' The dispute relates to a house which is being used by the appellant as business premises. The respondents filed a petition for the ejectment from this property, on the ground of bona fide personal need. It was averred in the petition that they wanted to run the sports goods business therein. The appellant resisted the petition and pleaded that the plea of personal use was not bona fide. It appears that earlier the respondents sought eviction of the appellant from the property on the ground of subletting, reconstruction and that they required it for self-use as residence. This petition was accepted by the Rent Controller and the tenant's first by the appellate authority whereas he was successful in S. A.O. No, 264 of 1975. It was about three weeks after the decision of the aforesaid appeal that the respondents filed another ejectment petition giving rise to the instant appeal. The dismissal of the previous petition, was set up by the appellant as a ground of defence and it was asserted that section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance was a bar to the maintainability of the second petition. This argument prevailed with the learned Rent Controller, who by his order dated 2nd February, 1977 dismissed the petition. In appeal, the learned District Judge, took the view that the previous petition rested on the ground that the premises in dispute were required by the respondents for residential purposes and whereas as per second petition they required it for the purposes of business. He thus, by his order dated 20th June, 1977 accepted the respondents' appeal and remanded the case to the learned Rent Controller for decision on merits.
2. The learned Rent Controller after appreciation of the evidence, led by the parties, came to the conclusion that the property was bona fide needed by the respondent for the personal use. He maintained that the respondents' evidence was convincing and that of the appellant was not sound. This order was maintained even in appeal by the learned District Judge whose order dated 5th September, 1979 has been sailed through this S. A.O.
3. It is to be noticed that the first appellate Court's order, dated 20th June, 1977 was not questioned by the appellant through second appeal and therefore it attained finality. The question whether the property was required by the respondents bona fide for the personal use is a question of fact on which concurrent findings have been returned by the two Courts below against the appellant.
Normally, such findings cannot be interfered with in the second appeal. The appellant's learned counsel, however, came forth with the plea that the evidence was ignored and was not discussed by the Courts below. With his assistance I have gone through the entire evidence and I am not inclined to agree with him.
4. The main argument advanced on behalf of the appellant was that the respondents are owner of four shops which can be utilised by them for business purposes and that therefore, there is no justification for evicting the appellant.
5. In addition to the testimony of Muhammad Shafi respondents reliance was placed by the respondents on the statement of Abdul Karim, A. W. 2 and Muhammad Abdullah, A. W.
3. Both of them supported the respondents that they required the property in dispute for personal use. While appearing as his own witness Muhammad Shafi, respondent, corroborated the averments made in the petition. In cross-examination, he stated that a house was constructed by his sons in which there were three shops but these were incomplete. The appellant in the statement conceded that the shops were without shutters. It is to be noticed that these shops belonged to the sons of Muhammad Shafi, respondent, and as per evidence are still incomplete. The objection raised by the appellant's learned counsel, that the respondents have other shops at their disposal is without any merits. It may be observed to notice that a landlord owning more than one property is entitled to lay hand on any unit for personal use and his choice in this respect cannot be curtailed.
6. So far as the appellant's evidence is concerned, he examined two witnesses, namely, Muhammad Khan, R. W. 1, and Taj Muhammad, R. W. 2, but their evidence does not inspire confidence. As observed above, the learned Rent Controller has discarded the appellant's evidence with which the learned District Judge concurred. I have no reason to differ with them.
7. There is no misreading or ignoring of evidence for which there is no scope in second appeal. The Rent Controller in his order dated 31st January, 1979 did make a brief mention of the appellants evidence but he regarded it as unconvincing. Even the learned District Judge in they impugned order has observed that the appellant failed to produce any cogent evidence. It is, therefore, not possible to intervene on the ground that the evidence was not discussed by the Courts below. The impugned order may be lacking in contents but certainly not in soundness. Anyhow, E I have myself examined the evidence and I find that the respondents have succeeded in establishing that they required the property bona fide for personal use.
8. There is no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed in limine.
9. The respondents entered appearance through their learned counsel in pursuance of the notice served on them in the C. M. Their learned counsel has no objection if time is allowed to the appellant to vacate the demised premises. Accordingly, the appellant is directed to band over the possession of the demised premises to the respondents within two months.