' This writ petition calls in question orders, dated 21st March, 1982 passed by the E.A.C.O./Collector, Bhakkar, whereby the eligibility to get proprietary rights, as earlier determined in favour of the petitioners, was cancelled.
2. The land in question was held by the petitioners as temporary lessees for 5 years, giving an assurance in their affidavits that they shall surrender it as and when it will be required to accommodate various oustees from Projects like Kala Bagh, Atomic Energy and Chashma Barrage.
By letter, dated 22nd June, 1976 the Board of Revenue, earmarked all the State lands in Tehsil Khushab, Mianwali and Bhakkar for such oustees. Since the eligibility of the petitioners to get proprietary rights to this land had already been determined, the Commissioner, Sargodha Division, vide his letter, dated 28th October, 1981 (Annexure "B"), directed the Collector to review those orders under section 163 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, and cancel it. Accordingly, the Collector exercising the power of review passed the impugned orders.
3. The writ was opposed contending inter alia, that declaration of mere eligibility did not confer any right under Policy Letter, dated 3rd September, 1979 by which proprietary rights were intended to be conferred upon such landless tenants ; that the writ was not an efficacious remedy because the petitioners did not go to the Board of Revenue to exhaust their remedy in that channel ; that the area being earmarked for oustees could not be transferred to any lessee as it stood excluded ; that by their own overtures, the petitioners were bound to vacate it and could not insist for its grant ; and lastly, that decision in I.-C.A. No, 543 of 1980, delivered on 1st November, 1983 by this Court was binding upon this Bench inasmuch as a number of writ petitions on similar facts were dismissed.
4. Mr. Shaukat All Saqib, counsel for the petitioners, vehemently argued that they were condemned unheard, in that the Commissioner/ Collector did not afford them any opportunity of representing against the proposed exercise of review powers ; that the decision of the Division Bench was on somewhat different facts ; and lastly, that in similar writ petitions, just the other day, a Deputy Secretary of the Board of Revenue made statement that areas in those writ petitions were not reserved for any oustees.
5. It is not denied that the petitioners held only temporary allotments. It was further not denied that their cases were covered by Policy Letter, dated 3rd September, 1979. Their eligibility to get proprietary rights, in itself did not confer any vested right in them. Paragraph 1 of the letter clearly lays down that their eligibility was not enough to create any legal right. It was equally not denied that these lands were earmarked by letter, dated 22nd June, 1976 for oustees from these Projects.
Mr. Saqib stressed that even if it were earmarked, unless there was any specific reservation, the petitioners could not be denied the proprietary rights. The letter ibid uses both the expressions namely earmarking as well as reservation. The first being the initial step to safeguard the areas for outsees, the latter was an executor stage when actually the oustees, are settled thereon. Both the expressions, therefore, have the synonymous effect of taking out such lands from the Scheme of Permanent Grants.
6. The decision in I.-C.A. No, 543 of 1980 proceeds almost on the same facts, where writ petitions brought to claim proprietary rights were dismissed. I cannot visualise any distinction between the facts of those cases and of the present one.
7. The Deputy Secretary of the Board of Revenue in a few other writ petitions made a statement that the areas involved therein were not reserved. Reservation has its own significance but in this case the Policy Letter providing for proprietary rights, itself excludes such areas as may be earmarked.
Even in the absence of reservation for oustees, the factum of earmarking the land for the purpose was enough to take it out from the Scheme of proprietary rights.
8. Absence of notice under section 167 of the Land Revenue Act will have no place because the petitioners were not being denied any vested right. They were after all grantees with a specific rider that they will have to vacate the land as and when needed for settling oustees. They were aware of this pre-condition and, hence, could not insist for any notice on the principle of audi alteram partem. It will apply only if some vested right existed in their favour. At best, they were declared eligible to get proprietary rights and eligibility alone cannot be equated with a vested right.
8. For the foregoing reasons, there being no merit in the writ petition the same is dismissed.