' MUHAMMAD MUNIR KHAN, J.-This Intra-Court Appeal arises from the order of learned Single Judge, whereby he on 1-7-1979 dismissed Writ Petition No, 3014/79 filed by Syed Muhammad Hussain Shah appellant herein against Board of Revenue and 3 others.
2. The facts leading up to this 1.-C. A. As stated by the learned counsel, in brief are that about 25 years ago, Thal Development Authority acquired entire area in Thal and some portion of land therefrom was reserved for Forest Department as Shelter Belt Area in Chak No, 249/TDA. The land- owners who were affected thereby, were given, choice to get 113 of their holding in That area. Syed Noor Alam Shah, the father of the appellant owned land in that area who died in the year 1967 and his land was inherited by the appellant and other legal heirs. On 3-1-1977, the appellant moved application before the then Minister (Colonies), Government of the Punjab, Lahore praying that since it was not feasible to have shelter belt area near the Abadi, therefore, the land reserved for shelter belt area be cancelled and the Forest Department be allotted land somewhere else. On this application, the Settlement Officer suggested that Forest Department be asked to surrender the area for shelter belt in Chak No, 249/TDA and if the Department agrees, some other land may be given to it in lieu of shelter belt area in Chak No, 249/TDA. Ultimately, on 11-5-1979, the Board of Revenue decided that an area measuring 34 Acres and 4 Kanals in Chak No, 223-A/TDA may be given to the Forest Department in exchange for the land already reserved for shelter belt in Chak No, 249/TDA. As further stated by the learned counsel, some land situated in Chak No, 223-A/TDA was allocated to the Forest Department and its possession was taken over by the Revenue Staff to deliver the same to the Forest Department. The appellant claims that out of the land reserved for shelter belt area in Chak No, 249/TDA was allotted 70 Kanals and rest of that area had been proposed, to him. Since Thal Development Authority was not taking any interest to implement the order, dated 11-5-1978, the appellant made several applications for the implementation of that order but instead of confirming the area to the appellant, the Board of Revenue re-examined the matter in the light of enquiry report of the Assistant Commissioner, Leiah and decided as follows :- ' MEMORANDUM: ' The case has been re-examined in the Board of Revenue, Punjab, and in the light of Enquiry Report by the Assistant Commissioner, Leiah, it has been decided that
(1) Memo. No, 1000/-78/800/TH-V, dated 11-5-1978, regarding exchange of 34 Acres and 4 Kanals of shelter belt area in Chak No, 249/TI)A with equal area of Chak No, 223/A/TDA, be withdrawn, which is accordingly withdrawn.
(2) To supply a copy of the Enquiry Report to the Forest Department for reconsideration of their decision regarding concurrence for the exchange of Shelter Belt area measuring 34 Acres 4 Kanals of Chak No, 249/TDA, with an equal area of Chak No, 223-A/TDA.
(3) Shelter Belt area being Provincial Government land was not available for allotment. Regrant of this land to 6 different local proprietors from 1965 to 1975, was mentioned in Memo. No, Thal/50/786, dated 17-1-1977, from the Settlement Officer, Leiah to the Officer on Special Duty to the Minister for Revenue and Colonies and Extra Assistant Colonization Officer Memo. No, Thal/ADH/2082, dated 1- 2-1978, was, therefore, invalid.
' The Commissioner/Extra Assistant Colonization Officer, Leiah, should be cognizance of these allotments and proceed according to law."
' Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed Writ Petition No, 4667 of 1978 which was, however, withdrawn to file fresh writ petition impleading the Forest Department as a party. Consequently, the appellant filed Writ Petition No, 3014 of,1979 which was dismissed in limine on 1-7-1979. Hence this ultra-Court Appeal.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out the following guiding rules laid down by the superior Courts :-
(1) That an aggrieved person can maintain writ petition to redress his grievances. Reliance has been placed on Ch. Muhammad Younus v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1972 Lab. 847 ;
(ii) that right of hearing has to be read in every statutory provision unless it is specifically prohibited and that orders passed without hearing the aggrieved or affected parties being violative of the principles of natural justice do suffer from inherent disability and the superstructure would tumble down. Reliance has been placed on Cresent Sugar Mill v. Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 1982 Lah. 1 ;
(iii) that principle of locus penitential cannot be invoked once the order has taken legal effect creating certain legal rights in favour of a party. He relied upon Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Hamaitullah Farrukhi PLD 1969 SC 407 ;
(iv) that anybody or person having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and having duty including administrative duty to act judiciously if acts in excess of legal authority its orders subject to controlling jurisdiction of High Court. Relies on Khawaj Din v. Ration Controller, Food, Faisalabad PLD 1980 Lah. 15 ;
(v) that in review or revision the authority concerned shall apply its independent mind and not merely to countersign the note put up by subordinates. Reliance has been placed on Ghulam Mohy-udDin v. Chief Settlement Commissioner Pak., Lahore and others PLD 1964 SC 829 ;
(vi) that when some land is given to proprietor in lieu of the land acquired from him the same has to be deemed to have been given with full proprietary rights. Relies on Muhammad Iqbal and another v. Member, Board of Revenue and 2 others PLD 1978 Lah.
372.
The examination of these principles and the relevant case-law cited at bar would make crystal clear that for the proper application of these rules the existence of some legal and vested right in favour of the individual is a A condition precedent because an individual cannot be termed as an 'aggrieved person' or 'affected person' unless the decision or order has wrongfully refused him something, which he had a right to demand.
4. After having elaborately explained the principle and case-law cited above the learned counsel adverting to the merits of the case raised the following points :-
(i) That in pursuance to the order, dated 11-5-1978, the land in dispute was actually allotted to the appellant and the Forest Department took physical possession of the land situated in Chak No, 223-A/TDA in lieu of the land reserved as shelter belt area in Chak No, 249/TDA and as such the appellant has acquired a right and was entitled for an opportunity of being heard before withdrawing decision, dated 11-5-1978 ;
(ii) that the order, dated 11-5-1978 having been implemented, the same could not be reviewed by the Board of Revenue without notice to the appellant ;
(iii) that since the order, dated 31-8-1978 was made on secret and one- sided enquiry, the same was illegal and without jurisdiction ;
(iv) that the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition without discussing the points raised therein.
' As against this, learned 'Assistant Advocate-General on behalf of the respondents has vigorously defended the impugned order of the learned Single Judge.
5. As observed earlier, the question which shall engage our attention is the existence of any legal/vested right of the appellant in the particular piece of land reserved for the Forest Department as a shelter belt area in Chak No, 249/TDA so as to term him as 'aggrieved person' or 'affected person' in the juristic sense, entitled to any opportunity of being heard at the time of re- examination of the decision, dated 11-5-1978, through order, dated 31-8-1978, impugned in the writ petition. The learned counsel relies on Annexures C, C/1 and B to contend that order, dated 11-5- 1978 having been implemented and the land reserved for Forest Department in Chak No, 249/TDA having been allotted and proposed to the appellant, he had a vested right in the disputed land and as such the Board of Revenue, by passing order, dated 31-8-1978, without notice to the appellant and at his back has condemned them by violating the rules of natural justice.
6. In the interest of justice we propose to examine the documents i,e, Annexures C, C/1 and B to satisfy ourselves whether these documents do create any legal or vested right in the appellant entitling him to claim show-cause notice and opportunity of being heard before undoing decision dated 11-5-1978. After having examined Annexures C, C/1 we find that these are the mere proposals for allotment. We are convinced that proposals after all are proposals and by itself do not give the appellant any right to demand the proprietary rights of that particular land. As for Annexure 'B' i,e, decision, dated 11-5-1978, we see that this decision does not create or confer right or interest in the disputed property, in favour of the appellant and as such to our mind he had no right to demand the application or proprietary right of this piece of land. It is remarkable that it is not the case of the appellant that the particular piece of land reserved for Forest Department in Chak No, 249/TDA originally belonged to his father or was taken away from him. Furthermore, we do not find any proof of the actual allotment of the disputed land to the appellant or of the delivery of the possession of the land situated in Chak No, 223/TDA to the Forest Department in lieu of the land recovered in Chak: No,249/TDA. We further find that in pursuance to the re-examination of the decision, dated 11- 5-1978, no decision has been pronounced against the appellant refusing him something which he had a right to demand.
7. For all these reasons, we are of the view that in law as well as equity the appellant stands nowhere and this is an answer to the points (i) and (ii), raised by the learned counsel.
8. As for Point No, (iii) we find that since the appellant had no right to the disputed land, he had no locus standi to raise this point. Even otherwise, in the circumstances of the case, the order, dated, 31-8-1978 cannot be declared as illegal or without jurisdiction.
9. So far as Point No, (iv) is concerned, we find that the learned Single Judge has applied his mind to the legal and factual aspects of the matter, has discussed the material points and has given sound reasons in support of the conclusions arrived at by him.
10. For what has been stated above, we are fully convinced that on 31-8-1978 when the order, impugned in the writ petition, was passed, the appellant had no legal or equitable right to claim the allotment and confirmation of the disputed land and as such he being not affected person was not entitled to any show-cause notice or opportunity of being heard. Needless to add that it is well- settled that the regal light to enforce the performance of -duty must be in. The individual himself. It must be a specific right as distinguished from general interest in the property. The upshot of the discussion is that the appellant has hopelessly failed to show his, immediate and specific right to demand the disputed property.
11. As for the guiding principle laid down in the case-law cited by the learned counsel there hardly can be any dispute with these guiding rules but since the conditions precedent for the application of these rules and authorities are lacking in the case in hand, the same do not help the appellant.
12. Before parting with the judgment we would like to observe that the learned A ssistant Advocate- General undertakes that the appellant would be fairly accommodated in accordance with the rules.
13. Resultantly this I.C.A. Is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.