' The facts giving rise to this appeal are that the respondents, Muhammad Amir and another, filed a suit against the appellant, Muhammad Hussain for possession of certain land, through pre- emption. While ordering the registration of the suit on 10th November, 1976, the Civil Judge, Chiniot, District Jhang. Directed the respondents to file naqsha dal (statement of net profits) and make good the deficiency in court-fee accordingly before 15th December, 1976. The respondents, however, did not comply with the above direction of the learned Civil Judge nor did they make any application for extension of time for so doing. The learned trial Court, therefore, rejected the plaint, under Order VII, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On this, the respondents filed an appeal before the District Judge, Jhang. The learned District Judge took the view that since the amount of deficiency in court-fee was not clearly specified, the plaint could not be rejected. He, therefore, accepted the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Civil Judge and remanded the case to him with the direction that he should first determine the deficiency in court-fee and then give direction for making good the same. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned District Judge, the appellant has come up in appeal to this Court.
2. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that it was the headache of the respondents to file the statement of the net profits and make good the deficiency in court-fee accordingly, but since they had failed to do so, the learned trial Court was justified in rejecting the plaint. His plea was that it was not necessary for the learned trial Court to work out the exact amount of deficiency before directing the respondents to make up the same. In this connection, reliance was placed by him on Mst. Walayat Khatun v. Khalil Khan and another (1).
3. In reply, it was submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the respondents had not filed the statement of net profits because it was not supplied to them by the Patwari. His argument was that the plaint could not be rejected by the learned Civil Judge without specifying the amount by which the court-fee was deficient.
4. In view of what has gone above, the question which falls for determination is whether the trial Court can reject a plaint for the plaintiff's failure to make good the deficiency in court-fee within the time allowed to him if the direction of the trial Court in this behalf does not mention the precise amount by which the court-fee is deficient. This question was also agitated in Muhammad Ali v.
Allah Ditta and 4 others (2) and it was observed that it cannot be laid down as a general principle of law that the Court must determine the amount of valuation for the purpose of court-fee A and also the amount of court-fee payable inasmuch as it depends upon the facts of each case whether such prior determination would be necessary or not. In the case of Muhammad Ali also, the plaintiff had been directed to determine valuation for the purpose of court-fee on the basis of the statement of net profits ( fard khalis munafa) but as he had failed to do so, the plaint was rejected. It was held that the plaintiff was rightly penalised for the failure on his part. Relevant observations made by Aftab Hussain, J. (as he then was) in Muhammad Ales case read as follows :- "Clause (b) of Yule 11 says that the plaint shall be rejected where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a it me to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so. It does not make a reference to the question of ascertainment or determination of the court-fee. In these circum-
(1) PLD 1979 SC 821 (2) PLD 1979 Lah. 763 ' stances it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that the Court must determine the amount of valuation for the purpose of court-fee and also the amount of court-fee payable. It depends upon the facts of each case whether such a prior determination would be necessary or not ? It is possible that whether the court-fee is payable on the market value of the property and that value may not be ascertainable from any document on record, the Court may be bound to first determined the jurisdictional value on the basis of the evidence to be recorded by it and to ascertain the correct amount of the court-fee payable. In such a case if the matter is left to the discretion of the plaintiff, the defendant can certainly raise an objection that the valuation fixed by the plaintiff is arbitrary and should not be acted upon. In such a case determination may become necessary. But in a case where a person has to multiply by 15 the amount of net profits determined on a Pard Khalis Munafa' determination is altogether futile. It is duty of the plaintiff to deposit correct court-fee on that basis unless a question be whether the court-fee is at all determinable on 15 times the amount of net profits. But once it is conceded that it is so determinable and the only question is of the procurement of the Tard Khalis Munafa', the insistence of the plaintiff that the Court should first determine the amount of court-fee by the exercise of multiplication would be absurd. In such a case where it is the duty of the plaintiff to determine the court-fee valuation on the basis of a Pard Khalis Munafa' and he fails to do so. The Court's order for filing that document and also for paying the proper court-fee on its basis would be unexceptionable. I, therefore, do not subscribe to the view held in the two other authorities relied upon by the learned counsel since the present case it is a matter where the amount shown in the 'Fard Khalis Munafa' had merely to be multiplied by 15 and the court-tee to be paid on that amount".
5. In the case of Mst. Walayat Khatun, relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant, Mst.
Walayat Khatun had brought a suit by filing a plaint which was stamped with a court-fee of Rs, 2 only. It was stated by her in the plaint that the deficiency in court-fee shall be made good after ascertaining the annual net profits for the land after having obtained the fard Aar paidawar for it.
While entertaining the plaint the Court directed her to make good the deficiency in court-fee within a stipulated period but she did not do so. The plaint was, therefore, rejected and the order made in this behalf was upheld by the Supreme Court although the precise amount of deficiency in court- fee was not given in the direction by which the learned trial Court had required Mst. Walayat Khatun to make up the deficiency. Thus, the case of Mst. Walayat Khatun lends support to the view taken by Aftab Hussain, J. In the case of Muhammad Ali.
6. In suits like the one in hand, valuations for the purpose of court fee is generally determined on the basis of the statements of net profits and if such statements are not furnished by the plaintiffs, how can the trial Courts determine such valuations before the defendants are summoned and enter appearance before those Courts. If a plaintiff is allowed to successfully B attack the order of rejection of plaint on the ground that the deficiency in court-fee is not satisfied in the direction requiring him to make good the deficiency it will amount to permitting him to take the benefit of his own default, that is, his omission to file the statement of net profits. And it is well known maxim of law that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong (nullus commodum carpere potest de injuria sua propria). If the view taken by the learned appellate Court in the instant case, namely, that the trial Court must name the amount of deficiency in court-fee before the plaint is rejected for not making good the deficiency is approved of, it will make the trial Court helpless quo a plaintiff who is guilty of culpable negligence and contumacy in the matter of filing of the statement of net profits inasmuch as according to the above view a plaint cannot be rejected unless the amount of deficiency is specified by the Court, and the Court cannot specify the deficiency unless the statement of net profits is made available to it. Such an unfortunate result could not be intended by the Legislature while enacting clause (b) of rule 11, of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am, therefore, unable to accept the view expressed by the learned District Judge.
7. As indicated above, the learned trial Court had afforded a reasonable opportunity to the respondents to make good the deficiency in court-fee after putting in the statement of net profits.
They did not furnish the said statement nor the deficiency was made up during the time allowed to them for the purpose. No explanation was offered for their failure to do so. They did not even make any application for extension of the period for doing the needful. The respondent's plea that the Patwari had not supplied the statement of net profits to the respondents is an afterthought inasmuch as it was not raised before the learned trial Court by submitting an application or otherwise. There is also no substance in the above plea inasmuch as it is not supported by any document (such as application made to the Patwari for supply of statement of net profits or an application complaining to a higher authority on the revenue side that the Patwari was avoiding to give the said statement) or a certified copy thereof. No valid exception can, therefore, be taken to the order of the learned trial Court by which the plaint was rejected. In other words, the learned District Judge was not justified in setting aside the order of the learned Civil Judge. In this view of the matter, the order of the learned District Judge is not sustainable. This appeal is accordingly accepted, the order of the learned District Judge is set aside and the order of the learned trial Court is restored. There shall be no order as to costs.