The simple facts giving rise to this Civil Revision, which has been unnecessarily delayed for more than five years, are that one Mian Allah Bakhsh, a land-owner of Mauza Behram Shah, District Bahawalnagar, had surrendered a portion of his land under Martial Law Regulation 64. One of his sons, Ghulam Qadir plaintiff-respondent, claimed one-half of the compensation to be awarded in lieu of the land so surrendered on the ground that half of it had been gifted to him by his father. He brought a suit for declaration on 15-1-1963. The written-statement was filed by the present petitioner on 13th of April 1963 and issues were struck on 21-6-1963. About four months later, the defendant-petitioner filed an application seeking amendment of the written-statement which was allowed on 17-10-63 resulting in the framing of two additional issues raising for the first time the question of jurisdiction of the trial Court to try the case. These issues were framed on the 23rd of November 1963. Having scored this point it was not till seven months thereafter when the plaintiff- respondent had closed his case that on 19-6-1964 the defendant-petitioner filed an application under Order XIV, rule 2 praying that the legal issues relating to the question of jurisdiction may be decided before proceeding with the rest of the case. After having heard the parties' counsel on the point, the learned trial Judge dismissed the petition vide his order dated 3-7-1964, giving rise to the present Civil Revision, which has been allowed to linger on being a short matter could have been readily disposed of.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, presumably being conscious of the fact that he is on a weak wicket, has half-heartedly referred me to the provisions contained in Order XIV, rule 2 and Order XV, rule 3. He has also referred me to Janki Das and another v. Kalu Ram and another in support of his contention that in the circumstances of the case the learned trial Judge should have exercised his1 discretion in favour of the petitioner.
3. The point raised by the learned counsel is patently devoid of force. It is well-settled that it is discretionary with the trial Court to decide interlocutory matters and the discretion, if properly exercised, should not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. In the above background of the case when after having already succeeded in considerably prolonging the matter the petitioner filed an application under Order XIV, rule 2 for the first time at a stage when the plaintiff-respondent had closed his case and the conclusion of the trial should not have taken more than a couple of hearings; it can hardly be said that it was not a case of proper exercise of discretion by the learned trial Judge. Rather, I am constrained to observe that if the petition had been allowed it would, in all probability, have been a case of an improper exercise of discretion in favour of the present petitioner. It need hardly be added that the correct legal position in this regard is well-settled in matters of this nature the Court is under no obligation to allow such B a prayer which also suffered from laches. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred me to Faqir Chand v. Mst. Bibi Zulekha and Srit. Sarojini Roy and another v. Shivaram Poddar and others . Having considered the authorities pressed into service by either side, I am in no manner of doubt that Janki Das and another v. Kalu Ram and another relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no bearing, whatever, to the circumstances of this case. On the contrary, the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondent apply with full force to the facts of this case.
4. The upshot of the discussion, therefore, is that petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. AIR 1936 Pat. 250 PLD 1962 Pesh. 1 AIR 1957 Pat. 59