his mind the points for determination in the case viz. whether there was prima facie case, whether balance of convenience was in favour of a particular party and whether irreparable loss was likely to be caused to the appellant in case no injunction was issued. On all these three points the learned Additional District. Judge has given his findings against the appellant. Hence it cannot be said that there was any non-compliance with the provisions of Order XLI, C.P.C.
' For the above reasons I do not see any substance whatsoever in these revision applications which are calculated to set at naught the ejectment orders passed in rent proceedings as long back in the year, 1974 which were confirmed even by the High Court. Both the revision applications, being misconceived and frivolous, are dismissed in limine. Stay application is also dismissed and ad interim stay vacated.
' The observations made in this order about the merits of the case are provisional and tentative in nature and have been made only for the purpose of deciding the question of interim injunction and shall in no way prejudice the learned trial Court in deciding the suit of the appellants on merits.