1. WAHIDUDDIN AHMAD, J.-The petitioner is occupying shop No. 365 in Sadar Bazar, Sialkot, as a tenant. Respondent No. 3 who claims to be the transferee of the property from the Settlement Department as an auction-purchaser has filed an application for the ejectment of the petitioner under sec--tion 17 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The petitioner is resisting this application. On the pleadings of the parties, the following two preliminary issues were framed :-
(1) Whether respondent No. 1 is entitled to a notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958.
(2) Whether respondent No. 1 was entitled to any notice under section 17 (4) (b) (3) of Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, and what is the effect of non-service.
2. The learned Rent Controller, by his order dated the 6th March 1970, has decided both theissues against the petitioner. An appeal filed against this order was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sialkot, on the 9th September 1970. The petitioner challenged this order in Writ Petition No. 1577 of 1970, in the Lahore High Court.
3. The main contention of the petitioner is that as he sells books of educational and cultural values, the respondent is not entitled to evict him from the premises in dispute unless be is given notice of two years under the proviso to section 17 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963. This conten- -tion was repelled by the High Court. It came to the con--clusion that the petitioner's case does not fall within the ambit of the proviso and therefore, he was not entitled to any statutory notice before his eviction. This order is being challenged in this petition for special leave to appeal.
4. In support of the petition, Mian Bashir Zafar, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the High Court has erred in thinking that no notice was necessary under clause (b) (iii) of subsection (4) of section 17 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act. He contended that the above provision of law should be read in wider sense and the case of the petitioner falls within the proviso of section 17 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel, the proviso to section -17 is reproduced below :- "Provided also that this subsection shall not apply to Sarais, hotels, Dak bungalows, lodging- houses, boarding houses, residential clubs, restaurants, eating-houses, cafes, refreshment. Rooms and places of public recreation or resort or premises dealing in sales or production of materials of books of educational and cultural values except where the landlord requires any such building to carry on any such business of his own, in which case he may make an apple--cation under this sub-section after having served two years notice on the tenant ; but no building which is not, on the commencement of this Act, being used for any of the aforesaid purpose, or has not after such commencement been let out expressly for any such purpose, shall be converted to any such purpose except with the consent in writing of the landlord."
5. The learned counsel contended that the words in the above proviso "premises dealing in sales or production of materials of books of educational and cultural values" covers the case of the petitioner. It is admitted that the petitioner is selling books of educational and cultural values.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the words in the above proviso "premises dealing in sales of production of materials of books or educational and cultural values" should not be read in literal sense but should be read in a wider sense as the object of the Legislature in the enactment of the said provision was to afford protection to the pursuit of educational and cultural activities and to save them from sudden disruption in the larger interest of the community. He further contended that in case where literal interpretation is likely to lead to manifest absurdity or to rob the relevant provision of any reasonable meaning, the Courts were competent to ascertain the intention of the Legislature and give full effect to the same. The contention of the learned counsel has received our anxious consideration. Unfor--tunately, the protection afforded by the proviso applies only to "premises dealing in sales or production of materials of books of educational and cultural values". It does not apply to premises where only books are sold. If the contention of the learned counsel is accepted then in interpreting the relevant provision of law we shall have to delete the word "materials". This in our opinion is not permissible according to the well-known principles of interpretation of statutes. The High Court has rightly observed that the Court cannot go behind the language of the law when there is no ambiguity. The language in the present case in the proviso in question is not ambiguous and, therefore, the principles urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be applied. We are satisfied that the High Court was right in observing that the protection extends to premises dealing in sales or production of materials of books and not in sales of books as such. We, therefore, find no merit in the petition which is dismissed.